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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, I argue for a move from the preoccupation with the obvious 
(crude and quantifiable impacts), towards critically examining the subtle (less 
than obvious impacts), which will allow us to deal with adversities (the likes of 
HIV and AIDS) in the most effective ways. The thesis adopts the summative 
governance framework to demonstrate how our preoccupation with the 
quantifiable impacts shrouds our intellectual and practical ability to deal with 
the subtle impacts of AIDS. Governance is hypothesised to emerge amidst 
turbulent, unpredictable, messy, complex and dynamic path conditions 
predicated upon certain orders of criticality, including but not limited to the 
process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. The thesis suggests 
that the evolution of governance from nascent to fully institutionalised 
mechanisms of control is in itself a product of the evolution of knowledge. 
Notwithstanding, HIV and AIDS constrain the emergence of governance 
through impacting the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. 
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Resultantly, these impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the sectoral 
governances, but are summative, intergenerational and structured, and 
potentially endanger the fundamental systems of governance. The pre and 
post independence induced vulnerabilities of Namibia are presented to 
demonstrate that the country is an engrossing, but yet a perilous mix of the 
past and the present. Whilst Namibia aspires for a democratic, non-racial, 
progressive society, the thesis demonstrates that due to constraints 
engendered by HIV and AIDS this proceeds on terms and conditions that by 
no means guarantee a happy outcome. 
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SECTION	  I:	   CONCEPTUALISATION	  
	   	   	   	   	  
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Background and justification 
 
In an effort to demonstrate the subtle but yet perilous impacts of HIV and 
AIDS on societal systems of rules that foster order and stability, I set out 
to advance the argument that, in the most severely affected countries of 
the world, the impact of HIV and AIDS on the various levels of systems of 
governances cannot be viewed as merely additive but must be 
understood as summative. The summative governance framework is 
considered- and thus adopted for this thesis- to best approximate the 
impacts of HIV and AIDS, as they move through societies’ governance 
structures in varying horizontal and vertical densities. The thesis is rooted 
in the notion that whilst disruptions to societal order are sometimes visible 
to the eye, many are rendered visible only by a more inquisitive gaze. 
This is not hard to see, because human civilisations, despite their level of 
development, self-consistently generates complex problems, requiring 
insights into the extent to which the social, cultural, political and economic 
systems can tolerate such complex problems and rapid changes without 
them succumbing. The conceptualisation of the impacts of HIV and AIDS 
on governance as ‘summative’ helps us understand how rapid, pervasive 
and subtle changes- such as those engendered by HIV and AIDS- are 
capable of disrupting the stable continuance of societies. By utilising the 
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governance framework that views governance as a summative 
phenomenon, we begin to comprehend the extent to which HIV and AIDS 
subtly disrupts societal coherence of nations most afflicted by HIV and 
AIDS.  
 
Governance is viewed (in this thesis) as a summative phenomenon, in 
that the various systems of governances from a higher to a lower order 
interact “between actors on micro, meso, and macro levels of socio-
political aggregation”.1 Rosenau proposed the term summative 
governance in order to reflect the complex interplay and interdependence 
of the various systems, which not only involves flows, consequences and 
causation within the systems but also involves sustaining flows across the 
systems.2 Governance in this context encompasses what Knight calls the 
complex web of multi-level governance structures”.3 And whilst scholars 
admit that it is important, from a conceptual point of view, to recognise the 
various governances related to a specific arena of activity- that is sectoral 
governances- in the grand scheme of things, governance must be seen 
as the totality of all these sectoral governances and thus a summative 
phenomenon.4 In a sense, Simon’s concept of architecture of complexity 
captures the summative governance framework more clearly. Simon 
argued that “complex systems (such as governance) have some form of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jan Kooiman (ed), Modern governance: new government-society interactions, in Jan 
Kooiman, Modern governance. New government: Society interactions, (Sage: London, 
1993), p. 41 
2 James N. Rosenau, Governance in the 21st century, in Jim Whitman (ed), Global 
governance (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2009) 
3 Andy W. Knight, Global governance as a summative phenomenon, in Jim Whitman 
(ed), Global Governance (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2009), pp160-188 
4 For a detailed discussion of sectoral governances see Jim Whitman, Global 
governance as a sector-specific management, in Jim Whitman (ed) Global governance 
(Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2009) 
	   -­‐3-­‐	  
hierarchical structure, that is, a structure within a structure, within a 
structure”.5 His hypothesis is that complex systems are characterised by 
a multi-level structure, each of which depends, in an aggregate way, on 
each other.6 Governance is therefore much more than the sum of all the 
sectoral governances, but more specifically about how these structures 
interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities.   
 
In a broader context, the thesis defines governance as the overall 
mechanisms of social order that emerges amidst turbulent, unpredictable, 
messy, complex and dynamic path conditions predicated upon certain 
orders of criticality, including, but not limited to, the process of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. I view 
knowledge as the necessary condition for the various actors of 
governance from a lower to a higher order to interact between actors on 
the micro, meso and macro level of socio-political aggregation. However, 
the systems of governance and the knowledge that sustains their 
evolution and stability are highly vulnerable to disruptions and 
fragmentations. And there is no evidence that suggest that we have 
started understanding these vulnerabilities, particularly in the context of 
HIV and AIDS. My contention is that neither the governance literature, nor 
the HIV and AIDS literature takes sufficient account of the impact of HIV 
and AIDS on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer and its implication for both sectoral and summative governances, 
and the serious implication for governance at the state level. Thus, there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Herbert A. Simon, The architecture of complexity, Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, 106 (6), (1962), pp. 467-482 
6 Ibid. 
	   -­‐4-­‐	  
exists a need to improve our understanding of the underlying impact of 
HIV and AIDS on the interplay between the formal and informal, private 
and public and institutional and non-institutional governances, but more 
specifically how this is likely affected through the loss of intergenerational 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In this context, whilst 
summative governance is the way in which the various levels of 
governance interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities, the 
process of knowledge formation greases the wheel that allows these 
systems to interact and evolve smoothly. I refer to this as one of the 
orders of criticality for governance- in other words, it is a socio-political 
condition that must be maintained for there to be a continuous evolution 
of governance from a nascent to fully institutionalised systems of 
governance. I view governance as a product of knowledge and that its 
emergence must be seen in the context of the historical progression of 
knowledge. In virtually all of the informal and nascent systems of 
governance, knowledge is transmitted from individual to individual 
because it is largely tacit. Tacit in that it is not codified and therefore 
cannot be specified or easily transferred between people and is usually 
carried in strings of symbolically encoded meanings. Whilst language is 
an important tool that enables the sharing of knowledge, Michael Polanyi 
proposed that we often know how to do things without being able to 
articulate what we know in precise language. Such knowledge, in its 
broader sense, exists in the form of rules, norms, beliefs, customs 
created to protect populations by influencing accountability and 
legitimacy. Similarly, knowledge relates to how formal or institutionalised 
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systems of governance are run and how key tasks are most efficiently 
performed within them. It involves a collective set of facts, concepts, 
experiences, and know-how held by individuals. These are memories that 
transcend specific technical skills and require ongoing transmission 
among people in an organisation. Utilising Polanyi’s theory, I have 
postulated such knowledge as tacit in that it extends beyond and cannot 
be reduced to writing and thus cannot be inscribed in documents, books, 
manuals or journals. 
 
Conceptual Frameworks 
 
The thesis presents governance in its broader context as the overall 
mechanism of social order. It advances the idea that governance not only 
encompasses the work of government, but also includes other command 
mechanisms that perform functions, irrespective of whether these have 
evolved institutions. The functions are ever present and self-evident, and 
include such things as coping with external threats, avoiding conflicts, 
maintaining law and order and providing food to ensure survival of the 
human species.7 In positing that all these actors of governance be 
recognised and their interdependence acknowledged, both in the 
domestic and international arenas, I argue that governance is a 
continuous process of evolution that runs in a continuum from a nascent 
to fully institutionalised mechanism of control. Thus, governance emerges 
out of path-dependence conditions and passes through a lengthy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, and James N. Rosenau, Governance without government: Order 
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
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evolution and as Rosenau puts it; “is more likely to evolve out of bottom-
up than top-down processes”.8 From a broader perspective, governance 
is the totality of all the governances and thus a summative phenomenon. 
Whilst this framework may not sufficiently capture the complexities of the 
relationships of the various governances, Rosenau coined the summative 
governance framework as a first step to help us reconceptualise the 
interactions of the various actors from a higher to a lower order towards a 
self-regulating and self-organising state. Whilst the term summative 
governance is largely cited within the global governance literature due to 
the complexities of the global system and the inability of international 
governance institutions to adequately respond to world problems, I have 
nonetheless argued that the term also best describes the governance of 
the domestic. I posit that the domestic, as with the global, consists of 
some kind of collage networks of governances because what appears in 
the international arena reflects the complexities of the sphere of the 
“local”, the only difference is that it is all these on a global scale. 
Therefore summative governance is the sum of all the formal, non-formal, 
state and non-state governances at both the global and local levels.  
 
Additional to the summative governance framework, I have adopted 
Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge as the best framework to explicate the 
process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within the 
governance systems. Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge asserts that 
because not all knowledge can be articulated by verbal means as it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 James, N. Rosenau, Along the domestic-foreign frontier: Exploring governance in a 
turbulent world, (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1997), p. 152 
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rooted in tacit knowledge, transfer of such knowledge requires constant 
contact and interaction between people. My interest in the theory of tacit 
knowledge lies in Polanyi’s expression that ‘we believe more than what 
we can prove and know more than what we can tell’. This expression 
captures the complexity of the process by which knowledge is transferred 
because it cannot be understood by looking at how people communicate 
verbally. This is not hard to understand because, as Jackson reminds us, 
“[t]he knowledge whereby one lives is not necessarily identical with the 
knowledge whereby one explains life”.9 This is the case because 
humanity emerges primarily through our everyday, practical engagement 
with the world rather than through a contemplative reflection upon the 
world. Accordingly, the knowledge whereby one lives is thus largely tacit 
and consequently embodied and as Polanyi would say, it is ineffable. 
Ineffability in the theory of tacit knowledge is taken literally in that nothing 
can be said precisely. This is the hard to articulate knowledge with formal 
language, and therefore cannot be articulated in grammatical statements, 
mathematical expressions, specifications, manuals and so forth. It is the 
type “embedded in individual experience and involves intangible factors 
such as personal belief, perspective and value system…”10 It is therefore 
manifested in collective set of facts, concepts, experiences and know-
how. Such knowledge is regularly transmitted between members of a 
family and organisation through regular contacts and interactions. As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Michael Jackson, Introduction: phenomenology, radical empiricism, and 
anthropological critique. In Michael Jackson (ed), Things as they are: new directions in 
phenomenological anthropology, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), p.2 
10 Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, Knowledge creating company: how Japanese 
companies create the dynamic innovation, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), p. viii 
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Polanyi posits, “an art that cannot be specified in detail cannot be passed 
on by prescription since no such prescription exist for it”.11  It follows that 
it can be passed only through regular contacts and interactions, for 
example from a master to an apprentice. The problem is that HIV and 
AIDS restrain such contacts and interactions, because as I shall discuss 
in later chapters, HIV and AIDS has located itself among the drivers of 
the governance systems, that is, the economically active generations- 
those in their prime economically productive and sexually active years. 
 
Concomitantly, I have developed a summative impact framework to 
capture the impacts of HIV and AIDS as they move through the various 
waves, with such impacts being circular within and across the various 
structures of governance. The framework demonstrates that the waves of 
impact are omnipresent and starts with people getting infected, thereby 
increasing morbidity and mortality in these key institutions. Morbidity and 
mortality reduces worker productivity in these key institutions at the same 
time that it reduces household wealth and affects school enrolments. 
From the government point of view the cumulative impact is that human 
capital accumulation is impaired.  When this happens, the institutional 
ability to deal with the very agent that is weakening it is undermined. 
Demonstrably, HIV and AIDS have become a complex vicious circle that 
reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout the social and 
institutional structures of governance. These are no longer only 
projections, because evidences are piling up that governments’ ability to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Michael Polanyi, Personal knowledge, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 
p.53 
	   -­‐9-­‐	  
deal with the epidemic has been weakened; children no longer attend 
school as a result of being orphaned or being sick; teachers are dying as 
a result of AIDS and organisations are losing employees due to HIV 
related illnesses and death. The fact that people are not falling dead in 
streets cannot be seen as a sign of the ability of nations to deal with HIV 
and AIDS. The ameliorative powers of antiretroviral (ARV) therapy have 
evidently changed people’s perception of the devastating impact of HIV 
and AIDS. But, I argue that ARVs may have offered us with a temporary 
reprieve because the impacts of HIV and AIDS are yet to be felt in the 
coming years. There are no certainties about the longer-term survival of 
people on ARV treatment, albeit the only certainty is that they will 
eventually die, though they may have lived a little longer. When, as the 
current estimates suggests, 15% of the teaching profession of circa 
26,000 being infected with HIV, we are reminded that in these severely 
affected countries, unless a cure is found, the only viable option is to 
reverse the spread of HIV through intensive behavioural change 
interventions. Paradoxically, when teachers are infected with HIV and die 
of AIDS, it not only raises problems in terms of creating institutional gaps, 
but the very system that is key to imparting the knowledge- which 
knowledge is also necessary to reverse the spread of HIV- is weakened.  
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Research Methodology 
 
Research question and objectives 
 
My contention is that neither the governance literature nor the HIV and 
AIDS literature takes sufficient account of the impact of the pandemic on 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and its 
implication for both sectoral and summative governances and the serious 
implications for governance at the sate level. The key issue is to show 
that one of the major ways in which HIV and AIDS has an impact on 
governance in severely affected countries is through its effects on 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. I argue that 
such impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the sectoral 
governances, but are structured, endangering fundamental systems of 
governance. Therefore, the research aims to address the following 
question: how HIV and AIDS impact governance, by impacting on the 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer within the 
various systems of governance and more importantly on how these affect 
the interplay between these systems from a lower to a higher order, that 
is, the interplay between the formal, non-formal, state and non-state 
governances.  
 
Major objectives of this thesis are to demonstrate that; i) the necessity of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the 
purposes of sectoral and summative governance is generally assumed, ii) 
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that the complex governances, both formal and informal, high and low, 
that provide and sustain intergenerational knowledge are highly 
vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations and iii) in the event where 
this has become evident, as in the case of HIV and AIDS, our 
understanding of the foundation of governance, both sectoral and 
summative is impoverished.  
 
Moreover, the governance literature is silent on the imperative of 
intergenerational knowledge to the functioning of the various systems of 
governance. The concept is even less understood in the literature on HIV 
and AIDS.  Therefore utilising the concept of intergenerational knowledge 
as one of the important lenses through which the impact of HIV and AIDS 
on governance can be understood serves multiple purposes. It not only 
helps us understand the imperative of intergenerational knowledge to 
governance, but also helps us conceptualise the flow of impacts across 
the various levels of governance- for the reason that intergenerational 
knowledge is the key factor for the continuous evolution of governance 
and its emergence from long run equilibria of processes. It also serves to 
underlie its necessity for the various systems of governance, from a 
higher to a lower order, to interact between actors on micro-, meso-, and 
macro-levels of socio-political aggregation.  
 
Unfortunately there are major gaps in knowledge on the interactions of 
the various systems of governance in Namibia and why, because of their 
inherent interdependency, the effects of HIV and AIDS are likely to be far-
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reaching. In fact, there is little research about the impact of HIV and AIDS 
on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and 
whether we have started comprehensively addressing these core issues. 
I believe that if we are to bring true knowledge regarding the complexities 
of the operations of social systems, whether individually or collectively, 
there must be a fundamental change in our outlook of things, and thus 
acknowledge that human problems are not simple, they are complex. 
Besides, I hope that focusing on the theme of knowledge, in terms of its 
necessity to sustain governance systems, I will keep alive an issue, which 
I believe has received less attention than what it deserves and that I am 
not only adding to knowledge as it relates to the subject of this thesis, but 
that I am contributing to a higher goal- the constant search for truth of all 
things (political, economic, social, religious, personal and environmental), 
which bear greater significance in our lives. Perhaps adopting the 
intergenerational knowledge framework also serves another higher 
purpose- in as much as we know the multifaceted nature of the impacts of 
HIV and AIDS, such knowledge is ineffable in that we are unable to 
articulate these impacts clearly. 
 
Justifying the case study and the education sector as the 
quintessence of the flow of impacts in Namibia 
 
Namibia is in an unenviable position of belonging to one of hyper 
endemic countries with 18.8% of the population testing positive during the 
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2010 Sentinel Survey.12 Sadly, HIV has also located itself among the 
young people. Whilst it is increasingly recognised that young people are 
the greatest hope for turning the tide against AIDS, the overall HIV 
prevalence for the age group 15–24 years is alarmingly 10.3%. The 
epidemic is concentrated in three geographical areas of the northwest, 
north and central districts. These areas have high mobile populations, or 
are border entry or exit points. The geographical variations also mean 
that the epidemic is not evenly spread across the country, with some 
areas showing emerging epidemic, others show declining epidemic, 
whilst some others show increasing epidemic. With the fist case of HIV 
reported in 1986, the epidemic spread like wildfire, with the first official 
Sentinel Survey carried out in 1992 reporting 4.2% prevalence among 
pregnant women, before reaching a peak of 22% in 2002. Since 2002, it 
appears the epidemic across Namibia is stabilizing around 18-20%, but 
such stabilization could either likely be due to statistical abnormalities or 
reflect an appalling equilibrium with the number of people dying equaling 
those being infected. Moreover, the extent of the epidemic is not known 
because Namibia is yet to carry out a comprehensive population based 
testing. As I shall explain, the current Sentinel Survey, which tests 
pregnant women, is fraught with deficiencies of measurement. Despite all 
the efforts, reducing new infections- the only viable solution in the 
absence of cure- has proven illusive. It has often been commented that 
as elsewhere in Africa, patterns of sexual behaviour in Namibia are 
embedded in complex and often opaque social relations, which, in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2010 National Sentinel Survey, (Windhoek, 
2010) 
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different respects and to differing degrees, may favour or hinder viral 
transmission in various parts of the country.13 Therefore sustained 
inroads against the epidemics in all likelihood have remained inadequate 
because these social templates are less understood and continue to be 
reproduced.14 Be that is it may, HIV and AIDS are likely to remain de 
facto threats to the Namibian people for the foreseeable future.  
 
Namibia also provides a good case study because, besides being one of 
the countries severely affected by HIV and AIDS, there is a way in which 
the various levels of governance are closely intertwined, such that 
impacts are easily replicated across these governance systems. It follows 
that once a crack appears in one structure of governance, all others are 
readily affected. The inherent fragility of the governance systems has 
been occasioned by years of colonial and apartheid rule. Namibia’s 
societal dimensions of its mnescope15 (a term used widely by Reinhart 
Kossler, a leading scholar on Namibian history, which term I use here in 
reference to our visual memories on the past) represent social and 
cultural juxtaposition resulting from an evolution spanning a period of over 
100 years. For instance, the consequences of the land dispossession and 
labour migrant system shaped the institution of the family to an extent 
that scholars agree that this provided the prelude to the culture of 
polygamy, violence against women and child neglect in Namibia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Nana Poku, AIDS in Africa: How the poor are dying, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006) 
14 Jane Freedman and Nana Poku, The socioeconomic context of Africa’s vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS, Review of International Studies, 31, (2005), pp. 665-686 
15 The term mnescope refers to our visual memories of the past and is adopted from 
Reinhart Kossler, Facing a Fragmented Past, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
33(2), (2007), pp.361-382 
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Therefore, the vulnerability of the family unit to HIV and AIDS must thus 
be understood in the context of the historical progression of the interplay 
between social processes and economic and political factors. In the 
context of HIV transmission, this has far-reaching consequences. 
Pernicious and overtly racially ranked hierarchies endorsed and enforced 
during apartheid are often cited as reasons for higher incidences of rape 
of women and girls in Namibia.16 The general admittance is that the 
apartheid system denied the women and girl child from taking part in 
economic affairs, effectively subordinating women to lower economic 
status than men. Today sexual relation reflects men’s generally superior 
economic position and access to resources. For most women, lower 
economic status sometimes results in them engaging in risky sexual 
relations, inter alia, transactional sex. Women are particularly vulnerable 
to unsafe sexual activities within such sexual relationships due to their 
weaker bargaining position relative to their male partners. Women tend to 
use their limited bargaining power to negotiate for higher economic gains 
instead of safe sexual practices increasing their risk for contracting HIV. 
Therefore, the issue of vulnerability to HIV and AIDS for these systems of 
governance cannot be divorced from the enduring struggle for the 
independence of Namibia, and as I shall demonstrate in later chapters, 
this is applicable to all other structures and levels of governance. 
 
Similarly, after independence, Namibia adopted an education system that 
served to re-enforce the interdependency of the vulnerabilities of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Helen Moffett, ‘These Women, They Force Us to Rape Them’: Rape as Narrative of 
Social Control in Post-Apartheid South Africa. Journal of Southern African Studies, 
32(1), (2006), pp. 129-144 
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various structures of governance. In its totality, the education system 
encompasses a whole spectrum of governance systems. At the lowest 
level of the education structure is the circuits and clusters, then the 
schools at the meso level. At the macro level is The Ministry of Education 
(including the seven directorates). Besides being one of the institutions of 
governance at the nation state, the Ministry of Education is solely 
responsible for the implementation of education in Namibia- in the sense 
that private education is limited only to a few, and constitutes only a 
marginal fraction (5-6%) of all schools in the country. Coupled with the 
fact that the Ministry of Education employs 10,000 of the 96,000 public 
service employees (or 3% of the total workforce of 334,000), making the 
government the largest employer and education the biggest sector in 
Namibia, there is no better place to demonstrate the impact of HIV and 
AIDS as it moves through the various governances. There is an intrinsic 
mutual dependency between government and the people at every level of 
socio-political aggregation. In the context of HIV and AIDS, these are 
important factors and must enter the frame of mind when analysing how 
the various social systems interact in varying horizontal and vertical 
densities, because this bears upon the nature of their vulnerability to HIV 
and AIDS. It follows that the impact of HIV and AIDS is not only limited to 
this sector, but filters through to the other governance structures almost 
unhindered. Therefore using the Ministry of Education to demonstrate the 
impact of HIV and AIDS on governance serves multiple purposes: First, 
due to the interdependency of the school system and the Ministry of 
Education, there is no better way to demonstrate the interactions of the 
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various systems from a lower to higher order, that is, to describe the fact 
that the interdependence not only involves flows, consequences and 
causations across the systems, but that they also sustain such flows. 
Second, using the school system and in combination with the Ministry of 
Education provides for the best setting to capture the complex flow of 
impacts of HIV and AIDS across the various systems of governance and 
the overall implication for the fundamental systems of governance, which 
system includes the Ministry of Education as one of the most important 
institutions of governance at the level of nation state. Third, it offers the 
most appropriate platform to discuss the framework of knowledge 
formation, retention and transfer because, in totality, the school system 
and the Ministry of Education are the key social mechanisms for the 
process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer 
in their continuum from the family, school, local governance, to the level 
of political institutions of governance. 
 
It follows that the education system is the quintessence of the flow of 
impact from the lower levels to the higher levels of socio-political 
aggregation in Namibia. 
 
Philosophical consideration and methodological construction 
 
The ensuing debate in the social sciences has been focusing on which 
paradigm best describes the social world, with each of them having their 
own assumptions about the nature of reality. Whilst these are too diverse, 
	   -­‐18-­‐	  
the two extremes are the interpretivism and the positivism. The 
ontological perspective of positivism is that reality is independent of the 
researcher and thus objects of study are external to the researcher. The 
view is that objects have intrinsic meaning, and knowledge is a reflection 
of a correspondence to reality, and thus knowledge should be stable, 
“because the essential properties of objects are knowable and relatively 
unchanging”.17 The ontological perspective of interpretivism on the other 
hand is that the knowledge people build reflects their particular goals, 
culture, experience, history, and so on, that is, they intentionally 
constitute knowledge.18 It follows that the researcher cannot be separated 
from reality, and therefore the researcher and the objects of study are 
inseparable. Whilst these presents the two extremes in the ontological 
continuum about the nature of reality, my research leans towards the 
interpretivist paradigm and specifically draws from the work of critical 
realism (CR), first proposed by Roy Bashkar. Critical Realism holds that 
the social world, though socially constructed, is a social product that 
people reproduce and transform. Whilst CR diverts from the strictly 
interpretivist approach in that it views social objects (such as governance) 
as “typically structured and intransitive, that is irreducible to patterns of 
events and active independently of their identification by men”,19 it 
regards the social world as open and context dependent and therefore 
can only be studied by qualitative methods. CR is clear on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 David H. Jonassen, Evaluating constructivistic learning, Educational Technology, 31, 
(1991), pp. 28-33,  
18 Ron Weber, The rhetoric of positivism versus interpretivism: a personal view, MIS 
Quarterly, 28 (1), (2004), pp. iii-xii,  
19 Roy Bashkar, The possibility of naturalism, (Trowbridge and Esher: Redwood Burn 
Limited, 1979), p. 14 
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inappropriate use of quantitative methods of research in the social 
sciences, because as Sayer puts it, quantification of objects implies that 
objects must be qualitatively invariant, that is, they can be added and 
subtracted without changing their nature.20 This creates a particular 
problem because in the social world, we cannot have certainty of the 
stability of objects, as they are context-dependent. In studying the object 
of governance and what makes it vulnerable to HIV and AIDS, the first 
and foremost question is whether governance is reducible to qualitatively 
unchanging entities, in other words, whether it can be added and 
subtracted without changing its nature. Obviously, it cannot be argued 
that governance is qualitatively invariant, because in studying the powers 
and liabilities of governance, a critical analysis is required and as critical 
realists would say, the ability of quantitative methods to critically examine 
objects is minimal as quantitative research leans towards the use of 
causal language, which misses the point as mathematics, at least as a 
language, is causal and astructural. In other words, “it lacks the category 
of producing, generating or forcing”, which critical realist take to denote 
causality.21 Therefore the major question was whether the objects of my 
study will pass the test of being qualitatively invariant to be studied using 
quantitative methods. In view of governance as a summative 
phenomenon and its irreducibility, it is clear that these cannot be added 
and subtracted without changing their nature, because as I have referred 
to earlier, these phenomena are context-dependent.22  It is clear that my 
research must critically evaluate the powers, and more specifically the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. P. 179 
22 Andrew Sayer, Method in social science, (London: Roudledge, 1992) 
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knowledge liabilities of governance structure as a result of HIV and AIDS. 
The question was; what powers do the governance structures possess 
that makes them withstand the impact of HIV and AIDS? This is what CR 
denotes as the mechanisms of objects, their causal powers to generate 
change when activated.  
 
Therefore the research took on the qualitative approach, and contains 
both the elements of being descriptive and explanatory. Descriptive in the 
sense that the aim was simply to describe and “not to develop 
explanations…. (therefore) problems of causation, of causal order of the 
influence of uncontrolled variable do not matter”.23 At the same time the 
research aims to collect data to establish the relationship between HIV 
and AIDS and the loss of intergenerational knowledge within the 
institutions of governance using the education system as an example of 
how HIV and AIDS affect the interactions of the various systems from a 
lower to a higher order. I have adopted some aspects of Grounded 
Theory (GT) as the analytical framework for this study. The key 
motivation for the adoption of GT is because I have decided to enter into 
an unknown territory of the impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer and its implication for 
summative governance. Whilst literature on HIV and AIDS is 
unprecedented, in that scores of books, articles, journals, manuals, 
encyclopaedias, have been written about HIV and AIDS since the 
summer of 1981 when the epidemic was discovered, none so far have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 David A. De Vaus, Research Design in Social Research (London: Sage Publications, 
2001), p. 195 
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looked at the impact of HIV and AIDS on summative governance, 
particularly in terms of how this is likely impacted by the loss of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. This is the 
case because I have alleviated knowledge to the level of criticality for the 
systems of governance to interact between actors on micro, meso, and 
macro levels of socio-political aggregation. Therefore, utilising the GT 
method to develop a theory on the relationship between summative 
governance, knowledge formation and HIV and AIDS seemed the most 
appropriate approach. Because GT’s central tenet is the “discovery of 
theory from data systematically obtained from social research”24, one can 
argue that even if the various frameworks were adopted for this research, 
the ultimate goal is to discover a theory of how HIV and AIDS impact the 
summative governance through impacting knowledge formation, retention 
and transfer within the structures of governance.  In this regard, my role 
was to understand what is going on on the ground by observing, 
conversing and interviewing. These techniques are viewed as key tools 
by GT.  Perhaps the theory that I will develop, as GT would say, may not 
be completely contested or replaced by another theory since it is too 
intimately linked to the data. 
 
Data Collection and sampling 
 
Data collection started with a review of literature of existing documents, 
reports and data on HIV and AIDS within the structures of governance as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid. p. 2 
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defined by the thesis. Whilst the fierce debate rages on in GT on whether 
literature should be used before the research or not, or whether literature 
is necessary and inescapable, I have rather adopted the latter argument 
and utilised literature as emergent, in that it was used to provide more 
insight into the phenomenon of my study in order to establish the current 
state of understanding about the various frameworks. The literature was 
also viewed to get an in-depth understanding of how HIV and AIDS affect 
the governance systems in varying horizontal and vertical densities and 
linked to the summative governance framework, though I must admit 
such literature was few and far between.  
 
Following literature review, 17 one-on-one interviews were conducted 
across the various structures of the Ministry of Education (MoE) with 
administrators, workplace programme managers, teachers, managers, 
training managers and other senior personnel of the education system in 
Namibia. A senior government member in the Office of the Prime Minister 
responsible for the Public Sector HIV and AIDS Workplace and Wellness 
Programme was also interviewed. A purposive sample technique was 
used and therefore respondents were chosen on the basis of their 
relevance to the research and were sampled by referral method. The aim 
was to try as much as possible to cover respondents from the lowest to 
the highest level of governance systems. Key informant interviews lasted 
minimum 45 minutes and maximum 95 minutes. In addition to the 17 key 
informants, two focus groups discussions, consisting of five participants 
(teachers) and six participants (administrators and teachers) respectively 
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were also conducted at the selected school in the Kavango Region of 
Namibia. In total, 28 people (17 key informants and 11 as part of the 
FGDs) were interviewed. The major motivation for conducting both key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions in this particular study 
was to compare and contrast responses in a more private and relaxed 
environment- as is the case with individual interviews- and a group setting 
where respondents could verify and challenge individual responses. In 
this way I could use group discussions to verify certain responses 
provided during individual interviews. Information obtained from key 
informants could be expanded, clarified, confirmed and reflected upon 
during focus group discussions. In combination the individual interviews 
and focus group discussions proved useful as they allow me to explore 
and probe participants responses in order to gather more in-depth data. 
All interviews were carried out between June and November 2011. The 
cooperation rate and understanding of the research purpose was very 
high among all respondents.  
 
Whilst the research is mainly a desk review and analysis of the various 
documents, interviews also proved useful for chapters six and seven as 
the responses provided valuable insights into the current understanding 
of the factors fuelling the epidemic and the impact of HIV and AIDS on 
the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. The 
interviews also served to demonstrate that the necessity of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the 
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purposes of both sectoral and summative governance is generally 
assumed and not well understood. 
 
Limitations of the research 
 
Although this thesis has several methodological limitations, it aims to offer 
various insights into an important issue, which I felt was neglected for far 
too long. Because I have opted to enter an unknown area for which little 
or no research has been done, problems of appropriate methodology and 
sampling became prevalent from the onset. Therefore, in judging the 
merits of this thesis, several limitations should be noted. The first is 
methodological and related to the appropriateness of the sampling 
procedure and sampling size in terms of whether this will help to 
adequately reflect what is actually happening on the ground. Second, 
whilst I first set out to demonstrate how empirically HIV and AIDS affect 
summative governance by impacting on the process of knowledge 
formation, retention and transfer, the thesis is biased towards secondary 
data analysis. The little empirical work conducted in this field also 
required that, first and foremost, I spend a great deal of time 
conceptualising the research question and related hypotheses. Third, the 
complexity of the research question provided the need for creative 
analysis and interpretation of the existing materials, thereby limiting the 
available time to collect sufficient primary data. Fourth, this study was 
primarily limited by its sample size. The participants provided a narrow 
range of the various systems of governance, and therefore was limited to 
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the schooling system. Ideally, in demonstrating the impact of HIV and 
AIDS as they impact summative governance, it would require that this be 
empirically demonstrated by analyzing the circular impacts of each of 
these structures in isolation, and then collectively. Fifth, the questions 
asked during key informant and focus group discussions were in many 
respects too general, because the issue being addressed was unknown 
to many of the respondents, resulting in the use of proxy indicators about 
respondents’ perception of how HIV and AIDS affects intergenerational 
knowledge. Therefore responses may not effectively capture the real 
intergenerational knowledge gaps created by HIV and AIDS. Despite 
these limitations, the thesis provides some evidence of the subtle impact 
of HIV and AIDS on the societal structures that sustain order and 
continuity. 
 
Ethical Issues 
 
The subject of my research gives rise to ethical concerns as it not only 
involves human subjects, but also deals with a sensitive public health 
problem. The known ethical concerns include harm to participants 
because talking about HIV and AIDS often invites emotional reactions 
and in a generalised epidemic, everyone is either infected or affected in 
one way or the other, as is the case with Namibia. Some of the 
participants may already know their status and the interview may 
“confront (them) with the severity of their illness and lack of prospects in 
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their future life”.25  Another generally known concern is that of invasion of 
privacy.  This is particularly relevant in the context of this research as 
people may feel that talking about HIV is too private. My research 
experience in Namibia shows that if people are given full information 
about the purpose of the research and feel adequately protected and 
respected, they are normally willing to participate.  All participants on this 
research gave full consent; and a request for anonymity was respected. 
In addition, whilst the research also refers to intergenerational knowledge 
within family as a key institution of governance, no interviews were 
carried out with people in family settings or children.  
 
Another ethical issue not only relates to concerns about the subjects, but 
with the conceptualisation of my research topic. The European Union 
(EU) Code of Ethics acknowledges that “conducting ethical research is 
not necessarily easy…. and researchers have to make difficult decisions 
and address complex ethical dilemmas (that) may emerge before, during 
or after the research project is completed”.26  Notably, my research gives 
rise to the “before” ethical dilemma of what constitutes the most 
appropriate “research topic”, that is, what is worth researching in the 
context of Namibia and its vulnerabilities as a developing nation.  The 
challenge pertains to the acceptability of this research because, to some 
degree, it entails linking HIV and AIDS to state vulnerability. According to 
Walliman (2006: 151) the aim of any research should “be analysed from 	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Publishers, 2006), p. 50 
26 Sally Dench, Ron Iphofen and Ursula Huws, An EU code of ethics in social-economic 
research (report 412), The European Commission’s Information Society Technologies 
(IST) Programme and Institute for Employment Studies, (2004), p. 55 
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an ethical viewpoint” as well.27 It follows that the aims and objectives of 
the research be clearly defined and ultimately be beneficial to the society 
being studied. In addition, research in any setting should lend itself to 
being studied using conventional social research methodologies and right 
from the start the researcher must address the question of whether the 
use of social research methodology is suitable for the topic.28 Evidently, 
the topic of my research fits well within the sphere of social science 
research and can be studied through empirical investigation. 
Nonetheless, the major challenge relates to the social acceptability or 
rather political acceptability of the research topic. The central question is 
the extent to which the outcome of the research will benefit the country or 
at the very least, not to harm it. Although this may seem as a politically 
and/or ideologically motivated argument, it may be exacerbated if the 
research is construed, wittingly or unwittingly, to contain elements of 
deception. “Deception occurs when researchers represent their research 
as something other than what it is”.29 Due to the sensitivity of the topic, 
there exists an inherent potential to suspect the research as being more 
than what it is. The ethical concerns should also be viewed in the context 
of Namibia as a developing country that relies on external funding for its 
HIV and AIDS programmes.  Therefore, revelations of failure of the 
responses may compromise the country’s ability to attract funding. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Nicholas Walliman, Social Research Methods, (London: Sage Publishers, 2006), p. 
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28 Martyn Descombe, Ground Rules for Social Research, (Berkshire: Open University 
Press, 2010). 
29 Bryman, (2004), p. 514 
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However, this research project is a consequence of previous research 
findings that identified the need to research how HIV and AIDS affect 
institutions of governance in a complex way and the broader implication 
for state functioning.  For example, the Multi-sectoral Response Review 
of 2008 highlighted the need for research to move beyond the obvious 
economic and epidemiological impact of HIV and AIDS. Essentially, there 
is an appreciation of the need for more in-depth research in Namibia.  
 
Another ethical issue I had to deal with arised during the data analysis 
and reporting phase of my research, specifically relating to how best to 
ensure anonymity and confidentiality of my respondents. Confidentiality 
and anonymity are not only important from an ethical point, but 
methodologically important as well. This is so because “if participants are 
confident and that their responses are truly confidential (or even better if 
they are anonymous), we can expect that people are more likely to 
participate in the study”.30 The issue of anonymity and confidentiality is 
inextricably linked to the issue of privacy as discussed above.  The key 
question here is the protection of the privacy of respondents by ensuring 
anonymity and confidentiality. Since this research is largely qualitative 
and cross-sectional in nature it was easy to convince participants that 
research anonymity will be ensured, since I required no tracing of 
participants. The issue however was that I had collected detailed 
information on one school which I used as a case study… “and with 
detailed information…. it would be easier for someone with access to the 
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data to identify some individuals”.31 It was therefore important that as the 
researcher I ensured that “no individual is identifiable by means of cross-
classifying detailed information in individual cases”.32 The way I did this 
was to anonymise the data before I pass on to people whom I will share 
my analysis with, by omitting certain information such as biographical 
details, locations and the name of the school were most interviews took 
place. This is what Campbel and Russo refers to as removal of individual 
“identifiers”.33 In this respect, the name of the case study school was 
removed in addition to making sure that individual data are not stored on 
time-sharing or networked computer systems and that all the electronic 
files had a password and are encrypted.  This was to ensure that the data 
is secure and protected.  Similarly, when presenting the thesis, I will  
make sure that findings are not linked to the school or individual. 
Responsible dissemination of results dictates that in no way, the 
respondents are identified in my thesis and by extension will not cause 
harm or distress to the participants.   
 
In the above case I have deliberately used anonymity and confidentiality 
interchangeably because in anonymising the data during analysis and 
reporting, I did not only ensure that I, as the researcher cannot link the 
responses to the respondents, but also ensured that the information is 
kept confidential between the respondent and the researcher by not 
passing this on to third parties. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid, p. 192 
32 Ibid., p.  192 
33 Donald T. Campell and Jean M. Russo, Social Measurements, (Thousand Oaks: 
Sage Publishers, 2001) 
	   -­‐30-­‐	  
Thesis outline and key themes 
 
The thesis is organised around specific themes, which also forms the 
basis for each chapter. Broadly speaking three themes are being 
explored: governance, intergenerational knowledge, and HIV and AIDS. 
The thesis is divided into two sections. The chapters can be read 
separately but are more rewarding if read as a whole, because they all 
link to the research question and related objectives. Section one is 
devoted to conceptualisation of the research in four distinct chapters. 
Chapter one is the overall orientation of the research and provides the 
reader with a snapshot of the key issues to be addressed, justification for 
the case study, the conceptualisation of the various theoretical 
frameworks to be employed and the overall philosophical orientation and 
methodological construction of the research. Chapter two introduces the 
summative governance framework and gives an analysis of the various 
sectoral governances (formal and non-state actors), the dynamics of 
governances and their application. Whilst acknowledging the fact that 
summative governance has often been discussed in relation to global 
governance, in this chapter, I extend the argument of summative 
governance to argue that this framework is indeed more applicable to 
national governance because no one actor of governance can adequately 
deal with the complex issues at any level. The chapter concludes by 
introducing the socio-political imperatives of governance, including the 
necessity of knowledge for the evolution of the governance systems from 
a lower to a higher order. In Chapter three, I present an analysis of the 
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central nature of knowledge in social systems. Whilst it was not my 
intentions to enter the epistemic enterprise, it was necessary that in this 
chapter, I provide an overview of the classical theories of knowledge and 
how these theories were foundational to our understanding of the nature 
of knowledge and the complexities of the study of knowledge. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the theory of tacit knowledge, 
which I view as having the best epistemic significance to my area of 
inquiry. The theory of tacit knowledge is put forward in this chapter as not 
only glorifying epistemology for its own sake, but transcend the early 
epistemologies by proposing the necessity of knowledge to sustain social 
systems. Chapter four discusses the governance liabilities of HIV and 
AIDS. The various impacts are discussed as they move through the 
formal and informal institutions of governances. The chapter introduces 
the summative impacts of HIV and AIDS framework. The framework 
provides a good basis for the subsequent chapters as it demonstrates, 
rather in a simplified fashion, how the impacts of HIV and AIDS are not 
only additive or isolated to the sectoral governances, but also summative. 
The final section of this chapter re-introduces the concept of knowledge 
and postulates that because the emergence of governance is a function 
of the evolution of knowledge, when HIV and AIDS affects the process of 
knowledge formation, the systems of governance are endangered.  
 
Section two presents the context and empirical evidences in four 
chapters, from chapter five through chapter eight. Chapter five introduces 
the case study and discusses how at independence, the future of 
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Namibia was severely constrained as a result of protracted periods of 
colonisation and apartheid, with many commentators agreeing that only a 
few countries have started on such a severely constraint state. The micro, 
meso and macro governance vulnerabilities of the governance systems 
are discussed and their interdependency contextualized. These 
vulnerabilities are discussed within both the current economic and social 
and historical contexts. In this chapter, I argue that the prevailing 
economic and political order led to structural and political limitations to 
foster improvement in the lives of the majority of the people and that 
resultantly, this may endanger governance at the level of nation state. 
Similarly, the historical analysis demonstrates that the burden of the past 
weighs heavily on the present and the future, because the varied forms in 
which every activity of life is staged and acted reflects the colonial history 
of the country. The chapter demonstrates how specific events were 
directly linked to disintegration of some systems of rules, and how the 
vulnerabilities of the systems of governance to HIV and AIDS must 
primarily be understood through a historical lens. Chapter six builds upon 
the arguments presented in chapter four, but extends the argument to 
demonstrate how Namibia is in an unenviable position of belonging to the 
group of countries with hyper endemic prevalence. The chapter outlines 
the reasons for Namibia’s high prevalence, and demonstrates how- 
because of the inability of research to uncover the social, cultural and 
economic orders through which the spread of HIV is facilitated- sustained 
inroads have been inadequate. The chapter discusses the HIV and AIDS 
liabilities of the governance systems in Namibia and conclude by 
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highlighting how AIDS has become a vicious complex circle that 
reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout the various 
systems of governances. Chapter seven, re-introduces the concept of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer and argues 
that the various vulnerabilities of the systems of governance are best 
understood through analysing the impact of HIV and AIDS on the process 
of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. Utilising primary data 
collected through key informant interviews and focus group discussions, 
the chapter discusses how HIV and AIDS affects the process through 
which knowledge is passed between people. At the heart of this chapter 
is the attempt to address the question of how HIV and AIDS impact the 
process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer 
and how, because of the interdependency of the various systems of 
governances in Namibia, the impacts are not only additive but 
summative, that is, they are circular within and across the systems of 
governance. Chapter eight summarises the various chapters and 
reiterates the major findings that the best lens through which the impact 
of HIV and AIDS on the various levels of governance could be 
understood is through its impact on the process of intergenerational 
knowledge, formation and retention. The chapter concludes by providing 
the theoretical and policy implication of the findings of this thesis.  
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Chapter 2: Governance: theoretical framework for analysis 
 
Introduction 
 
Forms of governance are as old as human civilisation, but they only came 
to prominence in academic debates during the second part of the 
twentieth century, albeit their analytical use has largely been linked to the 
state and its ability to address societal problems. Understandably, the 
etymological root of governance derives from the Greek word kybernan, 
which means “steersmanship”. In Latin, the term kybernan transforms into 
gubernator, which literally translates into governor in English.34 The 
traditional conceptions of governance were therefore the processes by 
which the activities of the state are steered. Given that the term 
government and governance have the same root, these have hitherto 
largely been regarded to mean the same thing, the consequence of which 
is the dominance of state-centric theories of governance in the early 
literature on governance. State-centric theories, sometimes characterised 
simply as the control-centrism perspective, focus on the question of the 
extent to which the state has the political and institutional capacity to 
steer.35 Within this understanding, the state is seen as the only significant 
player, largely impervious to other actors and processes. This is not 
surprising because earlier academic discourse focused on understanding 
the mechanism of decision making and the study of the formal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Stafford Beer, ‘What is Cybernetics?’ Journal of Kybernetics, 33 (3/4), (2004), pp. 
853-863 
35 Jon Pierre (ed.), Debating governance: authority, steering and democracy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 3 
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procedures and institutions that societies have created to express their 
interest. While Knight attests that one can find examples of governance 
throughout human history, as people were always attempting to “manage 
the interactions of people, clans, tribes, city-states and states to ensure 
harmonious relationships or deal with common problems”36, John 
however observes that it was largely during the 1960s that the political 
sciences developed an interest in how social movements “became 
expressed in structural form of political behaviour, which became 
institutionalised over time”.37 
 
With the pace of social changes at the end of the twentieth century and 
the emergence of highly differentiated and diverse societies, academic 
interest shifted the theoretical perspectives of the concept away from the 
‘institutionalised’ view of governance. Rosenau notes how almost 
everyone during the end of the twentieth century sensed that the course 
of history was at a turning point.38 There were powerful forces within and 
outside the nation state that challenged both the theoretical and empirical 
traditional conception of governance to include other forms of 
governance. Today, there is recognition of forms of governance in 
addition to and/or without the presence of a formal state or inter-state 
institutions.39  Mayntz remarks how it is almost beyond argument that with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Andy W. Knight, Global governance as a summative phenomenon, in Jim Whitman 
(ed), Global Governance, (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 2009), pp. 160-188 
37 Peter John, Local governance in Western Europe (London: Sage Publications, 2001), 
p. 6 
38 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, and James N. Rosenau, Governance without government: Order 
and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
39 Thomas J. Biersteker and Rodney B. Hall, The emergence of private authority in 
global governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 
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the emergence of today’s highly differentiated societies, the complexity of 
functional interdependence of the various systems of governance has 
grown immensely.40 Indeed, Kooiman asks the central question “of how 
such dynamic, complex and diverse socio-political systems can be 
governed in dynamic, complex and diverse ways.”41 Since the 1990s, 
literature began to address what Dunsire emphatically calls the 
apocalyptic question of whether social change at an ever-increasing rate, 
towards ever-increasing complexity, diversity and criticality, can be 
accommodated by the current arrangements to steer change in desired 
directions.42  
 
Such questions led to the re-examination of governance and government 
and the concept of self-steering in political science, public policy and 
international relations. Since these questions emerged, the concept of 
governance has gained immense popularity in contemporary political and 
academic debates, but this did not necessary translate into a unified 
conceptualisation of governance.  Many are now united in the view that 
non-state actors are important in governing processes, but nonetheless 
the extant approaches differ markedly in that some address the question 
of how government can exert even more control over the actors, whilst 
others address the question of interaction between governments and rest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Renate Mayntz, Governing failures and problem of governability: some comments on 
theoretical paradigm, in Jan Kooiman, Modern governance. New government: Society 
interactions, (London: Sage, 1993), pp. 2-20 
41 Jan Kooiman (ed) Modern governance: new government-society interactions, in Jan 
Kooiman, Modern governance. New government: Society interactions, (Sage: London, 
1993), p. 36 
42 Andrew Dunsire, Modes of governance, in Jan Kooiman, Modern governance. New 
government: Society interactions, (Sage: London, 1993), pp. 21-34 
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of society to reach mutually acceptable outcomes or in combination, 
provide comprehensive forms of stability and order. For instance, Pierre 
and Peters adopt the state-centric approach to governance as they posit 
that although governance relates to changing relationships between state 
and society, the state is still the centre of considerable political power, 
and society provides complementary and occasionally competitive 
functions in the process of governing.43 On the other hand, other writers 
such as Rosenau postulate the probability of self-governing systems, 
grounded on the hypothesis that any viable human system has functions 
to perform, “irrespective of whether the system has evolved organisations 
and institutions explicitly charged with performing them”.44 This view is 
echoed by other commentators such as Dunsire, who considers the 
possibility of social system stability maintenance without constant 
government; and by Kooiman, who recognises the interdependency of 
society and government because, in his words, there is a need to shift 
from unilateral (government or society separately) to interactionist focus 
(government with society).45  
 
It is along these lines that the intent of this thesis moves; that governance 
be viewed broadly as the Council of Rome suggests; that it “not be 
restricted to the national and international systems, but should be used in 
relation to regional, provincial and local governance as well as to other 
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44 James N Rosenau, Governace, order and change in world politics, in Ernst-Otto 
Czempiel, and James N. Rosenau, Governance without government: Order and 
Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.3 
45 Kooiman, (1993) 
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social systems such as education, and the military, to private enterprise, 
and even the microcosm of the family”.46  Suffice to say, the complexities, 
dynamics and diversity of social systems renders the state-centric model 
of politics problematic in that many of the social systems meet the 
requirement of what Dunsire calls “dynamic constancy without 
governors”.47 It follows that social systems persist amidst constant 
changes through feedbacks and voluntary self-corrections, and mostly 
remain identifiably the same and recognisably in similar relationships with 
each other, with or without a government. Conversely, as Holsti 
eloquently argues, “institutions and organisations may exist… but if they 
are imposed solely by coercion and violence, then there is a government 
but no governance”.48 Thus, governance not only encompass the work of 
government, but must include all other command mechanisms that, as 
Rosenau succinctly describes,  “make demands, frame goals, issue 
directives, and pursue policies”.49 Governance can therefore exist 
irrespective of whether these mechanisms evolved into institutions or 
central political authority. This thesis characterises governance as a 
continuous process of evolution that runs in a continuum from a nascent 
to fully institutionalized mechanisms of control. It argues that governance 
be seen as the totality of governances, that is, state and non-state, or 
private and public and is thus a summative phenomenon. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Cited in James, N. Rosenau, Along the domestic-foreign frontier: Exploring 
governance in a turbulent world, (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1997), p. 
145 
47 Dunsire, (1993) 
48 Kalevi J. Holsti, Governance without government; Polyarchy in nineteenth-century 
Eauropean internationa politics, in Ernst-Otto Czempiel, and James N. Rosenau, 
Governance without government: Order and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: 
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Dynamics of governance and their application 
 
Conventionally governance has been regarded to manifest in four 
different contexts: global governance, national governance, local 
governance and corporate governance.  
 
Global governance 
 
Governance in the international arena has usually been examined from 
an international relations (IR) perspective and within the context of the 
enduring tension between and among states. The emphasis has been on 
the explicit relationship between countries and the roles of the different 
players. However, during the latter part of the twentieth century, there 
was an increasing disjuncture between these theoretical and empirical 
conceptions about authority as it relates to the operation of the 
international system.  At the same time, the multi-dimensional process of 
globalisation started to manifest itself in the “spatial reorganization of 
production, the interpretation of industries across borders, the spread of 
financial markets, the diffusion of identical consumer goods to distant 
countries […] and massive transfers of population within the South as 
well as from the South and the East to the West”.50 Political, cultural and 
economic institutions became more globalized as the world moved from 
the sharply divided international economy of the Cold War to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 James H. Mittelman (ed), Globalization: Critical Reflections, (Colorado:  Lynne 
Reinner Publishers, 1996), p. 2 
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increasingly integrated global economy. These events challenged and 
highlighted the limits of traditional IR theory to explain a world where the 
shape and importance of individual states is changing. In other words, it 
soon became evident that many aspects of perceptions about the power 
of government had to shift; and what followed was an attempt to address 
the apparent theoretical and analytical challenges posed by the 
globalised world. It could safely be argued that the opportunity was lost 
for intellectual engagement amidst changing realities, because IR 
scholars are, according to Zacher, the “most conservative groups of 
social scientists in the world” as they are very sceptical if not cynical 
about the possibility of change in their subject area.51 This is well 
reflected in Porter’s conclusion that “traditional international relations 
theory dismissed the importance of non-state actors and treated states as 
not only the most important actors but also as relatively bounded and 
autonomous institutions”.52 To a large extent, this may have blinded IR to 
the emergence of global politics and its impact on state and the 
international system.  
 
Now, there is a growing recognition in the IR literature that the concept of 
governance needs to be extended beyond the state to describe the 
current global order. According to Axford this growing appeal is 
embedded in the idea that the complexities of social life can no longer be 
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extracted from analytic focus of world society in its totality.53  The concept 
is further popularised in various sub themes such as international 
institutions and regimes where “it is widely recognized that certain 
important problems cannot be controlled or contained by action at the 
level of nation state alone“.54 It is perhaps for this reason that Weiss and 
Kamran point out that readers mistakenly consider international 
organisation and global governance as synonyms.55  
 
While theories of global governance are still nascent and the various 
frameworks conceptualise global governance differently, according to 
Dingwerth and Pattberg, “the best-known version is that of James 
Rosenau who conceives of global governance as a multiplication of 
spheres of authority”.56 It follows that global governance has been 
equated (by Rosenau and others) to the sum of all governances of every 
character and at every level, that is, global in an inclusive sense. 
Rosenau links global governance with global order in that the latter 
“consists of those routinized arrangements through which world politics 
gets from one moment in time to the next”, without an overarching 
political authority or a global government.57 This definition sufficiently 
describes the status quo, in the sense that it, in the words of Dingwerth 
and Pattberg, gives us a “new perspective that helps us describe, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Barrie Axford, The Global System:  Economics, Politics and Culture,  (Cambridge:  
Polity Press, 1995), p. 25 
54 Pierre (2000), p. 15 
55 Annelies, Z. Kamran, and Thomas G. Weiss, Global governance as international 
organisation, in Jim Whitman (ed) Global Governance (Hampshire: Palgrave McMillan, 
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understand and explain the political world that is undergoing profound 
change”.58 But others have raised concerns that the absence of an 
overarching authority may pose a challenge for the future of global 
governance. Stone, for instance, has suggested the formation of a global 
public policy. 59   While such discussion is beyond this thesis, it remains to 
be seen whether such global scale policies are feasible.  
 
National governance 
 
Governance is also applied in the context of national governance.  It was 
discussed earlier how conventionally, the term government and 
governance were conceived to mean the same because they had a 
similar root.  But more specifically, the interchangeable use of the terms 
became increasingly popular after the great depression and subsequently 
the Second World War in what Mayntz calls the increasing claims of 
political guidance, and the “growing orientation of political decision-
makers towards planning and the use of planning techniques”.60 
Criticisms were exerted over the glaring failure of states to maintain and 
avoid mass unemployment, prevent poverty and assure a fair sharing of 
benefits after the dark periods of the 1930s till the late 1940s in Europe.  
In Scharpf’s words, “the failure to maintain even (these) minimal 
assurances during the great depression destroyed the legitimacy of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Dingwerth and Pattberg, (2009) 
59 Diane Stone, Global Public Policy: Transnational Policy Communities and their 
Networks, Journal of Policy Sciences, (2008), vol.36 (No. 1), pp. 19-38 
60 Mayntz, (1993), p. 12 
	   -­‐43-­‐	  
democratic government”.61 Consequently, governance became the 
mantra in political discourse as the guiding principle for public 
management. The synonymous use of the term government and 
governance gained further currency with the increased advocacy of 
international development agencies, such as the World Bank, which 
underlined ‘good governance’ as a necessary condition to its loans to 
governments throughout the world.62 
 
Governance at the level of the nation state started gaining prominence 
amidst the political and social crisis of the Welfare State during the last 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Increasingly, both endogenous and 
exogenous factors rendered the state-centric view incompatible with 
current events. The conventional view of governance as the central 
theme in government started to dissipate, because understanding the role 
of government in the governing process required that, according to 
Breuillard, “we move away from the static description of political and 
governmental functions… to the dynamic analysis of mechanisms and 
processes at work which determine actions but also re-actions within the 
socio-political systems”.63 Even though many contemporary writers hold 
this view, government as the key centre of political power is still held pre-
eminent. Other social mechanisms of governance are seen to provide 
complimentary functions in the process of governing. This is clearly 	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captured in Stoker’s definition that governance be “broadly defined as a 
concern with governing, achieving collective action in the realm of public 
affairs, in conditions where it is not possible to recourse to the authority of 
the state”.64  
 
Local governance 
 
The third level of application of governance is local governance. 
Academic scholarship acknowledges the importance of local governance 
in facilitating local economic and social development and as a necessary 
condition for growth and stability. As discussed earlier, much of the earlier 
literature on governance reflected the consolidation of national 
democracies after the turbulent period of the 1930s and 1940s. The 
common agenda at that stage encompassed the role of central authority 
to deal with the radical changes and the process for managing the public 
action in a structured and systematic way.  Indeed John asserts that this 
has happened even when local politics were first democratised, with 
national institutions following rather than leading. He says: 
 
“Local organisations, party systems and institutions became 
embedded in national political, administrative, and legal 
frameworks whilst central or state government bodies managed 
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territorial politics. In the end nation states emerged as the 
legitimate political organisations.”65 
 
The consequence is the neglect of academic thinking and discourse on 
the imperative of local governance in the continuum of governance. It was 
not until recently that Stoker stimulated discussions on the link between 
governance and local government.66 He described governance as 
interaction of various agencies and postulated local government as but 
one of the multiple agencies that interact at the local level to form local 
governance. Today, it is recognized that government efforts must be 
pursued in conjunction with local authorities. Many scholars, as Goss 
explains, view “the switch from government to governance as a change in 
government processes, of how local communities are governed”.67  At the 
same time she argues that this was not simply a structural change that 
makes up government, but more a change in the governance project, that 
is, a change of purpose and a change in ideas of what governance is for. 
This is evident in recent debates that focus on how democracy can 
remain sustainable if the issues of social and economic justice at the local 
levels are not addressed. The key to the argument is that democratically 
elected local government should by definition reflect the will of the people, 
since how else could economic and social justice be achieved other than 
through local structures. At the heart of the argument, which is often 
referred to as the democratic project, lies the ideal of political, social and 	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economic inclusion. Decentralisation thus becomes an imperative for 
democratisation of governance. Many states have now enacted 
legislation to facilitate the process of decentralising the government 
functions to the local level.  To a certain extent, one can understand why 
the debate has only started focusing on the decentralisation of political 
and administrative functions.  Emerging democracies first required some 
time to develop the policy and institutional frameworks that can sustain 
the very process of democratisation.  Now local authorities around the 
world are taking the lead as policy makers to facilitate local economic and 
social development, as a co-ordinating body between the different levels 
of government (i.e. local, regional/provincial and national) and as 
facilitators of development through policy making, land-use planning and 
provision of information.68  The emerging functions of local government 
require that these are carried out in responsible and accountable ways, 
and as Goss asserts, “the requirement of equity, equality, and probity do 
not allow individual solutions to be found without regard to the impact 
they have on others”.69  We may be reminded at this stage that this is 
what is often referred to as ‘good governance’. 
 
Corporate governance 
 
Another area in which governance gained sustained and intense interest 
is in the corporate domain. Though the term is now commonplace in 	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literature on corporate management, it was rarely found in literature 
before the 1990s.70 It is difficult to appreciate that as recently as thirty 
years ago a course in corporate governance, and textbooks on this 
subject were few and far between, because today there are scores of 
books, articles and research publications on this subject. The World Bank 
attests that “corporate governance has only recently emerged as a 
discipline in its own right, although the strands of political economy it 
embraces stretches back through centuries”.71 With the increasing crisis 
in the corporate world and concerns about the defective nature of 
corporate management, corporate governance has now become a focus 
of much attention. Though there is still some disagreement on what the 
actual definition of the term should be, and that it is in any case 
symptomatic of the whole debate on governance reform, there is a 
general consensus about its purpose.  Accordingly, corporate governance 
serves to ensure that the corporation protects resources and allocates 
them to make planned progress towards the organisation’s defined 
purpose, that those governing and managing an organisation account 
appropriately to its stakeholders (shareholders, the public and 
government) and enable shareholders and other stakeholders to take 
boards to task.72 
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Fundamentally, the growing academic interest in corporate governance 
reflected concerns about business functions, specifically because both 
corporations and governments were confronted with the challenge of 
managing the expectations of societies which were becoming 
increasingly alerted to the negative externalities associated with 
economic development.73 Stated differently, society became more 
conscious that in their operations, industries produce spillovers, which 
affect the welfare of other people and that these at times are totally 
disregarded by the industries generating them.  Moreover, these are not 
included in the cost of production of the companies, neither do ‘they enter 
the set of prices that would be thrown up by perfectly competitive 
markets”.74  In other words, the price system fails to take into account 
these “spillover effects”. Because prices are the signals through which the 
nation’s resources are allocated, “a failure of the signal leads to a failure 
in the allocation of resources”.75 In many respects, there was what Clarke 
referred to as “a general sense that corporations cast a long shadow and 
they must be governed responsibly if they are to benefit society”.76 What 
is more, “in recent years, the institutions and structures required for 
corporate, public, and global governance have experienced a series of 
scandals resulting from a lack of responsibility on the part of political and 
corporate leaders”.77 More specifically, major concerns emerged with the 	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governance structures of public corporations following what Fratianni and 
Pattison call, “outbursts of corporate malfeasance, market volatility, 
inadequate disclosure, and conflict of interest that are injurious to the 
public and undermine confidence in the marketplace”.78 Other major 
concerns were related to how the current trend of economic growth may 
seriously degrade the environment and jeopardise the welfare of future 
generations.79 Undoubtedly, growth is almost entirely dependant on the 
capacity of the environment to sustain such growth. Scholars today 
discuss sustainable economic growth or sustainable development within 
the broader discussion on governance. They define sustainable 
development as “development that meets the needs of present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs”80- in 
other words, without affecting intergenerational equity, a concept that 
refers to equity over generations.  These concepts (sustainable economic 
growth, sustainable development and intergenerational equity) have 
gained popularity during the past three decades in discussions on 
corporate governance. 
 
As with global governance, the term corporate governance gained 
eminence and has been transformed as globalisation became entrenched 
in every sphere of human activity.  Corporate governance has expanded 	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in scope and is inextricably linked to the activities of multinational 
corporations, not least because privately owned multinational 
corporations are at the forefront of the process of globalisation. 
Paradoxically, there is a greater focus on how international regulation 
may contain them, because as d’Estaing argues, “the main problem 
facing the world today is lack of confidence” in business- in other words, 
the loss of trust in the very structures that facilitated the widening and 
deepening of international trade, finance, information, and culture into a 
single, integrated world market. 81  As a result and most notably, “the G8 
leaders are now dealing directly with the central question of how to build 
better global governance in both the public and private spheres”.82 
Evidently, we have entered the era in which it is impossible to talk about 
global and world governance without relating it to interactions of the 
transnational actors of business.  
 
Non-state governances 
 
Because this thesis defines governance as a continuous process of 
decision-making and command mechanisms at every level of human 
activity, it follows that “government could never govern if people- in their 
organisations, their families, their groupings of all kinds- were not self-
governing”.83 Yet, these systems have been overlooked and most 
literature has concentrated only on the four levels of application and most 	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importantly on state power and authority to the exclusion of the 
importance of the other mechanisms. Indeed, Hall and Biersteker point 
out that it was not only until the last few years of the twentieth century 
that the traditional theoretical and empirical conceptions of governance 
were challenged to include private authority, and now there is a 
recognition of forms of governance without the presence of a formal state 
or inter-state institutions.84 Whilst there has been discussion on the 
probability of governance in the absence of a government, a major 
weakness has been on the tendency to relate this to global governance 
(as discussed above) to the exclusion of the other levels of governance.  
It is important that these levels, such as the family, clanship, social and 
community networks, education and even illicit groupings be situated 
within the larger debate on governance.  This is not difficult to fathom as 
part of the explanation for the survival of states resides in the model of 
the family and social networks and the education systems, not only as 
instrumental, but constitutive forms of governance that sustain social 
order. Evidently, the rules and regulations associated with government 
cannot cover everything, and adherence to them cannot only depend on 
state coercion, but they are reliant on the social and moral dispositions 
that have come to be linked to these governance mechanisms. Moreover, 
the analyses of governance thus far have failed to acknowledge that over 
eons and before the dawn of formalised institutions, societies, however 
disparate, have created enabling and protective environments for their 
men and women because they have within themselves the resources and 
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capital to self govern. It follows that when we derive our understanding of 
governance largely by looking at the function of state, intra-state and 
international agencies alone, we fail to comprehend that many of the 
determinants of the ability of states to function lies beyond the observable 
means of governance. Borrowing from Rhodes, governance is carried out 
through both “self-organising and interorganisational networks”.85 
 
Community and social networks 
 
The starting point is to acknowledge that some self-organising networks 
are clearly visible at community levels.  Goss notes that many “examples 
of governances are taking place at neighbourhood level outside state 
agencies- through community development trusts, tenant management 
organisations and community groups”.86 Several writers such as Benn, et 
al., refer to these decentralised centres as “sub-politics”, consisting of 
networks comprising individual actors, not-for-profits and community 
groups. 87  Others, like Rosenau and Scharpf call it “multi-level” or “multi-
layered” governances respectively, even if those terms are often used in 
relation to national and international governances.88 The problem with the 
current literature is that, while acknowledging the importance of these 	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sub-political groups, much of it has remained superficial, despite a 
substantial amount of empirical work on the formal or institutional forms of 
governance. In truth, community governance is not a new phenomenon. 
Local authorities have always been promoting some form of locality 
governance for many years and according to Goss some have recently 
started creating neighbourhood communities or area forums and many 
others have supported community self-governance through such things 
as trusts and community-led projects.89 Recent commentators have 
embraced the importance of these self-organising networks and are 
united in the view that they constitute forms of governance- in the sense 
that these are not adequately understood and they operate across and 
between geographical boundaries.  That is, they are spatially diverse, 
pervasive and are important for social cohesion and as such create a 
challenge for the future discourse of governance. This is clearly captured 
in the following extract from Goss: 
 
“The most interesting dilemma for the future of governance is 
whether and when it is useful to formalise the concept of 
neighbourhood by creating structures of governance with spatial 
boundaries- or whether it actually helps the process of governance 
to have overlapping and fuzzy boundaries, with different groups of 
people coming together for different reasons and with governance 
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structures that can rise and fall depending on the energy level 
participants and the life-cycle of the neighbourhood”.90 
 
As we move towards a more globalised world, some of these self-
governing mechanisms are being transformed into formidable social 
movement networks across nations. Giddens refers to this as the New 
Social Movements (NSM) which started in the 1960s with the student and 
civil rights movements, followed by the 1970s with the feminist 
movement, then by the anti-nuclear and ecological movements of the 
1980s and the gay rights campaigns of the 1990s.91 With the current level 
of telecommunication technology, immediate and systematic connections 
across national boundaries have become common. The rise of the NSM 
in the information age makes it harder for traditional political institutions to 
cope and thus creates problems with governability. Giddens attests how 
“social movements around the world are able to join together in huge 
regional and international networks, comprising non-governmental 
organisations, religious and humanitarian groups, human rights 
associations, consumer protection advocates, environmental activists and 
others who campaign in the interest of people”.92 These networks have 
the unprecedented ability to respond promptly, access information and 
share resources. “In short, our time can well be characterised as the age 
of networked individual”.93  
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These movements in most cases start out as “loose self-organising 
networks, usually based on oppositional stances, and with informal grass-
roots networks”.94 As they seek to increase their political influence, they 
usually evolve into more hierarchical movements. Eventually, they start 
participating in political institutions and legislation in their areas of 
concern. In fact, it is known that such movements have led to the 
formation of Labour, Green and Feminist political parties around Europe, 
albeit once they develop hierarchies, they are referred to as Old Social 
Movements.95 Notwithstanding, the key point is that movements must be 
acknowledged as an integral part of the discourse on governance, not 
least because they provide a good model for the study of non-state 
governance, but because they promote a bottom-up approach to 
governance and challenge centralised authority.  In other words, they 
usually present a constant and strong challenge to ‘top-down’ 
governance.   
 
Education as the foundation for governance 
 
Needless to say, there is near universal agreement on the importance of 
education to democratic systems of governance, in that it increases the 
capacity of individuals to contribute and benefit from society and the 
economy. In this context, education is seen broadly as the system by 
which societies transmit their accumulated knowledge, skills and values 
from one generation to the next.  Gaffield points out that it must be 	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treated “as part of a larger social context involving basic transition of 
activity from family to school”.96  
 
Understanding the role of education as the key to human society 
presupposes its importance to governance.  Education transforms people 
to live a better life and serves as the means to develop people physically, 
mentally and socially. It brings about the desired change in society and 
helps develop a generation of virtuous individuals. It follows that 
education re-enforces the needed attributes to lead life in a proper way. 
Education in general “provides for better citizenship, the ability to 
appreciate and recognize wider range of cultural and other services, … 
and the chance to give the next generation better education and… a 
better future.”97 The principle purpose of education is to gain knowledge 
and inculcate the forms of proper conduct. In other words, education is 
not only the learning of techniques, but the process of helping man ‘to 
experience the integrated process of life”.98 Evidently, education is a 
central feature of the governing process as it not only re-enforces and 
produces the “governable”, but also generates what Rosenau refers to as 
the “governors”.99  
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While this link between education and governance, in terms of the 
capacity to govern and be governed seems obvious, discussions on the 
imperative of education to governance seem to have eluded scholars 
worldwide. This lack of attention can be attributed to the present-day 
education system that overemphasises technique, rather than education 
as a means to make people free and according to Krishnamurti, as a 
function of bringing about “an integrated individual who is capable of 
dealing with life as a whole”.100 Notwithstanding, the importance of 
education as the pillar for human advancement has long been 
recognised, albeit as it relates to its direct influence on poverty. Central to 
the argument is that education is having a key role in tackling the problem 
of what it is to be a citizen. It contributes to sustainable democracy by 
encouraging full participation of citizens in political, social and economic 
life. According to McCowan, citizenship education has long been taught in 
schools around the world and in some countries this is being 
reintroduced.101  Whilst McCowan argues that transmitting preconceived 
notions of citizenship through schools may both be unviable and 
undesirable, he nevertheless demonstrates that these are largely the 
matter of design. He further stresses that the future of citizenship 
education lies in acknowledging the significance of pedagogical relations 
and school democratisation, one that allows students to develop as 
political agents in their own right.102 The notion of putting education in the 
centre of good citizenship presupposes its necessity to make men 	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progress towards a more balanced, coherent and sustainable system that 
society so desperately needs. 
 
Concomitantly, there is a growing awareness that limited education in the 
modern digital world is the key reason for exclusion in the political 
process. The emergence of the telecommunications technology and 
infrastructure over the last few decades has been so immense, that 
according to Scrimgeour, they “have the potential to transform the way in 
which society is organised and governed”.103 Technology now enables 
individuals to engage with others, learn from others and contribute 
significantly to the rest of society in a meaningful way. Technology has 
opened up a new democratic space in which anyone can now participate.  
The rapid integration of technology into modern life has for the first time, 
made certain forms of participatory forms of governance feasible. People 
are now well informed and aware of what is happening in their societies 
and the rest of the world.  Looking ahead, education will play a key role 
within the continued progression of telecommunication technology.  
Whilst the archetype of a fully integrated society seems possible, those 
with limited education will be socially and economically excluded, at 
which point, a darker outcome is feasible since exclusion may sow the 
seeds of civil and political instability.  
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Family as a key institution for governance 
 
My contention is that in the continuing debate on social and political 
stability in modern states, the family should be in prominent focus.  
Though there are various concepts of the family, the use of the term 
takes its pre-eminent definition to include all forms of domestic living 
arrangements. As Karl Max succinctly puts it, “the individual depends on 
and belongs to a larger whole; at first it is, naturally the family and the 
clan, which is but an enlarged family”.104 The institution of the family has 
long been recognised in sociology literature as one of the key ingredients 
of human life, the basic unit of a society and as Peplar expressess it “is 
the necessary foundation of all order and morality”.105  The formal view of 
the family as a crucial institution within modern societies stems from 
functionalist schools that dominated sociology in the 1940s and 1950s.  
This view continues to be influential in Europe and the United States of 
America.  According to Muncie the view is that “society is upheld by social 
institutions, each of which has well defined functions to perform”.106 To 
this end, the role of the family is seen as the rearing and socialisation of 
children. Parents in families are the leaders that carry out the parental 
responsibilities, which not only entails enforcing discipline in their 
children, but includes provision of material needs and social guidance. In 
Africa, beyond the family is a network of people connected either by kin 
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or blood called the clan. The clan performs important functions of uniting 
their members, coping with external threats and avoiding conflicts. There 
are village heads whose primary responsibility is to attend to the 
immediate needs of their villagers and are also the custodians of the 
sacred traditions of their people. In fact, it is argued that with the 
crumbling of the Soviet’s attempt to collective action did it dawn on most 
people that only in small units, such as the family and the clan, are 
collectivist arrangements feasible.107  
 
Scholars now acknowledge that although the family institution has 
undergone radical transformation in recent years in response to external 
socio-economic environments, good family governance is increasingly a 
crucial element for peace and development. Inherent in this is the 
primacy of the family for the well being of society and by extension the 
security of states. This is partly the reason why, after the Second World 
War, states in Europe were concerned about the stability of the family 
and well being of the state, and these concerns, according to Peplar, 
were “inextricably linked”.108 Inevitably, the search for family stability in 
the face of rapid changes led to various state policies that aim to assist 
families to produce healthier social outcomes. While these were well 
intentioned, and founded in the recognition of the family as an important 
element for peace, these were often based on “functionalism and 
particular political as well as historical perspectives, one which gives 
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families… little scope for creating and sustaining social change”.109  
Moreover, the widely held view is that, while the family is an important 
element for peace and development, family life should remain a private 
affair as, in the words of Muncie, “the family provides sanctuary from the 
external world and thus the state should not be seen to be intervening 
directly in its affairs”.110  
 
The dynamism of actors and the changing forms of governance 
 
The discussion so far has highlighted the importance that the analysis of 
governance must include both the formal and informal, state and non-
state governances. Evidently, as Mayntz emphatically emphasises, 
“formal organisation is of course not a pre-condition for governability”.111 
More precisely, governance is the way these different levels interact 
according to certain rules and norms. Section two discussed varieties of 
formal governance, that is those based on written constitutions, laws and 
formal contracts; and section three referred to the informal governance, 
that is, those based on moral rules and unwritten societal codes of 
conduct. Actors involved in governance vary depending on the level of 
governance that is under discussion. Whilst formal state-actors are well 
known and to a large extent identified in the preceding sections, in recent 
years, there has been an “explosion” of literature that poses fascinating 
questions on non-state actors, their levels, modes and order and how 	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these influence governing processes. The birth of the ‘new governors’, 
their purpose and dynamism pose a challenge to the traditional 
conception, that is, the state-centric perspective of governance. 
 
Transnational actors and the changing nature of domestic and 
international governance 
 
Perhaps it is natural to start the discussion with the various actors in the 
international system because in essence this can be classified as either 
formal or non-formal, depending on the level of applications.  They could 
be regarded as formal because “while these actors are non-state, and do 
not rely exclusively on the actions or explicit support of the state in the 
international arena, they often convey and/or appear to have been 
accorded some form of legitimate authority”.112 On the other hand they 
are informal in that while they have formed what Dingwerth and Pattberg 
call “transboundary social institutions to address transnational problems”, 
they do not operate under a single global legal or policy framework.113 
Undoubtedly the dramatic increase in the different players in the 
international system cannot be overstated. According to Rosenau, “the 
pervasiveness of turbulent conditions has extended to the number and 
types of actors who play key roles on the global stage”114 and now the 
“proliferation of actors is at the centre of much of the global governance 
literature”.115 Because of the diversity of the actors, scholars have started 	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to conceptualise global governance as a multilevel structure of 
transnational and supranational actors, all of whom deal with each other 
in what Payne refers to as “complex networks of varying horizontal and 
vertical density”.116 Hall and Biersteker identify these actors to include 
authority of the global market, private market institutions, human rights 
groups, and environmental non-governmental organisations, religious 
movements and even illicit groups such as the mafia and mercenary 
armies.117 Dingwerth and Pattberg include in the list of actors hybrid 
orgnisations, private foundations, international bureaucracies, local state 
agencies and epistemic, migrant and local communities.118 It is telling that 
the plethora of actors is largely non-state, state-based or state-created 
and that as we begin to comprehend their magnitude and scope, many 
more are emerging. Perhaps, many scholars can be forgiven for believing 
that chaos theory best explains the international system; that our 
analytical focus is limited by the ‘disorderly nature’ of global politics.  As 
Rosenau would also attest, many students and scholars “are inclined to 
use the term anarchy to designate the absence of centralised authority in 
world politics”.119 Anarchy in the sense of lack of overarching authority, 
but then Rosenau disputes that anarchy is perhaps less determining of 
international stability- and by extension global order- than many realist 
theories sometimes suggest. In a sense, Rosenau echoed North’s view 
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that the “the international system (in spite of this lack of an overarching 
regime or world governance) is several steps beyond anarchy”.120  
 
What cannot be denied is the influence of these actors in both the 
international and domestic arenas. Put differently, the proliferation of 
these actors has significantly reduced the monopoly of the states in 
global politics and even domestic policy making. For instance, Cutler 
refers to how contemporary developments in domestic and international 
arenas are enhancing the authority of private international regimes 
through, for example, privatisation and deregulation of markets, the 
delegation of regulatory authority to private business associations and 
agencies and the increased reliance on market mechanisms across and 
between nations.121 Through such arrangements, private actors are 
increasingly gaining authoritative decision making powers, some of which 
were formerly the prerogative of government. Similarly, the past twenty 
years, or so have begun to see an unprecedented participation of socially 
based, non-state actors in global level regulation. Not only have they 
been involved in international meetings involving multilateral 
organisations such as the World Bank, World Trade Organisation, UN 
Economic and Social Commission (ECOSCOC), and Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, they have become instrumental in filling 
the gaps in environmental and social regulations. They have also become 
important actors in such things as UN election observers, advisors, 	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writers and “for seeing that regulations- both national and international- 
are adhered to by both public and private actors”.122 Whilst the discussion 
of the influence of all the actors are beyond this thesis, it is not hard to 
fathom that the sphere of what Hall and Biersteker call the “private” in 
global governance is changing and the change is accelerating.123 
Essentially, we are just beginning to understand the reciprocal, mutually 
defining relationship between the public and the private. What we know 
for sure is that the world is changing and other actors are taking the 
authoritative role in domestic and global politics. As Hall and Biersteker 
so eloquently and tellingly observe, “The state is therefore no longer the 
sole, or in some instances, even the principal, source of authority, in 
either the domestic arena or in the international system”.124   
 
Governance actors in the domestic arena 
 
In the domestic arena, the capacity of the society and the market to self 
govern are eluding the state’s ability to control them. The past two 
decades can be characterised by the demand for greater participation by 
various non-state actors. They include non-governmental organisations, 
community based organisations, community forums, women’s 
organisations, faith based organisations, trade unions, social movements, 
professional organisations, business coalitions and associations, self-help 
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groups, advocacy groups, and even the military, to name just a few.  
Whilst the list is obviously diverse, the common characteristic is that 
these are neither politicians nor public sector managers and are simply 
outside the institutionalised forms of governance. As the political world is 
changing these groups are, as Giddens asserts, thriving and bringing new 
issues in the mainstream.125 They make the boundaries of public sector 
governance blurred as they forge new relationships with the different 
levels of government, the private sector and among themselves.  This is 
well captured in Pierre’s assertions that as a result of the growing societal 
interdependency, “the dividing line between public and private sectors are 
blurring, and interests generally are not just public or private, they 
frequently are shared”.126  
 
More than ever before, these actors are popular and prominent in dealing 
with complex economic, political and moral issues and have gained 
legitimacy in the public eye and are increasingly regarded as an important 
centre of social life. They bring new complexities to the socio-political 
governing process and they are at the heart of the “civic culture- the 
sphere between the state and the marketplace occupied by family, 
community associations and other non-economic institutions”.127 Pierre, 
while trying to juxtapose traditional conceptions of governance with the 
normal changing nature of social relationships, unwittingly admits the 
complexities of governing by asserting that the “lengthening chains of 	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interactions cause and require a multiplication of numbers of parties 
participating in them, while the number of interactions among these 
parties also multiplies”.128 Kooiman, in response to the diversity and 
dynamism of the contemporary socio-political environment, describes that 
“these interactions not only reflect the basic complexity, dynamics and 
diversity of societies, they are themselves complex, dynamic and 
diverse”.129 Goss echoes this sentiment that if we recognise that 
communities and societies are now characterised by diversity of actors, 
then we also recognise that this creates problems for governance130- in 
the sense that public sector role in economic and social development will 
change from that of a governor in the real sense of the word, to more of 
an enabler, that is, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), providing a flexible framework 
within which economic and social activity can take place.131 Put 
differently, government’s role will be defined in terms of its ability to 
enable the capacity of the governing systems, as a whole, to coordinate 
policy and solve public problems in a complex context. Admittedly, as 
many commentators would confirm, the economic realities and political 
imperative will force government to withdraw from some areas in favour 
of these actors. With the rapid changes brought about by globalisation, 
the non-state actors are gaining further currency, as people feel 
powerless and more alienated from their governments. In Giddens’ 
words, “the cumulative effects of these new challenges… may be a 	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growing sense that people are losing control of their lives in the midst of 
rapid change”.132 Perhaps, as Goss and others would like us to believe, 
we are possibly approaching an alternative form of governance, some 
sort of “hybrid organisation”, characterised by a clear cell structure and 
decentred authority.133  
 
Governance as a summative phenomenon 
 
The challenge to the traditional conception of governance resulting from 
the emergence of new forms of governances and the dynamism of the 
various actors postulate a postmodern world characterised by 
extraordinary complexities, both in the domestic arena and international 
system. Yet, from the point of view of the layman, nothing appears that 
complex; somehow, the system seems to be one of a self-reproductive 
process, as if an invisible hand (a term which I owe to the greatest 
expositor of economic thought, Adam Smith, 1723-1790), were working to 
guide the system towards a self-organising and self-preserving state. 
Surely, from a scholarly perspective, it is not so much whether the system 
works or not (or for whom), but more about the critical analysis of what 
makes it function. With society becoming more diverse and volatile, 
scholarly diagnostics of the discernible features of the governing process 
become an imperative. It is therefore important to elucidate the 
consolidation of the various systems, especially in terms of how the 
actors from a higher to a lower order interact towards a self-regulating 	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and self-organising state, what Kooiman refers to as the “interactions 
between actors on micro, meso, and macro levels of socio-political 
aggregation”.134 Therefore academic description must reflect this complex 
interplay and clearly capture the fact that, using Rosenau’s claim, the 
interdependence of the various systems not only involves flows, 
consequences and causation within the systems but that they sustain 
flows across the systems.135 While such a synopsis may be a bit far 
fetched, Rosenau helps us to reconceptualise governance by referring to 
it as a ‘summative phenomenon’. Whitman attests the importance to- 
from a conceptual point of view- recognise the various governances 
related to a specific arena of activity, which he refers to as sectoral 
governance.136 He further acknowledges that, in the grand scheme of 
things, governance must be seen as the totality of all these sectoral 
governances and thus a summative phenomenon. Whilst this is applied 
more often in relation to global governance, I would argue that summative 
governance is both an international as well as domestic phenomenon, not 
least because no one sector of governance is adequate to deal with the 
complex issues at any level. 
 
The conceptualisation of global governance as a summative 
phenomenon is clearly embedded in the complexities of the global 
system and the inability of international governance institutions to 
adequately respond to world problems. Quoting Knight: 	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“[The] holistic conceptualisation of global governance is in part 
linked to the recognition that international governance 
institutions are no longer adequate to address contemporary 
transnational issues and problems and that ‘summative’ global 
governance (the sum of all governance processes and 
institutions that seeks to address transnational issues affecting 
our planet) represents, in effect, a shift of paradigm- from 
international to global politics- and an evolution in 
multilateralism, as top-down and bottom-up multilateral 
activities and institutions intersect”.137 
 
In effect, global governance can be thought of as the way in which 
sectoral governances symbiotically interact in both vertical and horizontal 
directions. It also highlights that, as Whitman describes, “global 
governance of any form of human activity, or arena in which it takes 
place, depends upon a vast array of other actors, some distant from the 
sector under consideration”.138 Whilst perhaps the concept of summative 
governance, in its normative sense, may not sufficiently capture the 
complexities of the global ‘disorder’, it nevertheless offers some level of 
assurance as a first step to conceptualise governance in the global arena 
as encompassing what Knight aptly calls the “complex web of multi-level 
governance structures”.139 It is surprising that the boom in literature on 
global governance has not translated into similar rigorous analysis of 	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governance at the domestic level. The domestic, as with the global, 
consists of some kind of collage networks of governances. In truth, what 
appears in the international arena reflects the complexities of the sphere 
of the “local”, the only difference is that it is all these on a global scale. 
The boundaries of what constitute global and what is local are blurred; 
and ‘opt-outs’ become an impossibility, because:  
 
“Globalisation has configured the world so that local or individual 
concerns cannot entirely be sheltered from global dynamics; and 
at the same time, larger-scale and/or inclusive global issues can 
be created or exacerbated by the cumulative and sometimes the 
synergic outcomes of small-scale activities. What this means for 
the practical purpose of exercising governance is not only that 
failing in sectoral global governance can have extensive, multiple 
impacts (as we have seen in the case of global finance), but also 
that a great many actors and dynamics that have a bearing on 
sector-specific governances originate outside of its purview”.140 
 
Therefore, and while summative governance is generally cited within the 
global governance literature, the term summative governance also best 
describes governance of the domestic particularly as it relates to its 
influence and/or its contribution to the globalisation of governance. How 
else do we describe governance emerging out of path-dependence 
conditions, out of a long run equilibrium of processes if the actors such as 
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local community leaders, families, teachers, community-based 
organisations, national social movements and the like are excluded from 
the discussion? To exclude these actors is to propose that the global is 
‘external’ to them, a proposition that lacks the trace of common sense. 
Conversely, how else do we make intelligible that a family in Lumwana 
district in the Copperbelt region of Zambia is faced with a severe food 
insecurity because the husband lost a job in the copper mine as a result 
of the 2008 financial crisis? Whilst I agree with the critical realist position 
that governance is a social object that may exist independent of the 
actors that created it, as Bhaskar141 alludes, it is however important to 
acknowledge that summative global governance is nothing other than the 
sum of all the formal, non-formal, state and non-state governances at the 
local and global levels. In fact, summative governance is well captured in 
Simon’s concept of architecture of complexity. In 1962, Simon put forward 
a very compelling argument that “complex systems (such as governance) 
have some form of hierarchical structure, that is, a structure within a 
structure, within a structure”.142  His hypothesis is that complex systems 
are characterised by a multi-level structure, each of which depends, in an 
aggregate way, on each other.143 It is therefore much more than the sum 
of the people that make up such structures, but more specifically about 
how these structures interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities.  
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Whilst summative governance is a relatively new concept, the interest in 
multi-level governances, mainly in the global arena, precedes this term. In 
his analysis of the contemporary interest in global governance, Night 
recalls how the global systemic challenges led to paradigmatic challenges 
in the 1970s and early 1980s, which in turn paved the way for intellectual 
discourse around multi-level governance.144 Thus, it is not so much a 
question of whether the participation of the new actors and 
interdependency of the various forms of governance at the domestic or 
on the global level is new.  But, as highlighted throughout the preceding 
sections, the summative concept serves to remind us to keep asking the 
right question and think afresh in the face of such unprecedented periods, 
because, as Rosenau so eloquently purports, “the pace of change is too 
great to justify avoidance of (these) phenomena that cannot be easily 
classified”.145 Because the current pace of change far supersedes any 
found in historical records, it begs the question: “how can one not pause 
and wonder what it all means… and consider the possibility that (maybe) 
one’s approach to the subject is in need of repair, if not replacement”.146  
 
Socio-political imperatives of governance 
 
What makes governance work amidst the turbulence, unpredictability, 
messiness, complexity and dynamism? This question has been implicitly 
repeated in several of the preceding sections. Addressing such questions 
requires greater insight into what I would refer to as the “orders of 	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criticality” that must be achieved for any system of governance to 
function, in the sense that their absence renders the concept of 
governance questionable.  Because governance does not emerge for its 
own sake, but out of what I referred to earlier as path-dependent 
conditions, it is predicated upon certain socio-political conditions. The first 
order of criticality is the admittance that nothing in the social world can 
exist without people. Whilst it is true that, from a functionalist perspective, 
society takes primacy over the individual, at the same time, society is not 
external to the people in the same way that physical objects are external 
to people. If we cease to exist, society will also come to an end, only the 
physical processes, such as gravity, sound, and orbits of planets will 
continue in the same fashion, although we will not be there to experience 
it. But just as important, governance is mediated through language and 
concepts, it is therefore embedded in ways of life; in what naturally 
emerges as individuals transform themselves into social groups as tribes, 
communities, and ultimately as nations. Put differently, governance 
cannot be alienated from people and their culture.  The idea that culture 
is an important aspect of governance is not new and according to 
Meranze it can be traced back to the eighteenth century with the “linkage 
of culture to direction, and thereby governance”.147 A common sense view 
is that people and their culture constitute the first order of criticality.  
 
The second order of criticality is the consideration that human security is 
a vital component of the process of governing. Since the early 1990s 	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there has been a marked recognition that the need to ensure human 
security is a critical condition for governance. Human security is the ability 
of people to enjoy complete and full lives. Duffield refers to human 
security as the technology for governance in that the “failure to achieve 
human security risks disillusionment, internal war and the mobilisation of 
transborder networks and flows that threaten the cohesion of borderland 
states and hence the global order itself”.148 The concept of human 
security is not new and can be traced back to the 1970s, starting with the 
Club of Rome which produced a series of volumes on the ‘world 
problematique’, which were premised on the idea that there are ‘complex 
problems troubling men of all nations’”.149 Whilst the Club of Rome 
facilitated discussions on security as a people-centred issue, the turning 
point was in 2003 when the UN Commission on Human Security 
proposed a paradigmatic shift from taking the state out of the equation of 
human security, because as they posited, the very state that was the 
fundamental purveyor of security often fails to ensure security of its 
people and at times it is a “source of threat to its own people”.150 What 
followed was a lesser emphasis on state security in favour of human 
security. Human dignity in terms of meeting their basic needs and 
ensuring full participation in political process became the mantra. Despite 
the criticism on whether this is too broad a term to be useful either 
analytically or practically, human security became much of the focus in 
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political and academic discourse on governance and security. Thus, in 
drawing attention to the critical imperative of human security, it is useful 
to recall that governance is carried out through both self-organising and 
self-regulating networks; therefore it is concerned with human 
organisations and with how people live harmoniously and persistently in 
their societies, and how freely they can exercise their choices, just as 
human security, according to the UN is concerned…. 
 
“[With] human life and dignity... It is concerned with how people 
live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many 
choices, how much access they have to market and social 
opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.”151 
 
In other words, in the absence of human security, governance or more 
appropriately, the exercise of governance becomes difficult, because all 
these conditions are critical for humans to co-exist. Thus, it is not a 
question of whether governance exists in spite of these conditions, as 
clearly, it is as a result of such conditions.   
 
The third order of criticality is that we cannot be fully human without some 
degree of knowledge, for our continued existence is largely dependent on 
the process of knowledge generation, retention and transfer. Suffice to 
say, knowledge is an important part of society and as I shall discuss in 
greater detail in later chapters, it exists both in the informal and formal 
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governance structures. In the formal governance systems, knowledge is 
partly of technical skills, and the kind of informal, hard-to-pin-down skills 
captured in the term ‘know-how’. Similarly knowledge in the informal 
governances exists in the form of rules, norms, beliefs, customs created 
to protect populations by influencing accountability and legitimacy. As one 
commentator puts it: 
 
“Knowledge, in all its forms, is a means to the attainment of (socio-
economic) self-determination and self-reliance. Every aspect of 
human activity in terms of the use of knowledge is becoming a vital 
component of socio-economic and political interaction. This has 
prompted many a commentator to proclaim that we have entered 
the 'Information Age'. Information is power, so the cliché goes.”152 
 
The current literature on governance fails to acknowledge the relationship 
between knowledge- in its broader sense, including but extending beyond 
technical expertise- and governance. It neglects the fact that governance 
is itself a product of knowledge and is also often directed at changing 
knowledge in order to influence behaviour. Governance is also a 
historical construct, and its emergence must be seen in the context of the 
historical progression of knowledge. By implication, we cannot imagine 
our world without such knowledge, for our understanding of such a world 
is dependent upon knowledge antecedents. Conversely, our knowledge 	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of the world, according to Bhaskar is the raw material of science.153 With 
the understanding that governance in the 21st century is best 
characterised by dynamism implies that the capacity of individuals, 
communities and societies must change and adapt to what Rosenau 
refers to as the modern “crazy-quilt”.154 People will have to become more 
analytically skilful just to comprehend the changes.  The world has 
transformed into what is often referred to as knowledge society. With the 
current trend of change, knowledge is increasingly becoming the 
fundamental basis for human advancement, both as individuals and as 
societies. Our education system in its totality, from the informal to the 
formal, will eventually be measured not only in terms of building technical 
competencies, but also in terms of its contribution to a more tolerant 
society, a society that appreciates diversity and a society that possesses 
appropriate social skills. In short, a society that is more governable.  As I 
emphatically stated earlier, education- as the key social mechanism for 
knowledge formation and transfer in its continuum from the family, school, 
institutions of higher learning, political governance institutions- will 
become the foundation for governance as we move into the new era.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a conceptual understanding of what we mean 
by governance and to identify the potential actors in the process of 
governing. I have highlighted how political, social and economic life has 	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clearly undergone serious changes in the last few decades. While it is 
true that continuous change is a natural condition of physical, biological 
and social systems, I have reiterated the words of Chambers that what 
makes the change different is “its combination of scale, speed, global 
scope and unpredictability (and) more seems to be changing and 
changing faster; changes are more interconnected and more instantly 
communicated; and the future is harder to foresee”.155 We are forced to 
operate along a continuum of local-to-global on an almost daily basis, 
constantly seeking to understand complex exchanges of activity. Whilst 
some writers proclaim that globalisation is possibly the best thing that we 
have ever witnessed, it is nonetheless what Knight calls a “double-edged 
sword”.156 Along with it came many ills, including, but not limited to the 
widening of the gap between the poor and the rich and the proliferation of 
illicit networks across the globe. Inevitably, from a governance 
perspective, new forms of non-state governance are emerging as 
community and social movements are gaining momentum. The 
implication of this is that that political scientists and scholars must come 
to grips with these new forms of governance. As Giddens puts it; scholars 
“may have to work across interdisciplinary boundaries and specialised 
subjects as they are to understand where the ‘new’ politic is taking us”.157 
Similar sentiments are echoed by Payne who argues that, “in seeking to 
make an analytical link between globalisation and governance at the 
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intellectual level, a coalescence of literatures or sub-fields within political 
analysis is required”.158  
 
I have presented governance in its broader context as the overall 
mechanisms of social order and as more than the sum of its constituent 
parts. It follows that governance not only encompasses the work of 
government, but includes these other command mechanisms that 
perform functions, irrespective of whether these have evolved institutions. 
The functions are ever present and self-evident, and include such things 
as coping with external threats, avoiding conflicts, maintaining law and 
order and providing food to ensure survival of the human species.159 In 
positing that all these actors of governance be recognised and their 
interdependence acknowledged both in the domestic and international 
arenas, I am arguing that governance is a continuous process of 
evolution that runs in a continuum from a nascent to fully institutionalised 
mechanisms of control. Thus, governance emerges out of path-
dependence conditions and passes through lengthy evolution and as 
Rosenau puts it; “is more likely to evolve out of bottom-up than top-down 
processes”.160 It should almost be axiomatic that the various forms of 
governances are inextricably discussed in relation to each other. In fact, 
the argument extends beyond identifying the various forms of 
governance, but advances the idea that governance is pronounced as a 
fundamental element of human existence. When we attach such issues 
as health, economic development, environmental quality, education and 	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human security to governance, we move the concept from being an 
ideological or academic abstract, to being a pre-condition for human 
existence (or more appropriately as a pre-condition for human co-
existence).  In the grand scheme of things, governance is the totality of 
the governances of all of these things that make life what it is. Thus, 
governance is defined as a summative phenomenon, premised on 
various “orders of criticality”, including, but not limited to, 1) societal and 
cultural stability, 2) human security and 3) the process of knowledge 
formation, retention and transfer.  
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Chapter 3: Knowledge formation, retention and transfer 
 
Introduction 
 
I have proposed the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer 
as one of the orders of criticality for governance to emerge from long run 
equilibrium of processes, as an important process that greases the wheel that 
allows the various levels of systems of governances to interact and evolve 
smoothly. It is a socio-political condition that must be maintained for there to 
be a continuous evolution of governance from nascent to fully institutionalised 
systems of governance. I view governance as a product of knowledge and 
that its emergence must be seen in the context of the historical progression of 
knowledge. I have also argued that knowledge be seen as one of the lenses 
through which the impacts of HIV and AIDS on governance could be 
understood. Thus, it is vital to examine the concept of knowledge more 
closely. However, to ‘know’, this epistemic concept par excellence, is much 
more complex than meets the eye. In a sense, the classical expression, cogito 
ergo sum or I think therefore I am, by the 17th century French philosopher, 
Rene Descartes, to prove that the mere fact of knowing that you think about 
being is enough prove that one actually exists, captures the complexity. Whilst 
the expression has a much deeper philosophical meaning, intrinsic to its 
constituents is the complexity of the nature of knowledge, for we acquire 
knowledge as we perceive our existence and the world around us, as we think 
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about things we already know, and as we look into our consciousness.161 
Socrates, renowned as the founder of western philosophy once remarked, 
“man is the measure of all things”, not only in reference to the fact that it is 
through the life of man that one can see what things mean, but also in that it is 
within the limits of human nature to produce knowledge in our endeavor to 
make sense of our lives. The study of knowledge and how it is formed, 
transformed, retained, and transferred has been puzzling scholars for eons. 
Leading classical and contemporary philosophers have postulated major 
themes on the nature of knowledge, how it is acquired and the evidences 
used to justify what we know. From Plato’s Theaetetus dialogue (Plato, 360 
BCE), to contemporary writers, the question of the nature and scope of 
knowledge has been a major area of philosophical inquiry. This is because, as 
Aristotle once said, “all men by nature desire to know”.162 To date, there is no 
agreement on the precise definition of knowledge and numerous theories 
exist to explain it. Nonetheless, and while philosophers are unable to provide 
a generally acceptable analysis of knowledge, the general agreement is that 
when we talk of knowledge, we know roughly what we are talking about not 
least because it is hard to imagine a stable person, let alone a stable society 
without some degree of knowledge.163 Therefore, the various theoretical 
formulations, whilst different in their foci of knowledge, are uniform in their 
understanding that we cannot be fully human without some degree of 
knowledge, for our continued existence is largely dependent on the process of 
knowledge generation, retention and transfer. Knowledge serves as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161 Robert Audi, Epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge: 
second edition (New York and London: Routledge, 2003).   
162 Richard McKeon (ed), Basic Works of Aristotle (New York: Random House, 1941), p. 689. 
163 Paul K Moser, The Oxford handbook of epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002) 
	   -­‐84-­‐	  
human compass to navigate the interstice of the increasingly complex 
problems facing our world. Whilst this is incontestable, unfortunately studying 
knowledge has often been avoided in modern day academic discourse, 
because defining knowledge, especially as it pertains to the philosophical 
question of what constitutes true knowledge is complex. It is an easy to avoid 
question, which avoidance clearly creates gaps in our knowledge of the 
nature and causes of the stability of complex social systems. Mainstream 
academic inquiry paradoxically avoids the question of the central role 
knowledge plays in maintaining social systems, more so how continuity 
through change is maintained by the process of knowledge formation, 
retention and transfer. I hope that focusing on the theme of knowledge in 
sustaining social systems, I will keep alive an issue, which I believe has 
received less attention than what it deserves. Not only that, but knowledge is 
generally valuable in human social and organisational systems. My interest is 
inspired by the contention that in humans, knowledge has an instrumental 
value as it gets us through the day as well as the night. Essentially, I view the 
importance of knowledge not as its philosophical definition but its virtue. 
Borrowing from Aristotle, another renowned philosopher; “virtue has to do with 
the proper function (ergon) of a thing… (because) an eye is only a good eye 
in so much as it can see, because the proper function of an eye is sight”.164 
Thus knowledge is relevant because it serves specific functions to humans, 
and also because it has an element of immediacy. Admittedly, the epistemic 
importance of knowledge is also in its value, for knowledge is not only good 
for its own sake, but as Kvanvig, asserts, the value of knowledge is in its 	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connection to practical affairs of life.165 The early theories of Descartes, Locke 
and Kant and the preceding perspectives trace the value of knowledge to the 
value of its constituents or some intrinsic value that it has, but did not perceive 
knowledge as valuable because it is useful. These are questions very rarely 
asked in the early epistemologies, whilst clearly, it is only if the primary focus 
of epistemological theorising is valuable that the epistemological enterprise is 
itself worth undertaking.166  
 
In what follows, I will argue for the following: having scrutinised the available 
arguments that bear on some important questions in the theory of knowledge, 
the theory of tacit knowledge postulated by Michael Polanyi’s (1891-1976) has 
the best epistemic significance to my area of inquiry. Whilst the classical 
theories recognised that knowledge is never complete, it remained deeply 
ingrained in their conception that knowledge could be studied mechanically in 
a static way. Michael Polanyi, along with other philosophers in the twentieth 
century, saw weaknesses in this scientific view of knowledge and moved 
towards a post-modernist view. He questioned the commonly held view that 
knowledge can be studied objectively, and advanced the idea that “Into all act 
of knowing there enters a passionate contribution of the person knowing what 
is being known and that this coefficient is no mere imperfection, but a vital 
component of the knowledge”.167 
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Typologies of knowledge 
 
Before delineating the major themes of the theory of tacit knowledge, I shall 
first address the question of what is knowledge, not least because in everyday 
language we talk of knowledge fairly loosely without due regard to what it 
actually means to ‘know’, nor do we distinguish among the various kinds of 
knowledge and whether our narratives recognise that such differences indeed 
exist. More importantly, there is a general tendency to use the term 
information and data interchangeably with knowledge as though these are the 
same. It is therefore important to understand from the onset that when we talk 
of knowledge, we refer to a “more broader, richer and deeper” understanding 
of and ability to do things and as Davenport and Prusak assert, it “exists 
within people, part and parcel of human complexity and unpredictability.”168  
Knowledge is generally accepted to either belong to one of the three ‘senses’ 
or ‘kinds of knowledge’, namely a), procedural knowledge b) propositional 
knowledge and c) personal knowledge or acquaintance knowledge.169 
Procedural knowledge or simply ability knowledge, cannot be contested as it 
refers to knowing how to perform tasks such as driving a car, playing a music 
instrument, or swimming, but at the same time does not claim an 
understanding of the theory involved in those activities. It is rather that we 
actually possess the skills involved and are able to perform such things as 
driving, cooking or swimming. For analytical purposes, I will contrast 
propositional against acquaintance knowledge, though as I shall posit later, 	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because personal knowledge is information possessed in the minds of people 
and is personalised and may be related to facts, concepts, procedures, ideas, 
observations and judgements, it follows that it embraces both ability and to 
some extent propositional knowledge, though in contrast to the latter, 
personal knowledge cannot be mechanised. What this means is that whilst 
propositional knowledge does not give personal or procedural knowledge, 
personal knowledge on the other hand involves acquiring some form of 
propositional knowledge in as much as it involves knowing how to do things 
though such knowledge in ineffable. I will draw on Polanyi’s work to 
demonstrate how the tendency to make knowledge impersonal “has split fact 
from value, science from humanity”, because, the detachment from personal 
involvement of the knower in all acts of understanding has undermined 
science’s ability to make a relevant contribution to our understanding of the 
nature and causes of stability of social systems.170 I will return to this issue in 
later sections. 
 
Propositional Knowledge 
 
Without entering the epistemic enterprise for which numerous books have 
been written, to get a firmer hold on the typology of knowledge which I will set 
out to promote, it is important to discuss the propositional knowledge, also 
referred to as descriptive or declarative knowledge at some length. Unlike 
procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance, propositional 
knowledge is described rather than depicted, mainly by use of symbols, for 	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example language. The difference with knowledge by acquaintance or 
procedural knowledge is that “we know a description and we know that there 
is just one object to which this description applies, though the object itself is 
not directly known to us.”171 Epistemology is primarily concerned with this kind 
of knowledge, as it always involves truths as its source and ground. The 
reason is well captured in the following extract from Lemos:  
 
“[P]hilosophers are typically concerned with what is true. They want to 
know what is true and they want to evaluate and assess their own claims, 
and those of others, to know the truth. When philosophers ask, for 
example, about the extent of our knowledge, they are typically concerned 
with the extent of our propositional knowledge, with the extent of the 
truths that we know. When one philosopher says he knows that there are 
external objects and another philosopher denies this, they are disagreeing 
about whether there is propositional knowledge of a certain sort. They are 
disagreeing about whether truths of a certain kind are known. 
Acquaintance knowledge and ‘‘how to’’ knowledge are not in the same 
way ‘‘truth focused.’’172 
 
It is clear that the knowledge to which Lemos refers involves certain elements 
of complexity, in contrast to the characteristically direct sort of knowledge by 
acquaintance. According to Clark, the complexities are also in terms of the 
degree of syntactical complexities in our forms of reference.173 Whilst only 	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logical proper names and predicates are the syntactically simple linguistic 
vehicles used to express reference to the particulars, statements contain 
terms, concepts, theories which themselves may be syntactically confusing. 
Another complexity is that propositional knowledge can be further 
distinguished in terms of the range of subjects and questions to which it 
extends. Audi identifies three important domains in which “we are widely 
thought to have knowledge of truths that are central in guiding our lives: the 
scientific, the moral, and the religious.”174 Here, Audi attempts to show that 
different questions depend on the domain under discussion, but most 
importantly that while propositional knowledge is truth focused, some 
proposition are only true as far as our moral, or at times our religious beliefs, 
dictates. Accordingly, when we judge something to be wrong we go beyond 
the evidence of the senses, and indeed beyond scientific evidence. When, for 
example, we believe that beating a child for crying is wrong, we accept it but 
do not necessarily know it, nor can we establish it scientifically. We find it 
natural because it is grounded in our culture and to be accepted simply as 
part of the social fabric that holds our lives together.175 The complexity here is 
that Audi introduces an old epistemic debate on the nature of true knowledge. 
On the one hand empiricists, and many other theories aligned to it, reject the 
notion of personal beliefs, as they view this as personal acceptance, which 
falls short of empirical demonstrability. The complexity is in a sense intrinsic in 
the statement of what constitutes right or wrong, as empiricists would like us 
to believe that statements of belief and faith are value-laden. On the other 
hand, rationalists and similar theories recognise belief as a true source of 	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knowledge, because such things as intellectual passions, sharing of idiom, 
sharing of cultural heritage, affiliation are the impulses that shape our vision of 
nature of things that cannot operate outside what Polanyi calls the ‘fiduciary 
framework’ of belief.176 
 
Clearly, these earlier theories revolutionalised our understanding of the nature 
of propositional knowledge and how such knowledge can be acquired, 
transferred and retained. Since these early theories, many more theories have 
been framed in pursuit of understanding the nature of propositional 
knowledge. The complexities presented by these early theories seem to have 
instead inspired revolutionary intellectual discourse leading to a period known 
as Enlightenment, during the eighteenth century, where several schools of 
thought sprung to the fore. The period of Enlightenment saw the early theories 
of empiricism and rationalism radicalized. More theories of knowledge have 
emerged, attempting to rejuvenate the epistemic question of what is the 
extent of knowledge and whether the enterprise of epistemology is worth 
undertaking. The empiricist epistemology was extended, albeit under the 
positivist philosophy, and essentially reiterated and amplified the belief that 
progress in knowledge is made from observation to verification by means of 
observational methods. While rationalism on the other hand, inspired 
hermeneutics, the belief that true knowledge can only be uncovered in hidden 
texts embedded in human meaning. Both rationalism and empiricism continue 
to shape major epistemological perspectives to date. The theories are too 
numerous to be discussed in any length. Scanning these perspectives seems 
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to suggest that they continue to emphasise the high purpose of knowledge, 
what Aristotle calls Eudaimonia, the broadest and deepest human well-being, 
because as Roberts purports; “in the epistemically virtuous person the 
disposition of caring about the intellectual goods will derive in part from a 
disposition of caring about other goods such as justice, human well-being, 
and friendship.”177 This, of course, underscores and explicates the 
epistemological preoccupation with propositional knowledge. Whilst obviously 
my views are biased by my sincere interest in the necessity of knowledge to 
sustaining social systems, one may say, that the insistence on wholly explicit 
truth may have limited our ability to acknowledge that not all knowledge can 
be made explicit by prescription (I shall return to this in the next section). At 
the same time, one cannot help but to accept the contribution of classical 
epistemology as the foundation to our knowledge today and an indicator of 
our limitation to knowing. In truth, many greatest discoveries of our age have 
been rightly attributed to some of the greatest epistemologists. But it is also 
true that the avowed purpose of epistemology should be to establish 
intellectual understanding on the value of knowledge in terms of its necessity 
to sustain social systems. The major gap, as I shall explain later, is 
epistemological preoccupation with the principles governing social and natural 
systems, therefore turning a blind eye to the fact that not all knowledge can be 
specified in detail, insofar as the knowledge is useful whether it is codified or 
not. Admittedly, the epistemic importance of knowledge is also in its value, for 
knowledge is not only good for its own sake, but as Kvanvig, asserts, the 
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value of knowledge is in its connection to practical affairs of life.178 As I have 
stated earlier, the early theories of Descartes, Locke and Kant and the 
preceding perspectives trace the value of knowledge to the value of its 
constituents or some intrinsic value that it has, but did not perceive knowledge 
as valuable because it is useful, hence the neglect of personal knowledge. 
The value of knowledge is in its instrumentality as is evident that regardless of 
whether knowledge is ascribed in terms of its propositional form, social 
systems persisted before such propositions were laid out by science. These 
are questions very rarely asked in these early epistemologies, whilst as I have 
said earlier, it is only if the primary focus of epistemological theorising is 
valuable that the epistemological enterprise is itself worth undertaking.179  
 
Personal Knowledge 
 
I will now turn to the more relevant knowledge for which I shall start with the 
assertion that all humans possess such knowledge. Personal knowledge, 
sometimes also referred to as knowledge by acquaintance, is generally easily 
understood and usually taken to be a sui generis, a simple relation between 
the mind and objects, that is, between a conscious being and various kinds of 
entities. It is a cognisance of circumstances and facts gained through 
experience and observation (or in other words by acquaintance). In most 
cases such knowledge is unspecifiable, which in effect means that it should 
not and cannot necessarily be reducible to the laws of physics. The contention 
that knowledge is personal and largely extends beyond and cannot be 	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reducible to writing or enumerated and inscribed in documents, books, 
manuals and journals as is the case with propositional knowledge, lies at the 
heart of my thesis. Bertrand Russel popularised personal knowledge in a 
paper that appeared in the Aristotelian Society Proceedings for 1910-11. 
Russel’s view was that “we shall say that we have acquaintance with anything 
of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of 
inference or any knowledge of truths”.180 Russel further argues that 
knowledge of things by acquaintance is essentially simpler than any 
knowledge of truths and logically independent of knowledge of truths, “though 
it may be rash to assume that human beings ever, in fact, have acquaintance 
with things without at the same time knowing some truth about them.” The 
issues raised in Russel’s paper are too numerous to be dealt with adequately 
in this thesis. However at the core of his philosophy is the importance of 
knowledge by acquaintance and for him it is arguably the most fundamental 
concept on which all epistemology is built. His paper presents some 
compelling arguments that knowledge by acquaintance is indeed the basis for 
all knowledge, because “knowledge concerning what is known by description 
(i.e propositional knowledge) is ultimately reducible to knowledge concerning 
what is known by acquaintance.”181 This is true because for every proposition 
to be understood, it must be composed wholly of constituents with which we 
are acquainted with. For example, we attach meaning to the words used to 
speak significantly rather than rhetorically and such words must be something 
with which we are acquainted. This view has created major interests in 
knowledge by acquaintance, and with it, many criticisms. The major criticism 	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of this view was proposed by Sellars, when he argued that even if we were 
acquainted with individuals, properties, or facts, that relation does not 
necessarily give us knowledge of truth because while correct, it is irrelevant to 
the more sophisticated view according to which the acquaintance is only a 
constituent of the ground of propositional knowledge.182 Notwithstanding 
these criticisms, Michael Polanyi succinctly extended Russel’s argument 
further by proposing that no matter how empirical or formalised knowing is 
presented, ultimately all knowledge will rely upon personal knowledge or 
knowledge of what is known by acquaintance. Whilst many epistemologists 
draw a line between procedural and acquaintance knowledge, for Polanyi, 
because personal knowledge involves active comprehension of things known, 
connected to the ability and skills to do those things, he in effect treats both 
procedural and acquaintance knowledge as personal.  Polanyi therefore only 
sees knowledge to belong to either the knowledge of things by description or 
the tacit knowledge of things- which knowledge include both the knowing by 
doing and acquaintance, though as I have alluded earlier, it also involves 
acquiring some form of propositional knowledge in as much as it involves 
knowing how to do things though such knowledge in ineffable.  
 
Michael Polanyi initially set out to critique the positivist’s account of science by 
advocating a post-critical approach in which he urged us to recognise 
science’s neglect of the role of personal commitment in the very practice of 
science. Whilst the art of science set out to promote the explicit dimension of 
knowledge, in that knowledge can be codified in statements, manuals, 	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documents, books and journals, we ought to recognise that there exists a 
dimension of personal knowledge that cannot be made fully explicit, which in 
his later works, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy 
(1958), Polanyi popularised such as the tacit dimension of knowledge. His 
theory starts with the premise that all knowledge has personal and tacit 
elements. Polanyi was inspired by the Gestalt psychology, and therefore 
developed strong views that the process of knowing is inspired by fragmented 
clues, sensory motors and derives from memory. In Polanyi’s words, “Gestalt 
psychology has demonstrated that we may know a physiognomy by 
integrating our awareness of its particulars without being able to identify these 
particulars.”183 Gestalt Psychology is a school of thought originated by Max 
Wertheimer in opposition to structuralism, and specifically molecularism of 
Wundt’s program for psychology. The fundamental tenet of Gestalt, according 
to Wertheimer, is that “there are wholes, the behaviour of which is not 
determined by that of their individual elements, but where the part-processes 
are themselves determined by the intrinsic nature of the whole.”184 It is a 
theory that regards the whole as greater than its parts, and thus not reducible 
to the analysis of each part in isolation. Wertheimer was particularly interested 
in the capability of our senses, as they relate to the visual recognition of 
figures and wholes and how it goes beyond just a collection of lines and 
curves. He postulated that the mind and brain have self-organising tendencies 
that operate holistically, analogically and in parallel. Polanyi slightly modified 
the Gestalt psychology by extending it from the spontaneous equilibrium of its 
particulars impressed on the brain to seeing it as what he calls, “the outcome 	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of an active shaping experience performed in the pursuit of knowledge”.185 He 
sees the shaping of experience, or his version of Gestalt, to be the “greatest 
and indispensable tacit power by which all knowledge is discovered and once 
discovered, is held to be true”.  
 
Polanyi is famous for the expression, “we can know more than what we can 
tell”, an assertion that is reflective to his opposition to positivist epistemology 
of knowledge, which assumes knowledge to be explicit in nature. The 
positivist approach to knowledge, he argues, is the conception of natural 
science as a set of statements, which are ‘objective’ in the sense that its 
substance is entirely determined by observation, even if paradoxically its 
presentation may be shaped by convention. This obviously lacks substance, 
because knowing more than we can say helps explain how knowledge can be 
passed on by non-explicit means. Polanyi’s opposition to positivism was so 
entrenched that he once referred to it loosely as a “philosophy-to-end-all-
philosophy”.186 He was particularly concerned that positivism, while it set out 
to liberate reason from enslavement, disposed of the traditionally guiding 
principles, like morality, law, custom, and justice, insofar as these were not 
demonstrable by science. Paradoxically, the belief that science is positive, 
and thus involves no affirmation of personal belief was the cause of positivism 
demise during the latter part of the twentieth century.187 It is important not to 
construe Polanyi’s opposition to positivism as doubting the efficacy of 	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scientific knowledge, but instead his contention is that knowledge extends 
beyond propositional knowledge, and the area into which it extends is tacit.  
 
On the tacit dimension of knowledge, Polanyi set out to demonstrate that 
personal judgement may have made significant contributions to scientific 
thought, though such tacit operations may not be easily discernable. It is 
therefore not hard to imagine how personal belief not only led to discoveries, 
but also in the very holding of scientific knowledge. As Polanyi says; “even 
writers like Kant, so powerfully bent on strictly determining the rules of pure 
reason, occasionally admitted that into all acts of judgement there enters, and 
must enter, personal decision which cannot be accounted for by rules.”188 In 
essence, admitting that the exercise of judgement is at times inscrutable. It is 
this unaccountable truth that the theory of tacit knowledge attempts to 
elucidate because as Polanyi puts it; “an art that cannot be specified in detail 
cannot be passed on by prescription since no such prescription exist for it”.189  
The central tenet of the theory of tacit knowledge is that knowledge is 
ineffable in that it cannot be understood by looking at how people 
communicate verbally. This sort of knowledge, according to Fabian, “can be 
represented, made present only through action, enactment, or 
performance.”190 Ineffability in theory of tacit knowledge is taken literally in 
that nothing can be said precisely. Like Polanyi says, “what I call ineffable 
may simply mean something I know and can describe even less precisely 
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than usual, or even only in vague language”.191 In other words, it is the 
unspecifiability of personal knowledge, that part of knowledge that is the 
residue of what is left unsaid by our “defective articulation”, a term I borrow 
from Polanyi who describes such defectiveness as common and often glaring. 
Polanyi distinguishes the unspecifiable knowledge from subsidiary or 
instrumental knowledge, such as those of riding a bicycle, which he 
essentially uses to prove that though we may possess it, such knowledge 
cannot be articulated clearly, yet this will not prevent one to say, ‘I know how 
to ride a bicycle’. Accordingly, even if an analysis of such knowledge may be 
brought into focus by analysis, or formulated as a maxim, or feature in a 
physiognomy, such will never be at best and not exhaustive. Polanyi 
expresses this point quite explicitly in the following extract from his book, 
Personal Knowledge: 
 
“Although the expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton-classer 
can indicate their clues and formulate their maxims, they know 
more things than they can tell, knowing them only in practice, as 
instrumental particulars, and not explicitly, as objects. The 
knowledge of such particulars is therefore ineffable, and pondering 
of judgement in terms of such particulars is ineffable process of 
thought. This applies equally to connoisseurship as the art of 
knowing and to skills as the art of doing, wherefore both can be 
taught only by aid of practical example and never solely by 
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percept.”192 
 
Ineffability results from the highly personal knowledge of humans which is 
different from the facts of inanimate world. The personal faculty becomes 
even more manifested as we ascend the ladder of life, resulting in “more far-
reaching participation of the knower- in order to understand life.”193 Such is 
the participation that the tacit coefficient of knowing broadens and the 
complexities to declare it become dominant. In later writings, the tacit 
dimension of knowing became Polanyi’s focal point of his theory, thereby 
effectively shifting his focus towards the process of knowledge formation and 
transfer.  The framework of tacit knowing has its basis in Polanyi’s description 
of physiognomy, a term referring to recognition of human faces without being 
able to tell how we know it, which he extends further to include what he calls 
“peculiar appearances of species which can be recognised only aesthetically” 
and “the characteristics of wines and blends of teas which only the experts 
can recognise”.194  The three main themes of tacit knowledge are that, first, 
discovery cannot be accounted by a set of rules of algorithm; second, 
knowledge is both public and to a large extent personal; and third all 
knowledge is tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge.195 In a sense knowledge is not 
private but social and when conveyed socially, it blends with experience of the 
individual. Sveiby argues that this is as a result of the fact that “new 
experiences are always assimilated through the concepts of which the 
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individual disposes and that the individual has inherited from other users of 
the language”.196 Nonaka, echoes that it “consists of mental models, beliefs, 
and perspectives so ingrained that we take them for granted and therefore 
cannot easily articulate them”.197 Zappavigna-Lee and Patrick pronounce that 
whilst the part of experience is below-view and unattended, it nevertheless 
“allows us the experiential agility to be at once efficient and creative, to 
assimilate the novel and the familiar: in essence, to develop expertise.”198 
Zappavigna-Lee and Patrick further articulate how we possess skilful practice, 
such as those of the artisan, the witchdoctor or the physician, all of which 
have occupied a position of both importance and mystery in most cultures 
since ancient times. It is “such hidden knowledge [that] made us mythologise 
expertise, placing it beyond the common by constructing it as 
unspeakable.”199 Gerard adds to this quite appropriately, that it should not be 
confused with unconscious knowing, that is, the type of knowledge that, even 
while in use, is unknown to the knower, or with pre-conscious knowing or non-
conscious knowing.200 To extend this further, knowing that we know how to 
perform a task is not the same as knowing that we cannot explain the 
principals involved in performing such a task. Though we know our ability 
through successfully performing such tasks as riding a bicycle or swimming, 
we become puzzled when we realise that no matter how hard we try to 
elucidate the precise forces, laws and principles involved in such exercises, it  	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is inscrutable.  
 
It should become clear that whilst it was important, from an analytical point of 
view to present the various knowledge typologies, I am setting out to promote 
the importance of the personal dimension of knowledge or what Polanyi, in his 
later writing termed tacit knowledge, for such knowledge has largely been 
overshadowed by the vigorous scientific search for the laws governing the 
social and material worlds. According to Polanyi, universities around the world 
have failed to tap into this knowledge. In his words, “…while the articulate 
contents of science are successfully taught all over the world in hundreds of 
new universities, the unspecifiable art of scientific research has not yet 
penetrated to many of these…”201 I argue that by focusing on this type of 
knowledge I will promote an understanding of the imperatives of knowledge 
formation, retention and transfer to our everyday life, because as Bloch further 
remarks; “…it is not just the case that tacit knowledge is not formulated 
linguistically and not available for reflection, rather its effectiveness in 
enabling everyday life is founded on it not being explicit and linguistic…”202 
Despite this fact, there has been little mainstream academic inquiry into how 
tacit knowledge is an important element of the process of continuity of social 
and cultural systems. 
 
Knowledge formation, retention and transfer  
 
The nature of tacit knowledge is such that it is intergenerational and knowing 	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by experience, observation and education presupposes knowledge to be 
transferred between humans. Polanyi’s point that ‘we know more that we can 
tell’, is a significance starting point to remind ourselves that the knowledge by 
which we live our everyday lives cannot easily be verbalised, but yet our 
everyday activities in our social settings are meaningful even if such activities 
cannot be postulated in words. Polanyi’s argument also reminds us of the fact 
that, as Jackson puts forward; “The knowledge whereby one lives is not 
necessarily identical with the knowledge whereby one explains life”.203 This is 
the case because humanity emerges primarily through our everyday, practical 
engagement with the world rather than through a contemplative reflection 
upon the world. Because the knowledge by which one lives is tacit and 
embodied, we project ourselves into the world in our every day interactions. 
Polanyi’s theory in so far as it treats knowledge as largely personal and 
therefore tacit, provides the most appropriate foundation to address the 
question of how knowledge formation, retention and transfer is possible in 
social and cultural settings.  
 
Household knowledge formation, retention and transfer  
 
Reiterated throughout the previous sections is the primacy of the institution of 
the family (or family household) as one of the key ingredients of human life, 
the basic unit of a society and as Peplar expresses, it “is the necessary 
foundation of all order and morality”.204 All individuals relate to the community 
through the unit of family. It is the smallest social unit but yet the key facilitator 	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of the knowledge creation process, particularly that which I defined as 
personal and tacit, for such knowledge is largely not codified and thus cannot 
easily be expressed and transferred, specifically between members of a 
household. Unlike in organisations where attempts are made to preserve 
knowledge through succession planning mechanisms, encapsulated into 
computers using databases and systems, families pass on knowledge from 
generation to generation by means of tradition and value systems. Polanyi 
reminds us that whilst language is a means of getting information from one 
mind to the other, most knowledge during interaction amongst family 
members is carried in strings of symbolically encoded meanings. Such 
knowledge must be passed from generation to generation through learning by 
example. According to Polanyi, to learn by example is to submit to authority. 
In attempting to clarify how knowledge is transferred within social settings, 
Polanyi further alludes: 
 
“You follow your master because you trust his manner of doing things 
even when you cannot analyze and account in detail for its 
effectiveness. By watching the master and emulating his efforts in the 
presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the 
rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the 
master himself. These hidden rules can be assimilated only by a person 
who surrenders himself to that extent uncritically to the imitation of 
another.”205 
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Based on Polanyi’s description of authority which he further ascribes as 
tradition, we can proceed to conclude that family units have a natural 
authority, making them the key social unit for intergenerational knowledge 
transfer. As children grow up in family settings, there appears to be a clear 
hierarchy of authority to which they submit themselves to, because this 
authority exerts some form of legitimacy, credibility, trust and confidence. 
According to Polanyi such learning is first a-critical and therefore children 
would surrender to the knowledge of their parents and older siblings without 
questioning because they attribute to them the legitimacy of their actions. 
Therefore, the formation of knowledge within family settings takes place 
locally due to the submission of authority and the legitimacy ascribed to it. 
Most importantly is that most knowledge assimilated locally is largely tacit in 
that it triggers an individual’s personal knowledge, which knowledge is 
acquired through the immersion in the practice. Whilst it is true that 
knowledge transfer could be reciprocal across the ages, by adopting Polanyi’s 
view of authority, I am in effect promoting an understanding that 
intergenerational knowledge transfer involves an older member of the 
household passing on knowledge to younger members.  Put differently, I am 
positing that in family settings, the role that older family members play in the 
transmission of personal knowledge takes primacy in the process of 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer. Borrowing from the social capital 
theory, the father, mother, siblings and other older relatives, form the social 
capital through which younger members of the household assimilate 
knowledge.206 Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, I view the process of 
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knowledge creation as intergenerational. The concept of generation is not 
hard to grasp. Whilst generally, a generation is often used to refer to the gap 
between birth of a parent and their offspring, which period is considered to be 
about 30 years, I use it here simply to denote different stages in family 
members’ lives. It follows that a mother or father are the older generation and 
the son or daughter the younger generation, without necessary referring to the 
chronological age to which they belong. Be that as it may, with the current 
societal changes, including increased geographical mobility, increase in the 
nuclear family unit and ageing population, it has become imperative to invest 
in the promotion of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer, specifically as it relates to the personal dimension of knowledge. This 
becomes ever so pertinent because, as Polanyi proclaims; “an art (that cannot 
be specified) which has fallen into disuse for the period of a generation is 
altogether lost.”207 The loss is more so profound when family units are 
disrupted, which is (as I shall explain in later sections) usually linked to 
greater chance of children exhibiting problem behaviour such as delinquency. 
This is not difficult to demarcate, because as I have set out to demonstrate, 
whilst living in the age of explicit knowledge, systemised in rules and 
guidelines, interactions with members of the family (at an early age) creates 
the subtle knowledge that has come to be associated with socially acceptable 
behaviour of children. Many social science fields, such as clinical and 
developmental science, criminology, family studies, public health and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
networks as valuable assets, as they enable people to build communities and knit the social 
fabrics. Many researchers have now positioned social capital as a key factor in understanding 
knowledge creation. This is the case because if relationships are viewed as valuable and 
depending on the strength of the relationship, as is in the case of a mother and a daughter, 
the knowledge creation process tend to be seamless. 
207  Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: towards a post-critical philosophy, (London: 
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anthropology have all pointed to a relationship between lack of parenting and 
a range of problem behaviours, including delinquency, substance and alcohol 
abuse, early sexual activity and poor school achievement and truancy. In the 
era of HIV and AIDS, we have come to witness how far too often the ability of 
families to impart the key knowledge necessary to protect their young and 
promote changes in community norms have been compromised because of 
the lack of inter-generational knowledge formation, retention and transfer 
around sex and sexuality. This is particularly true for tacit knowledge in 
traditional communities where major differences exist in the ways boys and 
girls are treated by their parents and the knowledge they receive. Generally, 
boys are expected to engage with their fathers and girls with their mothers, 
with such exchanges involving mostly tacit knowledge, particularly as it relates 
to sexual conduct. Therefore, when the process of knowledge formation is 
disrupted, it affects boys and girls differently because this is embedded in the 
context of gender relations, and this has central implication for girls and boys 
vulnerability to delinquency, alcohol abuse, truancy, risky sexual encounters 
and other anti-social behaviours.  
 
Today, there is a greater recognition that families do possess some 
formidable knowledge not easily accessed through formalised systems, 
leading to greater interest in traditional and indigenous knowledge systems. 
This area of inquiry has captured the attention of scholars around the world 
and scores of research is being undertaken. With the current interest on 
biodiversity, health and environmental protection, recognition of traditional 
knowledge is gaining momentum and there is a general consensus that 
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traditional/indigenous knowledge is germane to all other knowledge. It has 
become ever clearer that traditional knowledge is the cornerstone of cultural 
identity and survival of communities and families as it produces a frame of 
understanding and validation that give meaning to the world. As one 
commentator during a conference on traditional knowledge systems 
pronounced; “the loss of traditional knowledge is not just a loss for the 
traditional communities themselves but also a loss to the intellectual property 
of the country as a whole”.208 Communities largely feel this loss not only 
because they use it for practical purposes, but such knowledge forms part of 
their cultural identities as well. It is handed down from previous generations 
through tradition, but as Polanyi reminds us, this knowledge is particularly not 
‘tellable’, positing serious challenges to those interested in such knowledge. 
Whilst some progress is made to codify indigenous knowledge, it becomes 
increasingly evident that the indigenous knowledge projects do not sufficiently 
account for the major part of knowledge because it is tacit. Whilst recognising 
that such knowledge indeed exists, not enough effort is made to ascribe this 
to the interaction of both the tacit and explicit knowledge. In other words, there 
is no sufficient attention given to the fact that traditional knowledge interacts 
with the formal education system to create knowledgeable people necessary 
to maintain societal systems. However, what seems the case is the treatment 
of indigenous knowledge as if it is the same across various cultural settings, 
resulting in ineffective articulation of the bounds of indigenous knowledge. 
The problem, as Bicker, Sillitoe and Pottier put forward, is the “link between 	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the tacit and the explicit, between the spoken and the unspoken that make it 
dangerous to treat indigenous knowledge as ‘fungible’ goods, freely 
convertible between different cultural contexts.”209  
 
Organisational knowledge formation, retention and transfer 
 
The area in which Polanyi’s theory has been used extensively is 
organisational behaviour. Nonaka and Takeuchi in particular, employed 
Polanyi’s theory to attempt to explicate how organisations act as knowledge 
creating machines where people acquire knowledge through the process of 
socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation. As such the 
theory has revolutionalised current understanding of organisational knowledge 
creating processes. It is the most cited piece of work in organisational 
knowledge creation. This point is echoed by Grant when he stated that “it is 
surprising that one of the most cited references in Knowledge Management 
and Intellectual Property papers is not to any of the work published in recent 
periods but to the work of an author from some 50 years ago.210  Grant was 
speaking in reference to the explosion of publication on knowledge 
management and intellectual capital in the period 1995 until 2002. He quoted 
Serenko and Bontis who found that prior to this period fewer than 100 papers 
were written, but between 1995 and 2002, over 5,000 papers were published, 
most of which cited the work of Polanyi, specifically his two books, Personal 
Knowledge: Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (1958) and The Tacit 	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Dimension (1966).211 One of the key authors known to have taken Polanyi’s 
theory to new heights in organisational knowledge is Nonaka and to a lesser 
extent Takeuchi.  
 
The theory of tacit knowledge is now the dominant theory in organisational 
studies.212 The interest in organisational knowledge management and the 
value creation of organisation has increased in both the popular and scholarly 
literature over the past fifteen years or so. But as McLean says, “as is often 
the case in applied fields, it appears that the practices related to the 
phenomenon of knowledge management and knowledge creation have 
accelerated faster than the scholarly work to explain them.”213 However, the 
theory of tacit knowledge appears to date to be the most appealing framework 
as it challenges the ‘input-process-output’ paradigm that dominated 
organisational knowledge studies for years. It has led to paradigmatic shift 
towards viewing organisations as knowledge creating machines through the 
process of socialisation, externalisation, combination and internalisation. 
Because, while new knowledge is developed by individuals, organisations 
also play an important role in articulating and amplifying such knowledge.214 
The appropriateness of the tacit knowledge theory is fathomable as the 
creation of institutional knowledge is complex and even hard to recognise in 	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the first place. Such knowledge exists unidentified until when it is necessary 
and impossible to do without it. Nonaka, epitomised as the most influential 
Polanyi scholar215, describes tacit knowledge in organisations as partly of 
technical skills, the kind of informal, hard-to-pin-down skills captured in the 
term “know-how”, for example a master craftsman who after years of 
experience develops a wealth of expertise at his fingertips, but more often 
than not “unable to articulate the scientific or technical principles behind what 
he knows”.216 In later works, Nonaka and Takeuchi have developed Polanyi’s 
theory of tacit knowledge in business organisation and included in their 
explanation the dimension of explicit knowledge to demonstrate the contrast. 
They have described tacit knowledge in organisations as the hard to articulate 
knowledge with formal language, the type “embedded in individual experience 
and involves intangible factors such as personal belief, perspective and value 
system” as opposed to explicit knowledge, “which can be articulated in formal 
language including grammatical statements, mathematical expressions, 
specifications, manuals and so forth.”217 The tacit knowledge of organisations 
is manifested in collective set of facts, concepts, experience and know-how. It 
transcends the individual, and is regularly transmitted between members of 
the organisation. It is the tacit knowledge that Nonaka and Takeuchi believe 
business organisations have virtually neglected in management studies. 
Organisational knowledge creation in this context is described as the 	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capability of a “company as a whole to create new knowledge, disseminate it 
throughout the organisation and embody it in products, services, and 
systems.”218 More specifically, organisations fail to see that they are not 
merely processers of knowledge but are also creators of it. In Nonaka’s 
words: 
 
“The theory of organization has long been dominated by a 
paradigm that conceptualizes the organization as a system that 
‘processes’ information or solves problems. Central to this 
paradigm is the assumption that a fundamental task for the 
organization is how efficiently it can deal with information and 
decisions in an uncertain environment. This paradigm suggests 
that the solution lies in the ‘input-process-output’ sequence of 
hierarchical information processing. Yet a critical problem with this 
paradigm follows from its passive and static view of the 
organization. Information processing is viewed as a problem-
solving activity which centers on what is given to the organization- 
without due consideration of what is created by it.”219 
 
Using the theory of tacit knowledge as the basis for their work, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi have demonstrated how Japanese companies have increased their 
global competitiveness through the process of knowledge creation.220 They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 Ibid, P. viii 
219 Ikujiro Nonaka, A dynamic theory of organisational knowledge creation, (Tokyo: Institute of 
Management Sciences, 1994), p.14 
220 Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi, Knowledge creating company: how Japanese 
companies create the dynamic innovation, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995), p. viii 
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have been able to strategically acquire, create, exploit, and accumulate new 
knowledge and use these to increase their competitiveness, competency, and 
sustainability. Herein lies my interest in tacit knowledge: my aim is to build a 
conceptual bridge that is able to span the space between the complex 
philosophical conception of knowledge and its practical application. The 
theory of tacit knowledge, specifically that of Nonaka and Takeuchi has 
demonstrated that knowledge creation is also a process of value creation not 
only for the organisation but for the person acquiring that knowledge as well. It 
extends knowledge beyond the theories of Descartes, Locke and Kant that 
trace the value of knowledge to the value of its constituents or some intrinsic 
value that it has, to perceiving knowledge as valuable because it is useful. It 
follows that Nonaka and Takeuchi utilises the theory of tacit knowledge to 
demonstrate that knowledge can get people and organisations money, 
prestige, power, and the like. Moreover, it can increase organisational 
competitiveness, thereby increasing its ability and probability to survive harsh 
times.  
 
Polanyi’s assertion that tacit knowledge is accumulated, for example, by a 
master craftsman who after years of experience develops a wealth of 
expertise at his fingertips, should remind us that the process of knowledge 
formation is, to a large extent, intergenerational. In attempting to justify this 
proposition, it is important that I turn to the question of what is meant by a 
generation in the context of business organisation, before shifting to the more 
relevant question of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer within organisational settings. In collective terms, a generation is seen 
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as “of the people born and living at the same time”,221 generally sharing 
distinct attitudes, behaviours, expectations, habits and sometimes, also 
engage in similar activities, because as the cohort theory denotes, “they are 
similarly located in time and as such have experienced similar historical 
events”.222 Whilst there are contrasting theories of generation, the general 
cohort theory best promotes an understanding of the intergenerational nature 
of knowledge in an organisational setting. In fact, organisational science 
literature usually builds on this theory to delineate the various generations. 
Many writers have since utilised the theory to classify generations in four 
groups; i) the still generations (born 1925-1945), ii) the baby boomers (born 
1946-1964), iii) generation X (born 1965-1980) and generation Y (born 1981-
2001).223 Many writers now use these groups to postulate and delineate the 
differences in knowledge characteristics of these groups. For example, 
McNichols, in her examinations of intergenerational knowledge transfer within 
an Aerospace Engineering community postulate how the baby boomers 
possess different knowledge than those of the Generation X. She further 
outlines how potential knowledge gaps may be created if the baby boomers 
generation aerospace engineers’ knowledge is left unharnessed.224 This is in 
consistence with Polanyi’s argument that an art that has fallen into disuse 
may be lost forever. Polanyi explains the transmission of knowledge within a 
social context by introducing the concept of communities of practice, where he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Oxford English Dictionary 
222 Donal C. Rogers, Making waves: ageing knowledge workers and intergenerational 
learning, (Center for research and intellectual capital: Inholland University of Applied 
Sciences, pp.3) 
223 Donal C. Rogers, Making waves: ageing knowledge workers and intergenerational 
learning, (Center for research and intellectual capital: Inholland University of Applied 
Sciences, pp.3) 
224 Debby McNichols, Tacit knowledge: an examination of intergenerational knowledge 
transfer within an aerospace engineering community, (Phoenix: University of Phoenix, 2008) 
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outlines the process through which knowledge is transferred between the 
master and student in the case of scientific practice. His contention was that 
because an art that cannot be specified in detail cannot be transmitted by 
prescription, it is only through example that a younger apprentice learns from 
the master to apprentice. In his words, “by watching the master and emulating 
his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks 
up the rules of the art, including those which are not explicitly known to the 
master himself.”225 Here Polanyi resolves two problems; first, by asserting that 
the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art from the master, 
Polanyi responds to the question of the possibility of how knowledge creation 
is made possible through both physical gesture (which to some extent can be 
described) and those subliminal unconscious rules not known to the master. 
Second and most importantly, whilst he does not specifically refer to 
knowledge as intergenerational, by postulating that a master, whose 
experience is gained over years, possesses certain level of authority and 
inadvertently is also a carrier of tradition, we could proceed to conclude that 
Polanyi indeed regarded the process of knowledge creation as being 
hierarchical. This is further evidenced in Polanyi’s introduction of the concept 
of authority and tradition in which he argues that “a society which wants to 
preserve a fund of personal knowledge must submit to tradition…we accept 
the verdict of our appraisal, be it at first hand by relying on our own judgment, 
or at second hand by submitting to the authority of a personal example as 
carrier of a tradition.”226 For knowledge to be passed on through tradition is to 
postulate that such knowledge is a consequence of intergenerational 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 Michael Polanyi, Personal knowledge, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 53 
226 Michael Polanyi, Personal knowledge, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 53 
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relations. Therefore, it is clear, according to Frade, that “Polanyi seems to 
regard tradition as a process in which the master is always older than the 
apprentice.”227 Whilst many writers argue that this is no longer the case, and 
that it was consistent only with professions up to the 1970s, I shall argue that 
for analytical and the purpose for which I use it, organisational tacit knowledge 
is largely intergenerational.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The theory of tacit knowledge is best suited to explicate the impact of HIV and 
AIDS on summative governance, because as I have said, the impacts of HIV 
and AIDS are subtle, daunting, subdued and long-waved and the concept of 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer, particularly that proposed by 
Polanyi, can help us conceptualise the flow of impacts across the various 
levels of governance- for the reason that intergenerational knowledge is the 
key factor for the continuous evolution of governance and its emergence from 
long run equilibria of processes. Polanyi’s epistemology demonstrates social 
science’s neglect of the necessity of knowledge to maintain social systems. 
Whilst presenting the various epistemologies, I have advanced Polanyi’s, 
whose was classified under the scientific period in which the greatest interest 
was the empirical pursuit of knowledge. This period is best categorised as a 
move away from the descriptive and normative meta-scientific claims about 
the nature of knowledge. In so doing, epistemology inadvertently started 
addressing the question of knowledge formation and transfer in the context of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227 Cristina Frade, Polanyi’s social construction of personal knowledge and the theories of 
situated learning, (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, p. 4) 
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social systems. In effect, the attenuation of the concept of knowledge from its 
purely abstract and philosophical conception took place during the scientific 
period, as a result of which knowledge regained its virtue. As I have 
highlighted in earlier sections, the virtue of knowledge is its relevance to the 
practical affairs of life. To an important degree, the theory of tacit knowledge 
demonstrates that knowledge is the central feature that sustains the various 
governances, whilst maintaining the philosophical underpinning of the 
concept. Its philosophical foundation is that most knowledge that people 
possess is not fully explicit and it is of the kind, which, by its nature cannot be 
conveyed in grammatical statements, mathematical and statistical 
expressions, specifications or manuals. Polanyi utilises the Gestalt 
psychology to demonstrate that most knowledge that people possess is 
ineffable in that it cannot be understood by looking at how people 
communicate verbally, because as he puts forward, ‘we can know much more 
than what we can tell’.  
 
It should now be clear that having scrutinised the available arguments that 
bear on some important questions in the theory of knowledge, the theory of 
tacit knowledge postulated by Polanyi have the best epistemic significance to 
my area of inquiry. This epistemology seems not only to glorify epistemology, 
in terms of only its propositional sense, but for its practical significance in 
social systems, specifically as it relates to the family unit and business 
organisation. The theory of tacit knowledge, moves from the traditional 
epistemology that typically expresses knowledge in propositional forms in 
formal logic to treating knowledge as a dynamic human process necessary for 
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maintenance of social system stability. In a sense, this seems to be more 
interested in the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In 
other words, it moves from the more epistemological question of the extent of 
propositional knowledge to more fundamental questions of how knowledge is 
acquired in every day life and how people use knowledge to navigate the 
interstate of life. Whilst the classical theories recognised that knowledge is 
never complete, it remained deeply ingrained in their conception that 
knowledge could be studied in a static way. Borrowing from Vuyk, classical 
epistemologies saw knowledge only as a fact and not a process. For the 
purpose of this thesis, I would argue that the theory of tacit knowledge is 
appropriately regarded as the epistemology of intergenerational knowledge 
creation, retention and transfer for it emphasises the process of knowledge 
creation as a dynamic process. Perhaps it is not surprising as this was 
developed during the period called scientific epistemology, whilst the 
preceding theories were developed either during the periods known as 
metascientific or parascientific epistemologies.228 Moreover, the theory of tacit 
knowledge has been utilised in real life settings and its proponent was not 
only a philosopher, but also practitioner of the art. 
 
By using the family unit and organisational setting as examples, I advance the 
idea that knowledge is indeed also socially situated, and its process where the 
context in terms of structure, activities and relationship influence the process 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
228 The terms scientific, metascientific and parascientific epistemology have been increasingly 
used by Jean Piaget to distinguish the periods in which the focus of science was in part 
determined by whether the interest was to establish the limits of science in that not everything 
could be known, or the philosophy of science, that includes the history of science, psychology 
of science, sociology of science politics of science, and the economics of science, or as with 
early philosophies, the challenge to conventional wisdom respectively 
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of acquisition. To understand how people learn to become knowledgeable, it 
is to acknowledge that knowledge is not fixed but an outcome of the changing 
relationship between social relations and individuals. The social relations are 
situated in institutional and social systems. Social in the sense of being long-
standing for “some of the most complex knowledge that people acquire, such 
as languages or cultural norms, can only be learned from other people, who 
themselves learned from previous generations”.229 It follows that knowledge is 
a product of transmission of prior knowledge. It is along these lines that the 
intent of this thesis moves; that whilst philosophy ponders the nature of true 
knowledge and the demarcation of the forms of knowledge, we recognize the 
interplay of the various kinds of knowledge and that the process of knowledge 
formation and transfer moves in a continuum from nascent to fully 
institutionalised social systems.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 Michael Kalish, Thomas Griffiths, and Stephan Lewandowsky, Iterated learning: 
Intergenerational knowledge transmission reveals inductive biases, psychology bulletin 
review, 2, (2007), pp. 288-94 
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Chapter 4: Governance liabilities of HIV and AIDS  
 
Introduction 
 
Ever since clinicians in the USA discovered HIV in the summer of 1981, there 
has been fierce debate about the origin of HIV. Earlier on, many theories on 
the origin of HIV were put forward. Some advanced the idea that AIDS was 
due to a smallpox vaccine. The smallpox theory is to date the most 
paradoxical as it suggests that, on the one hand the vaccine triggered the 
HIV, whilst on the other hand there are suggestions that the cessation of the 
vaccine may have triggered AIDS. The former view suggests that in 
obliterating one disease (polio), another disease (AIDS) was transformed from 
a harmless and minor endemic into a worldwide pandemic. The view here is 
that the vaccine triggered a rather dormant virus. In recent years, the 
prevailing view suggests that though the vaccine may have been responsible 
for AIDS, it is not because it triggered the virus, but contrastingly, the vaccine 
may protect against HIV infection as it improves the ability of the immune cells 
to fight HIV virus by, for example, altering the receptor called CCR5 on the 
surface of white blood cells, which HIV and polio viruses usually exploit to 
enter the host cell.230 The view that HIV was a result of a biological warfare 
experience that has gone wrong, has also received considerable attention in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230  The form of HIV that causes AIDS is well known to use CCR5 (a type of protein on the 
surface of white blood cells) to enter and infect the host cells. Various publications exist on 
this link. For reference see Joseph Anderson and Ramesh Akkina. "Complete Knockdown of 
CCR5 by lentiviral vector-expressed and protection of transgenic macrophages against HIV-1 
infection." Gene Therapy 14 (14), (2007), 1287–1297 and Alison P. Galvani and Montgomery 
Slatkin. "Evaluating plague and smallpox as historical selective pressures for the CCR5-Delta 
32 HIV-resistance allele.” Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci., 100 (25), (2003), pp. 15276–9. 
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the years following the discovery of HIV.231 Others, including the molecular 
biologist Peter Duesberg argued that the virus is not distinct from other 
viruses at all and that AIDS is not due to HIV. The Duesberg hypothesis 
argues HIV is rather a harmless passenger virus without any link to AIDS.232 
The dominant theories about the origin of HIV are those that advance the idea 
that HIV is a new human virus of animal origin. At the centre of these theories 
is that chimpanzees and other primates from sub-Saharan Africa including 
green monkeys, sooty mangabeys and mandrills carry a form of simian 
immunodeficiency virus (SIV) that is nearly identical to the aggressive form of 
HIV. Therefore it seems plausible that at some point the virus may have 
crossed species from primates to humans.233 It is generally accepted that 
many other viruses can pass from animals to humans in what is known as 
zoonosis. The first view is that HIV may have occurred through natural 
transfer of immunodeficiency virus from monkeys to humans, for example 
through a bite, sexual intercourse with primates or eating uncooked meat from 
any of these primates. The other view, made popular by Tom Curtis, is that 
HIV may have occurred through iatrogenic (man-made) transfer through 
contaminated polio vaccines used in Africa in the late 1950s.234 Over a million 
people in Burundi, Rwanda, and what is now known as the Democratic 
Republic of Congo were given the Koprowski’s polio vaccine between 1957 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 The biological warfare speculations are not surprising as many commentators believe that 
this is fuelled by secrecy surrounding military chemical and biological weapons programmes. 
Generally, medical sciences do not support this view, see for example Myra McClure and 
Thomas Schultz, the Origin of HIV: Either from Primates or from a Non-pathogenic Human 
Virus, British Medical Journal, (1989), 298(6683), pp. 1267-1268 
232 For detailed argument on the Duesberg hypothesis See Peter Duesberg and David 
Rasnick, The AIDS dilemma: drug disease blamed on a passenger virus, Genetica, (1998), 
104(2), pp. 85-132 
233 See for example Paul M Sharp, David L. Robertson, Feng Gao, and Beatrice H. Hahn, 
Origins and diversity of human immunodeficiency viruses. AIDS, 8, (1994), 527–542. 
234 Tom Curtis, "The origin of AIDS", Rolling Stone, 626, (1992), pp. 54-59, 61, 106, 108 
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and 1960. The polio vaccine is cultured on monkey kidneys, which may have 
been contaminated with SIV.235 All these theories are intensely debated and 
alternative theories are regularly proposed. Detailed analysis of these theories 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Notwithstanding and whilst the debate 
rages on, there is scientific consensus that HIV infection is a necessary 
condition for progression to AIDS. Science has proven that HIV weakens the 
immune system over time and that people with HIV will eventually develop 
AIDS. Sadly, since the first case was recorded, no cure has been found, 
though medication are available to slow down the rate of HIV infection 
progression. Now the AIDS pandemic, as it is commonly referred to, has not 
only become known as the killer of people but has become one of the most 
destructive crises of modern times, ravaging families and communities 
throughout the world. The epidemic knows no boundaries, and in the thirty 
years since the first case was discovered, HIV and AIDS has permeated 
borders, crossed continents and affected societies and has become what 
scholars appropriately refer to as “a public policy crisis of virtually 
unprecedented proportions”.236 This is not hard to fathom, because the AIDS 
pandemic has only few parallels in recorded history, “the 1918 flu pandemic 
and the Black Death in the fourteenth century”.237 It is therefore not surprising 
that no other topic has received so much attention as HIV and AIDS in recent 
history, despite the fact that as early as 20 years ago, the terms HIV and 
AIDS were not found in any medical dictionary. UNAIDS estimates that as of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 This hypothesis was vehemently rejected by Hilary Koprowski, the pioneer of the 
Koprowski polio vaccine. See for example Hilary Koprowski, AIDS and the polio vaccine 
(letter), Science, 257, (1992), pp. 1026-1027 
236 Robert Ostergard (ed) and Jim Whitman (Gen Ed), HIV/AIDS and the Threat to National 
and International Security, (Palgrace McMillan, 2007) p.3 
237 Laurie Garrett, HIV and national security: where are the links, A report presented to the 
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2010, over 33.3 million people were living with HIV and over 30 million have 
died to date.238 But the truth is, the virus has not spread proportionately 
across the globe. It is in Africa where the epidemic has taken its greatest toll. 
UNAIDS data shows that Africa carries 69% of the world’s infections whilst it 
is home to only about 12.6% of the world’s population, and worse, nine 
countries (Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Namibia, Mozambique and Malawi), are home to 34% of people living with 
HIV globally. As Craddock puts it, “the phrase [AIDS in Africa] has come to 
signal an almost apocalyptic level of devastation… [and] images of the 
pandemic as it has progressed through sub-Saharan Africa are by now mind-
numbingly familiar: painfully wasted bodies; haunted eyes; isolation; fear; 
imminent death”.239 The basis for all of these lies in the figures; “with less than 
8% of the world’s population, sub-Saharan Africa accounts for two thirds of 
the world’s HIV cases”. In some of the southern African countries, the HIV 
epidemic has grown at an extremely fast pace, for example of the ten hyper-
endemic countries, five have an infection rate higher than 15%, the highest 
being Swaziland where in 2008, 42% of pregnant women attending antenatal 
care have tested positive240 and 26% among the population aged 15-49 have 
also tested positive.241 Many of the sub-Saharan countries are only at the 
beginning of a rising impact curve of the AIDS epidemic, with impact on the 
vulnerable groups intensifying over the coming years.  
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239 Susa Craddock, Beyond Epidemiology: Locating AIDS in Africa, in Ezekiel Kallipeni, et al., 
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During the early stages of HIV and AIDS, its impact was widely discussed and 
disputed, but thirty years now, there is consensus about the devastating 
impact this is having on people, families, communities and societies. The 
question appears to have shifted from whether these consequences exist to 
whether they are well understood and adequately dealt with. What we know 
for sure is that the HIV epidemic continues to have devastating effects. 
Despite modest successes in some areas, serious challenges remain for 
Africa. The immense scale of AIDS related illness and deaths is weakening 
governance capacities for service delivery with serious impact on food 
security, economic growth, and human development. Despite the temporary 
reprieve from ARVs, many problems persist. For instance in some countries 
(for example Swaziland and Lesotho), more than 25%  of the health budget is 
spent on ARVs, resulting in over reliance on external funding; the number of 
AIDS Orphans are on the rise and economic conditions of many people are 
making adherence difficult, creating a breeding ground for drug resistance. 
AIDS has undermined the capacities of individuals, families, communities and 
the state to fulfil their roles and responsibilities in society. Thinking ahead, if 
current trends are not reversed, the longer–term survival of many African 
states will be seriously threatened as the pandemic not only threatens to 
reverse years of economic gains, but disrupts key governance structures, 
which structures are necessary for continuity. According to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), “AIDS already has significant 
consequences for all forms of social economic and political activity and thus 
for governance in the years to come”.242 More potently, HIV and AIDS disrupt 
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the interactions of governance actors from a higher to a lower order, which 
interaction is a necessary condition to achieve a self-regulating and self-
organising state. It is along these lines that the intent of this thesis moves, to 
demonstrate that HIV and AIDS has not only disrupted the sectoral 
governances as the UNECA suggests, but has had the greatest impact on 
what Kooiman would refer to as the “interactions between (governance) 
actors on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of socio-political aggregation”.243 
 
Impact of HIV and AIDS on sectoral governances 
 
Although this thesis characterises governance as a summative phenomenon, 
it is imperative to start the discussion with how HIV and AIDS is posing a 
challenge to sectoral governances. Here, I will restrict the discussion to two 
forms of what I referred to earlier as formal levels of governance, namely 
national and local and three forms of what I earlier referred to as non-formal 
governances. I will not focus on global and corporate governance, not 
because I do not view this to be an important component in my analysis of the 
impact of AIDS on summative governance, but because this will not add value 
to my endeavour to demonstrate how HIV and AIDS have the potential to 
affect the continuous process of decision-making and command mechanisms 
at every level of human activity in the highly affected countries of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Suffice to say, the loss for corporate governance is no different from 
the loss to national and local governance structures.  
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243 Kooiman (1993), p. 41 
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National Governance 
 
Over the past 60 years since the first country in Africa gained independence, 
the majority of the African countries have been working towards creating 
democratic framework of governance for their citizens. Institutions have been 
set up to deliver on the public good, which goods include not only the basic 
services such as roads, water, electricity and other infrastructure, but that 
which the market fails to produce in sufficient quantities, such as protection of 
internal and external peace, equality before the law and due legal process 
and enforcements of contracts. Now AIDS is threatening this very basis of 
democratic governance as it compromises the capacity of governance 
institutions to deliver these services. As the epicentre of the epidemic, the 
impacts of HIV and AIDS on the critical infrastructures that sustain the 
security, stability and viability of modern nation-states in Africa are 
manifold.244 HIV and AIDS are now reversing gains made in these rather 
fragile sectors by eroding all development efforts by sharply reducing human 
capital.  
 
The impacts of the AIDS pandemic on governance institutions at the national 
and local levels are not hard to see. In these most heavily affected countries, 
there is evident deterioration of social welfare indicators. General levels of life 
expectancy, literacy, and schools enrolment are falling as a result of high 
morbidity and mortality. In countries such as Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Namibia and South Africa, life expectancies have 	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declined to levels seen during pre-industrial ages. When life expectancy is low 
and prevalence is high, high profile personnel are lost in their active years in 
sectors as diverse as the military, the civil service, the private sector, the 
educational system, industry and other indigenous sectors such as 
agriculture. When this happens, according to Hsu, “the potential exists for 
institutional collapse, which would undermine governance”.245 In Zambia, for 
instance, the Commission on HIV/AIDS and Governance in Africa (CHGA) 
estimates that the country may lose 32% of its government workforce over a 
twenty-year period and will need to replace 1.7% of its workforce annually to 
maintain current staffing levels. Evidently,  
 
“[t] he loss of key skilled personnel greatly reduces the quality and 
quantity of basic services that the government can deliver and 
contributes to the rising costs of accessing infrastructure, deepening 
the cycle of poverty in areas affected by the AIDS epidemic. It is also 
harder and more expensive to replace such skilled workers.”246  
 
In other words, if the government fails to replenish its civil service, service 
delivery will be weakened, institutional robustness and vitality is reduced as 
the important function of policy-making and implementation are inhibited. With 
the nature of HIV, such institutional fragility could persist over time because of 
what Barnet refers to as “the evident disharmonious resonance between the 
life cycle of the virus and the length of infection in the individual human host 	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and the length of human generation”.247 In a sense, the trajectory of the 
impact is intergenerational as children born to HIV positive parents may grow 
to be orphans, who may grow up to be infected, but perhaps before they 
themselves have had children, who will also become orphans. These create 
problem for governability as these children grow up without guidance and 
education, an outcome that may create a threat to national order.  
 
At the same time, not only does AIDS undermine governance institutions in 
the highly infected countries by way of creating institutional fragility, but it also 
weakens the governance capacity for an effective response to AIDS. Coupled 
with the fact that many governments are only starting to treat AIDS, not only 
as a health crisis, but a broader public development challenge, it underscores 
the importance of governance in the context of AIDS response because AIDS 
“affects the way a government manages the response in its relationship with 
the population…”.248 Responding to the crisis created by AIDS will require that 
national policy makers devise innovative ways to sustain and improve the 
human resources capacity of the population in the face of the pandemic. HIV 
and AIDS make investing in the process of policy formulation an essential 
element of governance. At the same time though, Africa’s problem is that 
whilst many of the sub-Saharan countries display outward signs of democratic 
states, as though power and decision making reside within government 
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institutions, many of these countries’ institutions are deeply rooted in anti-
democratic and non-developmental mode. Whilst these states exhibit 
democratic characteristics similar to those found in the West, such as holding 
regular elections and forming democratic style institutions, real power resides 
in individuals outside formal institutions of government. In such states, 
corruption is rampant as the state and the individuals running the affairs of the 
state are inadvertently seen as one. State resources and personal resources 
become inseparable. As Cammack puts it, “decisions about resources are 
made by ‘big men’ and their cronies, who are linked by ‘informal’ (private and 
personal, patronage and clientelist) networks that exist outside (before, 
beyond and despite) the state structure, and who follow a logic of personal 
and particularist interest rather than national betterment.”249 This 
neopatrimonialism tendencies means the institutions of governance are not 
well developed to deal with the threat posed by HIV and AIDS, at the same 
time that HIV and AIDS weakens these institutions of governance. We can 
begin to see that HIV and AIDS becomes a vicious circle of lower capacity (as 
a result of AIDS itself and neopatrimonialism), loss of human resources, poor 
growth (i.e lower income base), lower propensity to save, increased service 
level requirement due to high levels of poverty and orphanhood, which in turn 
impacts the viability of the state to provide service, foster law and order and 
weakens government institutions to deal with HIV and AIDS. In due time, this 
may lead to even higher levels of HIV infections as the government’s capacity 
to respond to the virus is weakened, impacting on the number, quality and 
implementation of strategic policies for prevention and care due to lack of 	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capacity. Thus, for the purpose of building peace and political stability 
guaranteed by strong governance institutions, tackling HIV and AIDS cannot 
be regarded a trivial issue, but as fundamental to effective governance. 
 
Local Governance 
 
Whilst decentralisation is not new, it was not only until the early 1990s, that a 
number of African countries renewed efforts to implement policy instruments 
to facilitate the process of local or decentralised governance as a means to 
entrench pluralist democracy. Many are constituted as three or more 
distinctive but yet interconnected spheres of government on national, 
regional/provincial and local government. It is perhaps appropriate to point out 
at this stage that I am dichotomising the impact of AIDS on central and local 
governance here for analytical purposes only. Evidently, most of the African 
governments started as part of a framework of government imported from the 
West, wherefore many followed the integration model on which the emphasis 
is put on the role of the central and local government as part of the single 
state, instead of the autonomous model that regards the central and local 
governance as separate. Thus, the impacts of AIDS as described earlier are 
fully applicable to this level of governance.  
 
But in contrast to the central governance where the impacts are largely 
institutional and centralised, local governance provides a safety net for may 
people in Africa, and an impact on this level of governance has a direct effect 
on the people on the ground. Local government is a resource of social capital, 
	   -­‐130-­‐	  
which many local people use to solve their daily problems. This point is clearly 
put forward by Olowu and Wunsch who assert that “research in Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Congo and a host of other countries, particularly with weak central 
government, also demonstrate these patterns (of local governance as a 
resource to solve daily problems)”.250 On the other hand, a number of African 
countries follow the welfare state principles of equality of opportunity, 
equitable distribution of wealth and public responsibility for the citizens unable 
to maintain the minimal provision of a decent life. For examples, South Africa, 
Namibia and Botswana are among the few countries providing social welfare 
benefits including old age pensions, foster parents care grants and free basic 
services at the local government levels. Evidently, as Tomlinson eloquently 
purports, the “ability of local government to carry out this mandate is premised 
on institutional capacity and the ability to deliver and to obtain payment for 
services whilst being able to levy and obtain payment for property rates”.251 In 
South Africa, for example, the service policy dictates that local government 
should provide free basic services, which meets the “World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) criteria for the lowest services required to ensure the 
health of the user”.252  The loss of productive members of the society means 
not only a loss of key staff in the local governance institutions, but also a loss 
of income for local government to deliver these services. As Swartz and Roux 
so tellingly summarise: 
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“[T]he disease will most likely escalate socio-economic and health 
needs while at the same time undermining municipalities' capacity 
to provide for such needs. The rates base will be severely cut down 
as an increasing number of poorer households struggle to pay for 
services. At the same time a combination of rising needs, less 
money and the loss of skilled staff will place added pressure on 
already stretched resources. This will further undermine the 
capacity of local governments to carry out their core functions of 
local service delivery.”253 
 
Using the city of Johannesburg to demonstrate the impact of AIDS on local 
governance, Tomlinson estimates that in this city of about 2,2 million people, 
there will be 377,820 AIDS related deaths and 322,022 non-AIDS related 
deaths between the years 2000 and 2020 increasing the maternal AIDS 
orphans from 28% to 90%.254 This will increase service level requirements of 
households. It is hypothesised that because it is both undesirable and 
complex to expand service to only destitute households, the local government 
will find itself having to offer free basic services to all households in keeping 
with the social service policies. When this happens, service level 
requirements will exceed government’s free basic service levels, rendering 
the social policy unattainable. This scenario paints a difficult picture to local 
government as evidence is already piling up that majority of local 
governments are institutionally and financially unable to sustain their role to 
provide basic services.  	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Concomitantly, when people are infected, they lose hope and according to 
Poku, “many activities that used to be attractive when life expectancies were 
normal, lose their appeal and even relevance”.255 Consequently, things such 
as election and voting lose their appeal. When large numbers of people are 
infected, a significant number of people and families shift their attention from 
taking part in electoral processes to caring for the sick. Casting a vote, the 
cornerstone for democracy and the most fundamental and absolute of rights 
and civil liberties is diminished, as it is regarded a burden to vote, thereby 
putting the legitimacy of locally elected persons into question. This creates a 
particular problem for89 the democratisation process. During the past two 
decades or so, there has been a dramatic increase in the language of rights 
and entitlements, which rights were seen to be fully exercised through casting 
a secret ballot. A related challenge is that large numbers of HIV infected 
people cannot cast their votes because a sizeable number become disabled 
and many more are hospitalised. Most electoral laws in Africa do not make 
provision for this segment of voters, whilst many are signatory to the various 
international instruments guaranteeing and protecting the rights of people with 
disabilities, which instruments include the 1948 Declaration of Human Rights, 
the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, the 1971 Declaration on the 
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, and the 1969 Declaration on Social 
Progress and Development and more specifically, the Bill of Electoral Rights 
for Citizens with Disabilities. The latter Bill calls on states to meet their 	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obligation to take effective measures that all citizens with disabilities are able 
to exercise their universal right to participate fully and on equal terms in 
electoral processes. 
 
Again, at this level of governance, we witness the mutually re-enforcing 
consequences of HIV and AIDS, with substantive changes in demographic 
profiles of local communities (for example orphaning children), disruption of 
family units as we know them, burdening families and local governance, which 
in turn has the potential to disrupt social stability, and undermine democracy 
and governance structures.  
 
Social Groupings and Civil Society Organisations 
 
Since the 1980s, there has been a growing number of civil society 
organisations and groupings, which political commentators hailed as the key 
to democratic society transitions in Africa. These were the grassroots activists 
and promoters of political reform, who in some instances, were vital in moving 
policy forward. According to Hegel, these civil society groupings “occupy a 
space between the family and the state”.256 As Goss noted earlier, these are 
examples of governances that are taking place at neighbourhood levels 
outside state agencies, through community development trusts, tenant 
management organisations and community groups.257 With other writers like 
Benn, et al. and Rosenau and Scharpf calling them decentralised centres of 
“sub-politics”, consisting of networks comprising individual actors, not-for-	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profits and community groups258 or “multi-level” or “multi-layered” 
governances respectively.259 These are important governance structures that 
provide much needed services in many African countries and are a vital part 
of democracy and a driving force behind development. These organisations 
are key to dealing with diverse issues as solving local problems, solving 
conflicts and disputes, dealing with risks and disasters, and promoting 
sustainable practices such as those dealing with environmental protection. 
 
Unfortunately, literature on the impact of HIV and AIDS on these key 
governance structures is few and far between. But, the impact of HIV and 
AIDS on this level of governance is not difficult to elucidate. When HIV enters 
the picture, these locally based structures will have to adapt to serve changing 
needs in the communities they serve, and will experience the epidemic’s 
impact on their own operation and evolution. In short, the impacts are both 
exogenous, in the sense that organisations are unable to cope with the 
demand exerted by the communities they serve, and endogenous as they are 
impacted by the loss of key members due to death, long absence from key 
activities and in some cases members taking frequent compassionate leave.  
According to a report by Manning, conducted as part of the University of Natal 
Health Economics and HIV and AIDS research, HIV and AIDS have serious 
implications for the effectiveness, and long-term sustainability of locally based 
organisations. The report concludes: “To survive the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
continue to provide essential services and an important avenue for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Susan Benn, Dexter C. Dunphy and Andrew Martin, Towards a model of governance for 
sustainability: networks, shared values, and new knowledge, in Susan Benn, and Dexter C. 
Dunphy (eds), Corporate governance and sustainability: challenges for theory and 
practices, (London: Routlidge, 2007), p. 103 
259 Benn (2007), Rosenau (2000) and Scharpf (1998) 
	   -­‐135-­‐	  
participation in public life, organisations must recognise, plan for, and take 
steps to minimise the impact of HIV/AIDS on themselves and their work”.260  
 
On the other hand, these groups are vital partners for government in the fight 
against AIDS due to the inability of the government to confront the epidemic. 
As Seekinelgin puts forward, HIV and AIDS have inspired changes in the 
thinking of politicians and scientists and today, the disease is one of the most 
recognised issues in the global arena.261 Their work has increased the profile 
of the disease and helped reduce the stigma associated with it. The 
importance of civil society groupings is not particularly surprising as the 
response to HIV has coincided with unprecedented movement of civil 
societies around a wider range of social and economic issues in many of the 
African countries. What this analysis also points out is the paradox of HIV and 
AIDS. Whilst these organisation have been on the forefront of the response, 
they have not been spared the brunt of its impacts, with a large number of 
these losing staff due to AIDS related illnesses and death. In his study of six 
mid sized  companies, Manning finds that 76% of the 59 respondents reported 
that HIV and AIDS has impacted on their organisation, which impacts ranged 
“from absenteeism and turnover to declining community participation and 
stigma of those infected or affected by HIV/AIDS”.262 HIV and AIDS are clearly 
generating problems for community governance that was never part of the 
debate on this level of governance. The question therefore remains; if 
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Manning could demonstrate that the more formalised and professional 
organisations found it difficult to develop policies and programmes to manage 
HIV and AIDS, how will the less formal and more grassroots groupings 
survive the impact of HIV, considering that the worst of the AIDS pandemic is 
yet to come? Already, these groups operate in conditions of very high 
unemployment and poverty. 
 
Family Institution 
 
The impact of HIV and AIDS in Africa goes far beyond only the human 
tragedy of loss of key skill, but it altered social systems, disrupts family units, 
and produce AIDS orphans en masse. Many of the traditional structures are 
already overwhelmed and liable to break down if they are not given support, 
nurtured, protected and strengthened. The impacts of AIDS on families are 
manifold. First, the emerging specter of AIDS threatens to wreak havoc on the 
already precarious position of the poorest people of this world. A paper by 
Bloom, River Path Associates and Sevilla attempts to elucidate the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between AIDS and poverty. As they purport;  
 
“95% of those infected with HIV live in developing countries… [and] 
cross country evidence indicates a strong statistical significant 
association between high prevalence and poor socio-economic 
performance whether measured by per capita income, income 
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inequality, absolute poverty or the UNDP’s Human Poverty 
Index”.263  
 
As Arrehag, et al., further comment; “HIV/AIDS acts as a forceful vehicle for 
impoverishment at the individual and household level and result in increased 
income and asset inequality”.264 The loss of a wage earner means that a vast 
number of households become poor and are also fragmented as a result of 
children being sent away to extended family members. As the Urban 
Management Programme for Regional Office for Africa also points out; 
 
“Providing these children with food, housing and education in the face 
of disintegrating traditional safety nets and depleting government 
services with demand resources for many years to come… [and] caring 
for AIDS sufferers is a considerable drain on already tight household 
budgets”265 
 
Richter adds to this that in several countries, for instance Cote d’Ivoire, the 
average income of households where a family member has died as a result of 
AIDS, income levels fall as low as 60%, expenditure on health care 
quadruples, savings are depleted and families often go into debt.266  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 David Bloom, River Path Associates and Jaypee Sevilla, Health, wealth, AIDS and 
poverty, 2004, p. 6  
264 Lisa Arrehag, et al., The impact of HIV/AIDS on livelihoods, poverty and the economy of 
Malawi, (Lilongwe: Sida, 2006), p.5 
265 UNDP and UN-Habitat Urban Management Programme Regional Office for Africa, 
HIV/AIDS and local governance in Sub Saharan Africa, Occasional Paper 1, (2002) 
266 UNAIDS/UNICEF/USAID and, Children on the Brink, A Joint Report of New Orphan 
Estimates and a Framework for Action, (New York, 2004) 
	   -­‐138-­‐	  
Second, the increasing death rates as a result of AIDS have left in their wake 
a growing number of orphaned children. The declining HIV prevalence rates 
are not indicative of a declining orphan population. In fact the orphan 
population is estimated at 50 million up from 43.4 million in 2003.267 Children 
on the Brink Report points out that of these children, 15 million are as a result 
of HIV and AIDS, and the majority of them are in Africa.268 It is therefore 
appropriate to conclude that if the 1980s was the decade of HIV infection and 
the 1990s was the decade of AIDS, the 2000s are an era of orphan-hood in 
the East and Southern African regions. Without any intervention, most of 
these children, especially the young girls, will not attend school, as most of 
them will end up as primary caregivers of their households. This is in addition 
to other overlapping and interdependent impacts, which impacts include loss 
of home and income, poor nutrition, new responsibilities as children have to 
work, increased internal migration and general psychological impact of trauma 
due to the loss of a parent. These children, as Richter asserts, “will endure 
enormous anguish as they find themselves alone and unsupported, the butt of 
cruel commentary and behaviour, excluded, exploited, beaten, raped and 
forced into labour”.269 Whilst others may argue that children living in extreme 
adversity develop a certain resilience, it cannot seriously be argued that 
displaced children living in conflict, abusive, dehumanising and disaster 
situations will grow up to become what Rosenau referred to earlier as the 
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governable. Because it is suspected that these adverse conditions are 
endured over time, the likelihood of socially undesirable outcomes are 
increased.  
 
Third and compounding the challenge is the gendered dimension of HIV. 
Evidence clearly demonstrates that in Africa the burden is largely borne by 
women. Almost everywhere one looks, data clearly indicate that women bear 
the disproportionate burden at the community and household levels in terms 
of prevalence rates and also care (particularly the young and the very old). 
Recent estimates by UNAIDS suggest that 52% of people living with HIV and 
AIDS in low- and middle-income countries are women and that women 
account for over 60% of all new HIV infections.270 In sub-Saharan Africa, 
women comprise six out of ten people infected, according the Commission on 
HIV and AIDS and Governance in Africa.271 For instance, in Namibia, it is 
estimated that 39% of women under 30 years are positive compared to 29% 
of men of the same age.272 In terms of care, it is estimated that women 
account for 95% of carers in HIV and AIDS programmes in the Southern 
African region. Therefore, women overwhelmingly bear the burden for the 
physical and emotional caring of the sick, because the role of caring always 
has been regarded as the full responsibility of women including the girl child.  
In some cases, these young girls are expected to abandon their education, 
thereby denying them the benefits associated with education, including 
increased political participation, improved economic participation, lower crime 	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rates, general protection against diseases such as HIV, and so forth. The 
complex interplay between gender, orphans and HIV is daunting. As a woman 
or a girl, vulnerability doubles due to exposure to sexual violence and other 
exploitation, which increase their vulnerability to HIV, whilst at the same time 
these women face more AIDS-related stigma, discrimination and 
marginalisation than their male counterparts. And worse, when these men fall 
ill, women are expected to take care of them because caring for orphans and 
the sick falls within a woman’s domain.  
 
Fourth, the HIV and AIDS pandemic has profound implications for societal 
private enterprises, as families are forced to cope with the loss of skills.  For 
instance, in the subsistence agricultural sector, young family members are 
denied the opportunity to gain the required knowledge as their parents fall sick 
and die.  Subsistence agriculture plays a major part of social life of many 
African societies and it is the sector that sustains the stability of societies and 
ensures their survival.    
 
Fifth, the family in Africa maintains its place as the key social unit, whether in 
the nuclear or extended form.  Beyond these families is a network of people 
connected either by kin or blood called the clanship.  The clanship performs 
an important governance functions of uniting their members, coping with 
external threats, avoiding conflicts, maintaining law and order and providing 
food. HIV and AIDS is affecting the function of these important structures.  
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Education System 
 
The importance of the education system as the pillar for human advancement 
has long been recognised.  It has often been touted as the most important 
determinant of the future wealth of nations.  In his education paper in 1848, 
Mann wrote:   
 
“… our means of education are the grand machinery by which “raw 
material” of human nature can be worked into inventors and 
discoverers, into skilled artisans and scientific farmers, into scholars 
and jurists, into the founders of benevolent institutions, and great 
expounders of ethical and theological science”273  
 
Despite the benefits of education, and its role in lowering the spread of HIV274, 
which role has been widely documented, I have presented education more 
broadly as a key governance system. I have defined education in terms of its 
role to provide for better citizenship, the ability to appreciate and recognise 
wider range of cultural and other services. In this context, education provides 
benefits external to the person accruing such benefits, as other members of 
the society also absorb the benefits obtained from education. Akocha and 
Maiyo puts this rather succinctly when they posit that education must be “seen 
as a human right, a key to civilization and enlightenment and as a source for 
wealth and power… and it is a cornerstone of any country’s social and 	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political institutions”.275 Because a person being educated is a member of a 
society, the total benefit of education is the sum of the private benefit and the 
social benefit. The essence of education as a source for social capital is 
increasingly being recognised. Following on the theoretical work of Bourdieu 
who proposed such topics as human, social and cultural capital, Coleman 
extensively developed the concept of social capital and linked this to social 
stability. The World Bank Social Capital Initiative defines social capital as 
“internal, social and cultural coherence of society, the norms and values that 
govern interactions among people and the institutions in which they are 
imbedded”.276 Looking at education from the social capital theory should serve 
to remind us of the imperative of education as a key governance institution 
when such a definition is indeed linked to it. There is an understanding among 
scholars of the reciprocal relation between education and social capital. For 
example, in his paper on the effects of social capital on academic success, 
Acar analyses the work of various writers on social capital and concludes that 
the reciprocal link between education and social capital is in part due to its 
contribution to academic success, and due reciprocally to education as the 
source for social capital. 
 
Notwithstanding, this main source of social capital (that is, education) is at the 
crossroads. As Lavell noted, “the HIV and AIDS pandemic is seriously 
affecting education systems today and will continue to have a negative impact 
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in future”.277 Kagotho appropriately alludes to the fact that whilst the 
institutions of education is regarded in countries like Kenya, as a key 
socialisation agent, which inadvertently also provides coping mechanisms for 
the effects of HIV and AIDS, it is bearing the greatest brunt of HIV and 
AIDS.278 Available evidence suggests that thousands of students, learners, 
teachers and other school personnel have died as a result of AIDS, others are 
frequently absent as a result of AIDS-related illnesses. The most appropriate 
way to explicate the impact of HIV and AIDS in the education system is to put 
the child in the centre of the discussion and demarcate the various groups of 
children whose lives are mostly affected. Bennell has identified three groups 
of children being affected; i) children who are HIV positive, ii) children in 
households with a sick family member and iii) children whose parents (or 
parent figure) have died as a result of AIDS.279 Because of his focus on the 
direct effect of HIV and AIDS, the other group which Bennel fails to mention is 
children whose teachers are infected.  
 
Infected children 
 
Whilst information on the exact numbers of children directly affected by HIV 
and AIDS is scanty, because HIV is notoriously known to have no mercy, the 
double might of HIV is clearly evident in this segment of society. First, children 
get infected before they are born because their mothers are infected with HIV. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Lavell, A., The impact of disasters on development gains, clarity of controversy: Paper 
presented at the IDNDR programme forum, Geneva 5-9th July, (1999) 
278 Njeri Kagotho, A future possibilities: educating children living in HIV impacted households, 
International Journal of educational development, 32, (2012), pp. 394-400 
279 Paul Bennell, The impact of the AIDS epidemic on the schooling of orphans and other 
directly affected children in Sub-Saharan Africa, The journal of development studies, 3, 
(2005), pp.467-488 
	   -­‐144-­‐	  
Second, those who manage to live through puberty, they get infected, 
because in places like Africa, patterns of sexual activity are embedded in the 
social relations and material realities of families which often puts young 
people at risk of contracting HIV at an early age.   
 
Whilst prevalence among children is decreasing as a result of improvement in 
services preventing the transmission of the virus from the mother to the child 
during pregnancy, labour and delivery or breastfeeding, UNICEF estimates 
that globally 1,000 children were infected every day through mother to child 
transmission in 2010.280 UNAIDS estimates put the number of children under 
the age of 15 years living with HIV in the world today at 2 million, most of 
whom are infected by their mothers.281 There are suggestions that this 
number can be much higher because the silence, secrecy, and denial that 
surrounds the disease makes it very difficult to obtain accurate information.  
Notwithstanding, this figure is staggering, especially since these numbers 
refer to children. It is perhaps important to note that even in the absence of 
HIV, all children are most vulnerable during the first five years of life, with any 
child being at greatest risk of dying in the first year. HIV just makes things 
worse for the children unfortunate to be infected by their mothers. Whilst not 
all children born to HIV positive mothers do get infected, those infected have a 
slimmer chance of survival. In fact, research has observed some patterns of 
disease progression in children with about 20% developing serious disease in 
the first year of life and most of them dying by age four. The remaining 80% 	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have a slower rate of disease progression, with many not developing the most 
serious symptoms of AIDS until school entry. But 90% never actually make it 
pass elementary school.282 A related problem, according to the World Bank 
report on disease and mortality is that “children with HIV infection are at 
special risk for developmental disabilities… (and) low birth weight, 
prematurity, poverty, malnutrition, and micronutrient deficiencies, more 
frequently seen in HIV-infected children, are likely to compromise early child 
development”.283  
 
On the other hand, many young people become infected through unprotected 
sex during their adolescent years. This is a time when several key 
development experiences occur, including physical and sexual maturation, 
progress toward social and economic independence and identity. However, 
the scourge of HIV traps many of the world’s adolescents before navigating 
the interstate of life. UNICEF estimates that nearly 2,600 people aged 15–24 
were infected every day in 2010 and “some 2.2 million adolescents aged 10–
19 were living with HIV worldwide, the majority of them unaware of their HIV 
status.” The reason for such a high number is perceptibly the neglect of 
appropriate information, including age-appropriate sexual reproductive health 
and prevention service at such a critical period of transition out of childhood. 
The consequence of HIV is that it reduces the probability of some boys and 
girls of going to school.  
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The cumulative effect of these two scenarios is the reduction in the number of 
children seeking to attend school, as most of those infected from the mother 
do not make it past elementary school and studies have shown that HIV 
prevalence among adolescents is linked to school drop-outs and truancy. 
 
Orphaned children 
 
The HIV and AIDS pandemic have not only killed people and brought 
suffering to communities, as I alluded earlier, but has spurred a generation of 
children without parents, whose absolute number has increased from 28 
million in 1990 to 145 million to date, with AIDS attribution increasing from 3% 
to 37% over the same period.284 According to the Children on the Brink 
Report, there were 15 million AIDS orphans in 2003, of which 11.6 million 
were in Sub Saharan Africa.285 Indeed, this number should not come as a 
surprise considering that HIV and AIDS affects people in their young and 
child-bearing age. It has therefore the greatest impact on the people 
dependent on them. The distinctive characteristic of HIV and AIDS in regards 
orphans is that it has the largest potential to create double orphans. “With 
HIV, if one parent is infected there is a high probability that the other parent is 
or will become infected and that both will eventually die.”286 Fundamentally, 
the greatest effect of the HIV and AIDS epidemic on learners is the 
experience of being orphaned through the loss of one or both parents. When 
this happens, the education performance of these children is expected to 	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deteriorate markedly with higher repetition and dropout rates and generally 
poor learning outcomes.287 For instance, in Zimbabwe, research has shown 
that the “consequence of orphanhood is delayed school enrollment, an 
increase in the drop-out rate, erratic attendance, lack of concentration and 
poor performance.”288 The evidence of the impact of HIV and AIDS on 
orphans and education are now piling up. Gertler, Levine and Amos found 
that orphanhood reduced school enrolment in Indonesia and that the impact is 
greatest among children transitioning from primary to high school.289 At the 
same time Evan and Miguel found that in Western Kenya, orphans are 5% 
less likely to attend school.290 Other studies, for instance, Ainsworth, Beegle 
and Koda291 and Case, Paxton and Ableidinger292 found delayed enrolment 
and lower school attendance by orphans respectively. This is demonstrable of 
the havoc AIDS has wrought to existing family coping mechanisms. When a 
parent falls ill, the needs of children are likely to suffer as resources are 
diverted to taking care of that ill parent, instead of paying for children’s 
education and providing for other needs. Resources, including the available 
time that children may have, are shifted towards care giving. The challenge is 
that children who would normally be classified as living in stable family 
conditions are turned into children living in adverse conditions, leading to 
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greater frequency of truancy and dropouts. A research by Thupayagale-
Tshweneagae, Wright and Hoffmann, on mental health challenges of the lived 
experience of adolescents orphaned by HIV and AIDS in South Africa has 
shown a clear link between children orphaned by AIDS and school 
attendance. For instance, they have reported that “adolescents orphaned by 
AIDS are exposed to unpredictable and unfamiliar experience which is 
compounded by the grieving process where there is no adult”.293 They found 
that a child found it difficult to get integrated with their peers at school after the 
death of the parent as a result of AIDS. Jere adds to this that in Malawi, while 
some studies have shown that households are narrowing the gap between net 
enrolment rates of orphans vis-a-vi non-orphans, other household studies 
have disputed and demonstrated higher absenteeism and withdrawal 
amongst orphaned children.294 Various other studies have found evidence of 
the association between parents and increased risk of dropouts and delayed 
school entry.295 
 
Vulnerable children 
 
Parental death seems only one of the many difficulties children in these high 
prevalence countries are subjected to. There is an increasing group of 	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children whose educational prospects are made dire as they have to contend 
with what Kagotho refers to as “the complexity of navigating changing family 
roles”296 because a mother, father or guardian is chronically ill. Parents living 
with HIV has been narrated as one of the most stressful of human 
experience.297 Instead of developing within safe and supportive environments, 
children are faced with striving to integrate previous roles of being young and 
carefree to having to deal with the emotional demand of caring for a sick 
parent, exacerbated by the fear that the parent will die. The meaning of life for 
such children changes and sometime such change is permanent. Research 
has shown that the care giving responsibility has had a variety of economic, 
social and psychological impact on children. Children are often required to 
financially support themselves and their siblings in addition to having to take 
care of the ailing parent. The learning environment in a family is severely 
weakened, creating a worrying scenario as these children are at a stage of 
seeking for and developing norms around appropriate social behaviour. The 
absence of a parental figure means that children are left to navigate social 
interactions without the support of a parent figure. Because children in their 
early years of life need to feel emotionally close to at least one of their parents 
for their health development and survival, these children have the greatest 
possibility to enter a vulnerable puberty and adolescent period during which 
they can engage in risky behaviours without adequate precautions. Clearly, 
HIV positive parents in childhood pose a serious threat to the survival and 
development of young children. Already the Children on the Brink report, 	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states that children “under age 5 [five]- especially those whose families live in 
poverty in developing countries- are vulnerable to potentially fatal measles, 
diarrhea, and pneumonia”, which will increase the chance of dying by the first 
few years of life.298 In addition, it has been shown that “maternal-child 
interaction of HIV-infected mothers are at higher risk for cognitive and 
language delays”.299 It is therefore becoming increasingly clearer that HIV and 
AIDS are compounding an already dire situation in the poorest parts of the 
world. 
 
On the other hand, with responsibility shifting from being a child to being an 
adult, educational performance is compromised.  As Fontaine and Fletcher 
assert: “these care-giving responsibilities compromise a child’s ability to 
attend school; in instances where they do attend, their ability to perform well is 
diminished.”300  
 
Infected teachers 
 
The uniqueness of the HIV epidemic is that it does not discriminate; everyone 
in the poorest countries seems to have almost an equal chance of being 
infected. Significantly, teachers, who themselves are responsible to impart the 
skills necessary to prevent HIV, have not been spared the brunt of the 
epidemic, creating a formidable challenge to the system that is the key to 
turning the tide against HIV. With cash stripped countries already struggling 	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with the provision of basic education to their people, the increasing number of 
teachers being infected with HIV is appalling. A study examining the social 
determinants for HIV prevalence in South Africa makes some horrendous 
observation of the epidemic in this country.  The authors demonstrate how, 
despite the plethora of prevention programmes and comprehensive plans to 
control HIV and AIDS, HIV prevalence remains at a staggering 13% of 
educators working in the public service. The observation is that because 
South African women, as is the case elsewhere in Africa, make up the 
majority of educators (68%), the teaching profession is likely to face 
challenges of lack of female teachers. “With the majority of female educators 
teaching in primary schools, this is likely to have a devastating effect on the 
quality of education and on the learners themselves because these educators 
serve as their role models, nurturers and at times provide psychological 
support”.301 Ultimately, when the teachers fall victim to HIV, AIDS-related 
absenteeism, in-service mortality and early retirement will increase, the 
consequence of which is reduced productivity in the teaching sector.  
 
Using the ecological framework to demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS 
on teachers in South Africa, Theron expanded the discussion to include other 
contextual factors that further create and exacerbate the tensions that 
teachers face. She contends that because teachers are members of 
multifaceted social systems, in the context of HIV and AIDS their functions are 
compromised by a variety of exogenous epidemic related stressors such as 
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grief, fear, escalating workloads, pastoral care demands and others. 
According to her: 
 
“[E]ducators are ecologically situated beings. In other words, the 
educator functions within a dynamic, interconnected constellation of 
micro-, meso-, and macro-systemic relationships, and these relational 
contexts impact on educators’ roles, identities and experience. Given 
the scale of HIV epidemic in South Africa, it is possible that any (or all) 
of these relational levels have been revised by the challenges inherent 
to the epidemic- with concomitant ramifications for educators’ identities 
and lived experience. South African educators are situated within an 
HIV-impacted ecology, which often translates into demotivation.”302 
 
It is not difficult to discern the factors that Theron refers to in her assessment. 
When children are infected or affected by HIV or AIDS, teachers are likely the 
first in line to know. They first-handedly experience the suffering of children 
who are HIV positive, orphaned and whose parents are ill. In these contexts, 
many teachers do more than merely teaching the children, they become 
counselors, supporters and at times even the primary provider of material 
needs for these children. Moreover, because the experience of loss and 
bereavement is difficult for children and sometimes only manifest long after 
the event and have a tendency to fluctuate, teachers find it difficult to 
recognise these symptoms and provide the appropriate support. The key 
issue is that they become wearied by these multitudes of uncertainties, new 	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tasks and the distress of learners.303 With all of these micro- and meso-
ecosystemic impacts occurring against the macro-ecosystemic backdrop of 
high prevalence rates and deep-rooted poverty and gender imbalances, one 
cannot help but to foresee a difficult future for such a key governing institution.  
 
Summative effects of HIV and AIDS 
 
Because this thesis characterises governance to emerge out of path-
dependence conditions, with some form of hierarchical structure, 
characterised by a multi-level structure, each of which depends, in an 
aggregate way, on each other,304 it follows that the key issue is to 
demonstrate how the impact of HIV and AIDS on one of the key structures of 
governance will inevitably lead to an impact across all the other structures. To 
do this, I have developed a framework to illustrate the summative impacts of 
HIV and AIDS.  
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Figure 1: Summative Impacts of HIV and AIDS 
 
 
Whilst it is not possible to capture the full effect of HIV and AIDS, the 
framework demonstrates that once a crack appears in any of the structures of 
governance, all others are affected.  It is therefore possible to see that every 
level or form of governance impacts on all other levels and forms. The 
impacts are circular within and across the structures. From a national 
governance perspective, when a large number of people are infected, the first 
wave of impacts are increased attrition of the work force due to morbidity as 
increasing numbers of people fall ill, care for infected relatives and attend 
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funerals of colleagues, friends or relatives.305 The eventual outcome is 
reduced productivity of the workforce within the formal levels of governance, 
at the national and local levels. These losses are further compounded and 
consolidated by the second wave when workers in these institutions of 
governance develop full blown AIDS and eventually die. When this happens, 
there are cumulative absolute losses in the quantity and quality of labour to 
the economy and the nation and service delivery gets disrupted. This is not 
difficult to see, because HIV has located itself amongst the economically 
active population, those in the prime economically productive and sexually 
active years. Therefore, the drivers of service delivery are taken out of 
service. When these active members of society die, the whole spectrum of 
services gets disrupted, as services are now diverted to care. And as Poku 
asserts, the fact that sevice delivery gets weakened is no longer a projection 
as evidence are now piling up that institutions, businesses and families shift 
spending from  productive things that used to be attractive to medical care 
and related services.306 The losses in these sectors have a direct bearing on 
the welfare of families, communities and the nation as a whole. Simtowe puts 
this summative impact more succintly: 
 
“At micro level, when adults are dying or getting infected, the cost of 
treatment or funeral might outweigh the share of children and older 
member’s part of expenditure. At the macro level, while governments 
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are in tight budget constraints, the increasing expenditure on public 
health related to HIV may cause a decrease in other sectors”307 
 
When investment is reduced to key sectors such as education, school 
enrolment is impacted, which in turn reduces the amount of people available 
to work and contribute to the national budget and therefore reduces the 
national income available to carry out government’s mandate to provide the 
public good. Concomitantly, reduced levels of education reduces the social 
capital available to a society, which capital “greases the wheels that allow 
communities to advance smoothly”, because in the words of Acar, “when 
social capital exist in the form of norms, sanctions, or trust and 
trustworthiness, everyday business and social interactions become less 
costly”.308 This is the case because education, as I have shown earlier, does 
not only involve the development of science and technical skills, but it is a key 
ingredient needed to foster harmonious living with others, and an important 
element for good governance and participatory democracy.  
 
Similarly, when someone dies as a result of AIDS, household labour 
endowment is reduced, thereby reducing not only the supply of labour to 
government but household welfare as well. From a household point of view, 
the loss of labour, especially if the infected person was a breadwinner, means 
the whole family is affected, as not only households’ income reduces, the 
meager resources and time available to them are now diverted towards 
caring, making the impact multifaceted and multilevelled. From a national 	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governance point of view, it means that the quality and quantity of labour 
supply to the institutions is reduced, thereby impairing service delivery. For 
instance, the capacity of the management of the school sytems is weakened, 
which in turn leads to a lower human capital accumulation. At the same time, 
when families are affected, the number of people that seek to attend school is 
reduced as resources are diverted to taking care of that ill parent, instead of 
paying for children’s education. And as I have said earlier, the family is a key 
ingredient of human life, the basic unit of a society and as Peplar expresses it 
“is the necessary foundation of all order and morality”.309 It follows that when 
HIV and AIDS affects this very foundation of human existence, the future of 
nation states becomes hard to foretell.  
 
The uniqueness of HIV and AIDS is that its effect is not only one dimensional 
but multidimensional and circular, as it weakens family capacity to turn the 
tide against the epidemic, weakens the schools system, the very system that 
is key to imparting the knowledge necessary to reverse the spread of HIV, 
and inhibits government institutions for policy-making and implementation 
necessary to provide a conducive environment in which every player can 
contribute to reversing the epidemic. As Poku posits: 
 
“The epidemic weakens institutions, rendering the government 
increasingly ineffective at stopping the very agent that is weakening it. 
The result is a downward spiral wherein the epidemic relentlessly 
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reduces state capacity, even as the state requires ever-increasing 
capacity to stop the growing epidemic.”310 
 
Therefore, we are starting to see that HIV and AIDS have become a complex 
vicious circle that reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts throughout 
the social and institutional structures of governance. The impact cannot only 
be understood in isolation, but in the context of its intertwining impacts with 
other systems of governance. It follows that the impacts are not merely 
additive and isolated to the sectoral governances, but must be understood as 
summative and structured, thereby endangering fundamental systems of 
governance.  
 
Putting it all together: Governance, HIV and AIDS and knowledge 
formation 
 
Whilst the framework and the accompanying analysis demonstrate the 
impacts as it affects these structures in varying horizontal and vertical 
proportions, it does not reflect the fact that HIV and AIDS impacts are long-
waved events. As Barnett puts it, it is “one where the troubling and large-scale 
effects emerge gradually over decades” and is not the kind we call imminent 
disaster. Whilst many other imminent disasters have long-term effects, in as 
much as people die and leave others bereft, the impacts of AIDS are subtle, 
daunting and long-waved. It causes a gradual and subdued disruption to how 
communities and households are maintained and how governance institutions 
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and schools are run.  However, the debate on HIV and AIDS has largely 
neglected these fundamental questions of how continuity through change is 
maintained, but more importantly the critical role knowledge plays in 
maintaining stability of these systems. Such knowledge, as I have postulated, 
is largely tacit, and thus culturally and historically conditioned. In my earlier 
discussion, I also referred to Audi who posits that, “there exists good reason 
to say that at least many of our scientific beliefs are also culturally and 
historically conditioned.”311 In a sense, the process of knowledge formation 
and transfer facilitates both the vertical and horizontal interactions of the 
governance actors. In other words, tacit knowledge interacts with the formal 
education system to create knowledgeable people necessary to run 
governance institutions. Unfortunately, personal knowledge and its necessity 
to the functioning of social and cultural systems has been overlooked. Not 
only that, but HIV and AIDS literature is silent on this issue. However, with the 
current interest on biodiversity, health and environmental protection, 
recognition of traditional knowledge is gaining momentum. Traditional 
knowledge is the cornerstone of cultural identity and survival of communities 
and families as it produces a frame of understanding and validation that give 
meaning to the world. This is handed down from previous generations through 
tradition. I have earlier shown how such knowledge is generally tacit. The 
problem with AIDS is that the high and rising levels of morbidity and mortality 
have a direct impact on tacit knowledge because such knowledge cannot 
easily be articulated or postulated in manuals, books and journals. When HIV 
and AIDS struck, communities and families are robbed of the very basis that 	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defines and determine their existence. As one commentator during a 
conference on traditional knowledge systems pronounced; “the loss of 
traditional knowledge is not just a loss for the traditional communities 
themselves but also a loss to the intellectual property of the country as a 
whole.”312 Communities largely feel this loss not only because they use it for 
practical purposes, but such knowledge forms part of their cultural identities. 
The greatest challenge confronting governance today is how to promote, 
protect and nurture tacit knowledge amidst the rising tide of HIV and AIDS-
related deaths. The key challenges, as I will repeat throughout this thesis, is 
that HIV and AIDS has taken a foothold on the population whose sole 
responsibility is to impart knowledge, which knowledge is not only necessary 
for social systems stability, but also to turn the tide against the very agent that 
is affecting it.  
 
At the same time, the persistent loss of human resources in the severely 
affected countries compromises organisational knowledge systems. Whilst 
knowledge and its successful usage in business organisations have received 
much attention in recent years, little is known on how HIV and AIDS impact on 
the systems of knowledge formation within organisations, but more how this 
impact the indiscernible dimensions of such knowledge. The merits of this 
argument are quite clear as Polanyi’s theory of tacit knowledge views 
knowledge as ineffable in the sense that it cannot be understood by looking at 
how people communicate verbally. It is the knowledge that is often complex 	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and hard to recognise. Such knowledge, as I have demonstrated, exists 
unidentified until when it is necessary and impossible to do without it. This is 
the knowledge that has been virtually neglected in management studies, 
whilst such tacit knowledge allows companies to strategically acquire, create, 
exploit, and accumulate new knowledge and use these to increase their 
competitiveness, competency, and sustainability. It is this type of knowledge 
that poses the greatest loss to organisations when AIDS struck- however 
aware and able these organisations are in managing knowledge. The reason 
is that such tacit knowledge is held by people, whom themselves are unable 
to articulate such knowledge precisely, and as Polanyi asserts, is only at 
times manifested in collective set of facts, concepts, experience and know-
how. Even if “organisations strive to find optimal ways to facilitate the flow and 
transfer of the company’s knowledge from individuals in order to integrate and 
individual unique knowledge into the company’s knowledge bank”313, it is not 
possible to discern because tacit knowledge is embedded in individual 
experience and involves intangible factors such as personal beliefs, 
perspectives and value systems. Such knowledge cannot be articulated in 
formal language including grammatical statements, mathematical 
expressions, specifications, manuals and so forth. The key issue is that when 
people who hold such knowledge are increasingly absent from work or die as 
a result of AIDS, such tacit knowledge may be lost forever. It is almost like- as 
the old Ethiopian saying goes- ‘when an elder dies, a library burns’. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter constitutes the centrality of my argument that the various 
governance systems are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations 
and that such vulnerabilities could only be understood in summative terms. 
The chapter also highlights that one of the major ways in which HIV and AIDS 
has an impact on summative governance in severely affected countries is 
through its effects on intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer. In this context, I defined knowledge broadly to include rules, norms, 
beliefs, and customs created to protect populations by influencing 
accountability and legitimacy. In earlier sections, I referred to this as one of 
the orders of criticality for governance- in other words, it is a socio-political 
condition that must be met and maintained for there to be a continuous 
evolution of governance from a nascent to fully institutionalised systems of 
governance.  
 
Whilst my interest is on the summative effects of HIV and AIDS, I have spent 
a great deal of time demarcating the sectoral impacts of HIV and AIDS. This 
was an important exercise to demonstrate the magnitude of the HIV and AIDS 
epidemic in these sectors and also to highlight the vulnerabilities of these 
governance systems, for how else can we appreciate the summative impacts 
without understanding the depth of the impact of HIV and AIDS on these 
systems. I have developed the framework, which serves to demonstrate 
rather in a simplified fashion, the aggregate impact of HIV and AIDS on 
governance. The framework shows that the impacts are not merely additive 
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and isolated to the sectoral governances, but are summative and structured, 
endangering fundamental systems of governance. I have attempted to 
demonstrate that HIV and AIDS not only impact the sectoral governances in 
isolation through impacting on the intergenerational knowledge within these 
systems but more importantly that it affects the interplay between these 
systems from a lower to a higher order, that is, the interplay between the 
formal, non-formal, state and non-state governances. Literature is silent on 
the imperative of the intergenerational knowledge to the functioning of the 
various systems of governance, whilst at the same time there is recognition 
that the impacts of AIDS are subtle, daunting and long-waved. The concept of 
intergenerational knowledge is even less understood in the literature on HIV 
and AIDS.  Therefore utilising the concept of intergenerational knowledge as 
one of the important lenses through which the impact of HIV and AIDS on 
governance can be understood served multiple purposes. It not only helps us 
understand the imperative of intergenerational knowledge to governance, but 
also helps us conceptualise the flow of impacts across the various levels of 
governance- for the reason that intergenerational knowledge is the key factor 
for the continuous evolution of governance and it is foundational to its 
emergence from long run equilibria of processes. It is a necessary condition 
for the various systems of governance, from a higher to a lower order, to 
interact between actors on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of socio-political 
aggregation.  
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SECTION 2: CONTEXT AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCES  
 
Chapter 5: Vulnerabilities of Namibia’s Micro-, Meso- and Macro 
governances to disruptions 
 
Introduction 
 
Whilst it could be argued that Namibia presents a typical microcosm of an 
African country, its history is unlike any other. With a population of only 2,1 
million and a land area of 835,100 km² (the second least densely populated 
country in the world after Mongolia), Namibia had to content with over 100 
years of brutal colonial rule involving first Germany, then England and finally 
South Africa. Namibia endured the longest armed liberation struggle apart 
from South Africa, was the last country in Africa to receive its independence 
and its last coloniser was not any distant country, but what Simon refers to as 
“Namibia’s dominant and pariah neighbour.”314 It is perhaps ironical that this 
least populated country on the African continent attracted the likes of 
Germany, a country least known for being a coloniser, albeit notorious for its 
brutality. The history of Namibia is primarily documented from the time of the 
German seizure of Angra Pequena in 1884 and the subsequent annexure of 
the country, renamed for Germany’s convenience sake, as German South 
West Africa. From then onwards, the people endured one of the harshest 
forms of modern colonial history. Prior to colonisation, historical records point 
to a relatively harmonious existence of the San hunters and gatherers who 
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lived in the country some 2,000 years ago, followed by the Nama herders who 
are estimated to have arrived some 500 A.D, then the Bantu-speaking 
Ovambo and Hereros who migrated from the north into the southern African 
region sometime in the 14th century. The arrival of Germany signalled the end 
of any harmonious existence of these tribes and heralded the beginning of 
one of the longest and most brutal oppressions ever recorded in modern 
history. From then on, all facets of the Namibian society (the religious, the 
social, the economic and the political) became fragmented. 
 
In 1990, 106 years after the Germans arrived, Namibia became independent 
from South Africa, marking the end of Africa’s longest war and officially 
bringing to closure colonial rule over Africa. The significance of the year 1990 
is not only in ending the long protracted rule of the South African apartheid 
regime over Namibia, but can be seen as a moment in time when the geo-
political and temporal canvasses of the country’s socio-economic landscape 
was forever changed. What this means, for the examination of Namibia’s 
social systems, including those I define as forms of governance, is that our 
understanding will remain incomplete without relating these to the role played 
by years of colonisation. Be that as it may, the matter that has been puzzling 
the people of this country, is why, despite all government’s efforts, the country 
has been unable to deliver the expected results. This question is often 
explored within the context of the legacy of the colonial history, because at 
present, the varied forms in which every activity is acted out and staged, 
whether individually or collectively, reflects the colonial history of this country 
known to its people as ‘the land of the brave’. In fact, the numbers, rather 
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tellingly, reflect these legacies: At independence, the settler community was 
5% but controlled an estimated 71% of the GDP, whilst the bottom 55% of the 
population controlled just 3% of GDP.315 The last Income and Expenditure 
Survey, carried out in 2003-4 estimates that 10% of the population still owns 
about 60% of the wealth whilst the remaining 40% of wealth is shared by 90% 
of the population.316 What is more, “the 2% households with the highest 
income account for 15% of the total income, whilst the one-quarter of the 
Namibian households with the lowest income account for only 6% of total 
income.”317 The per capita income for the 25% households with the lowest 
income is about £ 130 compared to almost £ 12,500 for the two per cent 
households with the highest income.318  
 
Table 1: Namibia HDI indicators for 2012, actual and adjusted for 
inequality 
 
  Actual Adjusted for inequality Overall Loss (%) 
HDI Value 0.608 0.344 43.5 
Life Expectancy 62.6 49.4 21.1 
Mean year of schooling  6.2 4.48 27.8 
Income (US$ GNI per capita)   5,973   1,894  68.3 
Adapted from the United Nations Human Development Report, The Rise of the South (2013) 
 
A quick glance of the above table (column two) seems to suggest that 
Namibia is doing well in its Human Development Index. Namibia’s HDI is 
0.608, which according to UNDP, puts Namibia below the average of 0.64 for 
countries in the medium human development group but above the average of 
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0.475 for countries in sub-Saharan Africa.319 At the same time, when the 
index is discounted for inequality (column three), the HDI falls to a whopping 
0.344, putting the country way below the average of sub-Saharan Africa. This 
is clear testimony that Namibia is a country of poverty amidst plenty. The 
disparities have proved the most difficult issues to address. The UN has on 
several occasions proclaimed that Namibia is one of the most unequal 
societies in the world. The gini coefficient of 0.743 for the period 2000-2010, 
means “Namibia’s income gini coefficient is the worst in the world”320 and 
“higher than any recorded in the latest World Development Report.”321 
National Income Statistics like GDP per capita do not reflect the extent of 
poverty and inequality. Despite all the efforts and investments, economic 
development has been sluggish, particularly with regard to their impact on job 
creation and poverty reduction. Whilst these statistics always emerge with 
every research in Namibia, this is never followed with extensive intellectual 
analysis that will put the country on a road map to understand the 
fundamental causes of unemployment, poverty and inequalities. Accordingly, 
many efforts seem to have run up against formidable hindrances, not least 
because of the historical legacies, but also due to malfunctioning of the 
current system and misjudgement and poor management of the economy.  
 
Writings about Namibia’s history has often sought to dissect the post-
independent developments by focusing only on the effects of colonisation and 
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apartheid on the macro-economic and social landscape of the country, without 
an inclusive view of the pre and post independent developments and how the 
current political and economic order perpetuates the inequalities and thereby 
the vulnerabilities of the systems of rules. In what follows, I will broaden the 
inquiry, and include in my analyses both the current political and economic, 
and historical contexts. Admittedly, only through such an analysis are we able 
to understand that Namibia is indeed an engrossing and at the same time a 
perilous mix of the past and the present. 
 
Situating the vulnerabilities of the governance systems within the 
current political and economic order 
 
Contemporary macro governance vulnerabilities: national governance 
 
In 1990, after an agreement was reached by the United States, South Africa, 
Angola and Cuba to implement the peace plan as set out by UN Security 
Council Resolution 435 of 1978, Namibia became a constitutional democracy 
and joined the world as its newest member of the family of nations. For the 
first time, all Namibians were allowed to cast their votes. According to 
commentators, “the fact that 97% of registered voters cast their ballots, often 
in intimidating or difficult conditions, was moving testimony to the 
determination of the Namibian people to exercise their democratic rights”.322 
With independence, the political elite and civil society began the process of 
re-establishing and redefining the democratic state structures, systems, and 
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processes. A system of multiparty democratic elections was established, and 
the armed forces, from both the South West African forces and SWAPO’s 
guerrilla forces, became accountable to civilian rule. A new constitution was 
drafted by the Constituent Assembly, adopted on the ninth day of February 
1990. The constitution, according to the Namibian government, “established 
the country as a sovereign, secular, democratic and unitary State founded 
upon the principles of democracy, the rule of law and justice for all.”323  The 
constitution is based on the principles of separation of powers with the 
executive, consisting of the president and ministers responsible for the 
implementation of laws, the legislature consisting of the National Assembly 
and National Council responsible for law making and the Judiciary, consisting 
of the Supreme Court, High Court and Lower Courts, responsible for law 
enforcement and interpretation. This constitutional necessity of these 
structures lies in the need to establish checks and balances among these 
branches. Today, Namibia’s Constitution is construed the most liberal in the 
whole of Africa.  
 
The constitution laid the groundwork for genuine democracy and progressive 
social change. At the same time though, current evidence suggests that the 
process will be a long and painful one that will last several decades, because 
at independence the future of Namibia was severely constrained from the 
legacy of apartheid, making a move towards real independence and 
development minimal, such that many commentators agreed that only a “few 
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countries have started in such a heavily determined context”.324 Just after 
independence Freeman commented that the major problem is that Namibia 
started off with a severe fiscal crisis, dependent economy, uneven 
development and inadequate services for the black population. Namibia had 
to operate within these internal and external contexts, whilst attempting to 
promote social equity with an economy that faced decades of stagnation. On 
the balance of probability though, it could be argued that the SWAPO 
government inherited a country with very good structures to ascend, with the 
necessary adjustments, into the ranks of developed nations. However, 
challenges persist and the question has always been why SWAPO’s ascend 
to political power did not immediately result in the improvement of the well 
being of all the people. The major issue is that Namibia seems unable to 
convert its high income into human development for the majority of its 
population. Namibia is regarded a relatively wealthy country by continental 
standards, but as I have alluded earlier, it has the worst income inequality in 
the world, with concentrated and widespread poverty unmatched by any 
country in the world. According to the UN poverty index for Namibia, on 
average 25% of all Namibians are deprived of the basic needs for survival, i.e. 
they are absolutely poor.325  In some regions the index goes as high as 35%.  
The UN also notes that since independence the Namibian Human 
Development Index has not increased at the desired rate, mainly when 
adjusted for inequality. This is a worrying trend, because as Adam Smith 
wrote in 1776, “no society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the 
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greater part of the numbers are poor and miserable”.326 When Theodore 
Schultz accepted his Noble Price in Economics in 1979 he noted that “most of 
the people (of the world) are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor 
we would know much of the economics that matters”.327 These words of 
wisdom cannot be trivialised or taken lightly, because in its broader sense, 
stability is premised upon not simply sustained levels of growth, but on the 
need to reduce and ultimately eradicate absolute poverty and economic 
inequalities, which Namibia seems unable to do. Inequalities that decide the 
fate of the majority of the people continue to be reproduced. The economy 
seems structurally incapable to provide jobs on the scale and terms required 
to reduce poverty. Overall, the biggest challenge for Namibia is to maintain 
legitimacy and reproduce consent in order achieve social and political 
stability.  
 
It cannot be disputed that the long years of colonisation and apartheid 
entrenched these inequalities with grotesque and fastidiousness and to a 
large extent, anti-human severity. At the same time though Namibia is a hard 
country to classify, because on the one hand it represents a microcosm of the 
world system, with some areas mirroring the capitalist first world lifestyle, 
whilst some areas correspond to the third and even fourth worlds. There is an 
overwhelming white majority whose lifestyle exhibits the advanced capitalist 
world. There is also a growing black middle class who belong to the modern 
industrialised third world, whilst the rural population, making up 70% of the 	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Namibian population, do not differ much from the rest of Africa’s fourth world. 
But then there are the white farmers, who essentially have been put, by the 
racialist policies, into a group similar to the previous known socialist countries 
of the second world. But today, it cannot only be argued that the perpetual 
nature of this inequities strictly are conditioned (though traceable) to 
colonisation and apartheid, and understanding the present mnescope means 
the current political, and economic order cannot be left uninterrogated. Whilst 
certainly apartheid played its role, the continuity of the Namibian politics and 
history is premised in ways that seem to reinforce the inequities of the 
majority of the population and the signs of a happier future seems irresolute. 
Too often overlooked and unexplored are the power, strengths and frailties of 
the SWAPO party, which won all the elections since independence in 1990. 
Understanding how Namibia became a democracy but predominantly a one 
party state, we are able to appreciate the limitation or the aide to progress and 
thus situate the governance systems within broader post-independence 
context as well. In the aftermath of independence, the SWAPO party took 
over government and has since consistently won every election, some of 
which with absolute majority, leading to a type of neopatrimonialism on the 
part of the ruling party. When SWAPO won the second election in 1994 with 
an absolute majority of 74%, this according to some scholars “encouraged the 
misperception that the state is the property of the government… (and) 
SWAPO’s leadership started to perceive itself as untouchable.”328 The political 
elite started adopting aggressive reformist attitudes, but often for personal 
gain, further stimulating resentment among the populace. Compounding the 	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problem is that there are no serious vetoing agents in Namibia against the 
powerful SWAPO party. The institutions that yield some power (churches, civil 
society, unions) are incapable to influence the political process when such is 
set in motion by SWAPO. The economically powerful white business people 
and commercial farmers, for better or for worse, prefer to stay out of politics 
and therefore don’t offer any counterweight. Therefore it is conceivable that 
such power, when concentrated in a few hands, engenders 
neopatrimonialism. Whilst colonisation and apartheid clearly entrenched the 
divide between the rich and the poor, the powerful and the less powerful, 
there is a sense of perpetual indulgence on the part of the most powerful 
within the ruling party. Commenting on South Africa, Marais observed that; 
 
“Far from having dissolved into a fraternity of common purpose, 
tranquilised by the levelling language of nation-building, South Africa 
remains in the midst of an intense, renewed struggle that currently and 
demonstrably favours the most powerful and privileged sections of 
society. The defining trends of transition are shaping a revised division 
of society…”.329 
 
The division to which Marais refers to are not hard to see in Namibia. The 
African development Bank (AfDB), notes that Namibia’s middle class has 
been rising and now stands at 9% of the population.330 At independence, this 
urban middle class was almost non-existent. It is argued that many of these 	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have been rapidly enriched through their connections with the ruling party, by 
leveraging them into profit-sharing corporate partnerships with foreign 
investors, most of them in the mining sector. The SWAPO party senior 
leadership also seems entangled in an assortment of interest ideologies and 
ideals that now appear to contradict the liberation ideals of social justice. 
Sections of the party now have acquired what Marais calls, “reflexive 
sympathy for policies that put the market ahead of society, and the pursuit for 
justice deeper into the shadows.”331 As a result the country is now incapable 
to muster ideological and strategic coherence to steer it into a progressive 
project of change. Namibia’s inequalities are perpetuated by the persistent 
failure of the state to steer the country into the desired direction. As Marais 
reminds us; the problem is not only that of poverty (the lack of means), but the 
glaring disparities that assault people on a daily basis.  It is the oxymoronic 
nature of the public service, the widening inequalities, and the rampant sense 
of unfairness that generates rancour and resentments, which ultimately pose 
a threat to governance.332  
 
Witnessed recently is the tension created by the newly powerful political elite 
between the government and former fighters, many of whom were 
unemployed and yet to be fully reintegrated into society. Whilst Namibia 
enjoys relative peace and very low levels of armed violence for a country 
coming out of a long period of armed resistance, nation-building is often 
frustrated by dissatisfied former fighters demanding compensation for their 
sacrifices. What this clearly shows is what Kingma calls the naivety of the 	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government to assume “that demobilized soldiers would simply reintegrate 
into civilian life on their own, and no assistance was made available.”333 This 
entrenched heritage of armed struggle started when many became 
dissatisfied with the slow progress in socio-economic reforms. In the years 
coming, “ex-combatants expressed grievances through demonstrations and, 
realising the potential security hazard that a significant group of unemployed 
and dissatisfied individuals with military training represented, government 
devised a cash payment scheme, created vocational training programmes in 
the form of development brigades, and included ex-combatants in the general 
refugee resettlement programme.” The problem of dissatisfied ex-combatants 
still persists to date and there have been more protests in recent years. Again, 
whether this poses a threat for governance is not in dispute, but it remains to 
be seen how long their call will persist, because many of these fighters are 
well in their age. But, as events in neighbouring Zimbabwe seem to suggest, 
such issues have an enduring tendency to linger on for ages. The first signs 
have started to emerge with the so called ‘struggle kids’334 demanding greater 
recognition and preference for job recruitments. This discussion is however 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Another thorny issue that often remains tight-lipped is the Caprivi secessionist 
issue. Despite the successes in the transition from colonialism to 	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independence, attempts to write about Namibia national governance 
framework often leads to the issue of the Caprivi annexure and how up to 
date, it remains an issue that is often swept under the carpet. However, 
vulnerability of this governance structure must not only be seen in the context 
of post-independent structures of governance, but what makes it vulnerable.  
In 1999, armed men, known as the Caprivi Liberation Army stormed the radio 
station, police headquarters, border posts and the military base in Katima 
Mulilo, the capital town of the Caprivi strip, in what is now commonly known 
as the Caprivi Secessionist Movement. The group was led by Mishake 
Muyongo, a once post-independent parliamentarian and demanded the 
secession of the Caprivi strip from the rest of Namibia. The source of the 
conflict emanates from the belief that the Caprivi is not part of Namibia, but 
was annexed in July 1890 by the Germans “as part of a territorial swap with 
Britain known as the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty”. The treaty was inspired by 
the need to access corridors to the Zambezi, which would have led to easier 
access to other German protectorates in eastern Africa and the interior of 
Southern Africa in what was known as the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. The 
major motive was Cape-to-Cairo, specifically the Zambezi River, an important 
outlet to the Indian Ocean.335 Germany never fully settled in Caprivi, as this 
territory’s value was often questioned, “resulting in the sardonic name Caprivi 
Zipfelt”, a mockery name for the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty. As a result, the 
Caprivi was never actually fully occupied until sometime in 1909. Suffice to 
say, this was almost 25 years after the Berlin Conference of 1884-5, “which 
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laid down the rules for the Europeans partition of the continent”.336 As the 
Germans were about to settle in the Caprivi, the first World War broke out, 
South Africa marched into Namibia to replace the Germans, and the Caprivi 
strip was taken over by the British and administered as part of Bechuanaland. 
Similarly, under the British, the strip was largely neglected until South Africa 
started utilising it as a strategic supply route for the UNITA (National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola) movement in Angola only after the second 
World War. But they too “perceived the Caprivi Strip to be unsuitable for white 
settlement and low commercial potential”, requiring a “cost-effective 
administrative model of dual chieftainship under the supervision of the white 
government officer”.337 It was not until after the Odendaal Commission 
recommended the South Africa style Bantustan government for the Caprivi in 
1963 that white settlement occurred. In a sense, virtually all the colonial 
masters neglected this strip. For the people of Caprivi, this meant that at least 
until recent memory, the strip was never fully a protectorate of the Germans, 
nor the British or the South Africans. Whilst the secessionist movement 
seems to have dissipated since the uprising in 1999, the Namibian 
government views this as a potential threat to the territorial integrity of the 
country. Protecting the country’s territorial integrity is the mandate of the 
government provided for by the constitution. The current government seems 
aware of the implication of losing some or any part of its territory. Whether the 	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secessionist momentum will be maintained remains to be seen, but for 
analysis of governance in Namibia, it remains an issue worth discussing.	  	  
 
Contemporary macro governance vulnerabilities: local governance 
 
At the local levels, the current system of governance in Namibia is 
characterised by decentralisation of activities to regional and local councils. 
This system of governance is not new. When pre-empting the imminence of 
Namibia’s independence, Pretoria instituted a series of reforms in the 
management of local authority during the late 1970s and early 1980s.  These 
changes included overall re-organisation to create a “three-tier administrative 
structure headed by a supposedly autonomous central regime”.338 As 
evidence now suggests, although the administrative reorganisations were 
meant to devolve powers to the local people, there remained no change to the 
underlying model as conservative white local authorities were created only to 
promote what Simon refers to as “racially fragmented apartheid-style local 
authority structures legitimised by the vocabulary of change”.339 After 
independence, Namibia opted for the three-tier government of national, 
regional and local governance. In contrast, the new Namibian government’s 
argument was genuinely developmentally focused.  The contention was clear: 
for any country to achieve development at grassroots level, there should be 
effective decentralisation of responsibilities, policy management, decision-
making authority, and sufficient resources to local authorities. The Ministry of 
Regional, and Local Government and Housing became the line ministry 	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tasked with facilitating the establishment of an effective, decentralised 
regional and local government system, capable of delivering services, housing 
and physical planning. To this end the Decentralisation Policy of Namibia was 
approved in 1996, and implemented in April 1998. The policy was widely 
discussed with all the stakeholders, such as the Association of Regional 
Councils of Namibia (ARC), the Association of Local Authorities in Namibia 
(ALAN) and line ministries to get their input and reach consensus in the 
development of the policy. The philosophy underpinning this approach is that 
local government is better suited to take the lead in Local Economic 
Development (LED). The primary responsibility for planning and 
implementation of LED should therefore rest with local government officials.340  
It is further argued that democratically elected local government should by 
definition reflect the will of the people and therefore be best suited to lead 
LED. 
 
Since the institutionalisation of local authorities, strategies have been 
developed to ensure a smooth transfer to regional councils and local 
authorities. From the discussions within government and among local 
leadership, the preferred decentralisation model in Namibia is that of 
devolution of power to lower tiers within the context of and overall authority of 
a unitary state. Decentralisation in Namibia aims to ensure economic, cultural 
and socio-economic development, provide people at the grassroots level the 
opportunity to participate in their own decision-making, and extend democracy 
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to them as a right based on national ideals and values.341 Since the 
enactment of the Local Authorities Act (1992), the Regional Councils Act 
(1992) and the Decentralisation Enabling Act (1996), a lot has happened to 
build administrative capacity in the various regions. The challenge rests upon 
the individual local structures to take advantage of the enabling framework 
that has been set out by central Government. Critics believe that though this 
is a vital step towards local economic development, the pace of the 
decentralisation process is slower than what was expected and is yet to 
deliver the desired results. A key challenge facing local authorities has been 
the rapid increase in urban migration and the expanding urban population. 
This places tremendous strain on basic service delivery, urban infrastructure 
and employment creation.  
 
Some scholars now argue that, as a result of the slow pace of development at 
local levels, there are signs of resurgence of chieftaincy. Writing about 
Gender and Traditional Authorities in Namibia, Becker concludes that contrary 
to earlier predictions of the impending demise of these traditional institutions, 
there is now a growing revitalisation and popular support for them.342 
According to Becker;  
 
“Various explanations have been suggested for this resurgence. 
Several authors have argued that the weakness or inaccessibility of the 
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postcolonial state’s local and regional structures has driven rural 
populations to resort to the more accessible traditional authorities”.343  
 
Whilst it is encouraging that the emergence of traditional systems could 
provide an alternative form of governing, it is too early to forecast their future 
role given that neo-liberal ideologies have now taken precedence over any 
other form of governance in Namibia and other parts of the modern world. 
Notwithstanding, in the broader context, this bears testimony that this 
structure of governance in Namibia is highly susceptible to disruptions and 
fragmentations. 
 
Contemporary meso governance vulnerabilities: the education system 
 
The education system that Namibia inherited at independence was in a state 
of chaos, designed to perpetuate apartheid rather than providing the 
necessary human resource base to promote equitable social and economic 
development. It required that a specific approach be implemented, specifically 
to rectify the racial and geographical inequalities. At the time of 
independence, the World conference on Education, which was held at 
Jomtiem, Thailand in March 1990 adopted what became well known as the 
“The World Declaration on Education for All”.  Article One of the Declaration 
states that: “every person- child, youth and adult- shall be able to benefit from 
educational opportunities designed to meet their basic learning needs.”344 The 	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declaration could not have come at the right time for Namibia. Namibia was 
part of the 1,500 delegates representing 155 countries that participated in the 
drafting of the declaration.  Since then Namibia has put a lot of effort in trying 
to meet the objectives of the declaration.  At independence, a new Ministry of 
Education, Culture, Youth and Sport was formulated with the overall 
responsibility “to fashion a national and unitary ministry out of eleven 
departments bequeathed by the previous regime”.345 In 1991, a Commission 
on Higher Education was appointed by the President with the mandate to 
“advise government on the needs, demands and scope of higher education, 
its organisation, structure, location, funding, admission criteria, programmes, 
relationship with government and much else, including national research 
policy”.346 The Namibian government has since consistently expressed its 
intention to prioritise education as a means of promoting development.  Article 
20 of the Namibian constitution is devoted to education. It states: “Everyone 
has the right to education and, furthermore, primary education is compulsory 
and should be provided free of charge to every resident by the Namibian 
state”.  The role of government in the provision of education is emphasised in 
this article. And in April 1991, for the first time in history, all public education 
systems in Namibia came under one cohesive authority”. A philosophical 
perspective was adopted and contained in the policy document, Towards 
Education for All.  This document became the guiding principle for education 
in Namibia, specifically in terms of providing the overarching framework to 
redress the ills of the past and to use education as the vehicle and the driving 
force for development. The National Institute for Educational Development 	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(NIED) was set up to coordinate foreign development aid and to design new 
curricula, teaching materials and pedagogical approaches. 
 
To demonstrate its commitment to education, the Namibian government 
devoted the largest part of the public sector spending to education. By 2003, 
the amount devoted to Education Affairs and Services has risen more than 
fourfold from N$ 510347 million in 1990/91 to N$ 2.3 billion in 2002/3. 
Estimated spending in 2002/3 represented 21.3% of total public spending and 
actual spending rose from N$ 660 million to N$ 2,1 billion during the same 
period.348 As a percentage of GDP, actual spending is currently estimated at 
9% of GDP. This trend highlights the importance attached to education by the 
Namibian government. But the question is:  does higher spending in 
education lead to perceived improvement in the standard of living of a society 
as a whole?  Like many other countries, Namibia has succeeded in achieving 
high and sustained public spending on education since independence. 
Namibia has also consistently expressed its intention to prioritise education as 
a means of promoting development.  To this effect, Article 20 of the Namibian 
constitution makes this intention clear by asserting that “everyone has the 
right to education and, furthermore, primary education is compulsory and 
should be provided free of charge to every resident by the Namibian state”.  
The role of government in the provision of education is emphasised in this 
article. But what this constitutional provision does not highlight is that the 
involvement of government is not only necessary to correct the market’s 	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inability to achieve social efficiency, but that the education sector is also the 
largest employer base in Namibia, employing approximately 38,000349 (or 
11.5%) of the total workforce of approximately 331,444.350 In the context of 
HIV and AIDS, it is not only important to maintain stability in this sector for the 
sake of preserving the knowledge transfer to the younger generation, but to 
mitigate the macro-economic impact as well.  
 
The importance attached to education has led to the quick “quantitative” 
expansion in the numbers of education opportunities in Namibia. However 
there is now a growing discontent among economists on the role of education 
in bringing prosperity to the Namibian nation. The problem has been one 
endemic to most developing nations who believed that rapid quantitative 
expansion of the educational opportunities is a key to accelerated 
development. Many countries opted to adopt a fast-pace approach to 
education and have adopted the goal of education in the shortest possible 
time. The mission is more educated people and the vision was a faster 
economic growth. But this has not happened. The challenge that formal 
education does not lead to faster economic growth is now gathering 
momentum.351 After approximately three decades of rapid increase in 
registration and the expenditure of billions of dollars, we have not seen major 
changes in the position of the average African, Asian and Latin American.352 	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The same could be said about Namibia, because after decades of expanding 
enrolments and billions of dollars of education expenditure, the material well 
being of many people in Namibia has not improved. Following independence 
in Namibia, there was a steady increase in education expenditure, but little 
reduction in poverty and the number of people seeking for a decent job. 
Absolute poverty is what is evident and the gap between the poor and the rich 
is still widening. Additionally, and whilst millions of dollars are spent on 
education, the illiteracy level remains high, because as Smit alludes, 
“opportunity cost for going to school is high for poorer families who cannot do 
without the labour of the school going children”.353 Some critics raise concern 
that the situation for poor black people is yet to change with some positing 
that only a few elites- children of politicians and black business people, have 
access to schools previously reserved for whites. Accordingly, these schools 
have become inaccessible.  And most public schools face severe shortage of 
textbooks, classrooms, qualified teachers and other teaching aids like 
laboratories. Therefore the disparities still exist with many of the newly middle 
class people opting for education of their children in private schools. Whilst 
private schools in Namibia account for a relatively small percentage of 6%, 
their pass rates are way above public schools, which in essence, 
demonstrates the disparities of education in Namibia. 
 
The questions rarely asked is whether the current education system actually 
addresses fundamental questions of what education is all about. As I have 
earlier posited, education serves a higher purpose than only learning of 
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techniques, it is the key foundation to governance as it not only encourages 
the learning of techniques, but helps man to experience the integrated 
process of life and thus creates the governors and the governable. As 
Krishnamurti asserts, “it is the experience that will put capacity and technique 
in the right place”.354 The current education system emphasises specific 
technique, without necessarily looking at the whole spectrum of life, therefore 
does not produce creative people, able to turn opportunities into prosperity. It 
would appear that unless Namibia brings about radical transformation in the 
education system, unemployment, poverty, inequality and disease the likes of 
HIV and AIDS will linger on.  
 
Situating the vulnerabilities of the micro, meso ad macro governance 
systems within historical context 
 
I argue that the nature of the governance systems cannot be fully understood 
without an appreciation of their historical evolution. My contention is that the 
burden of the past weighs heavily on the present and the future, nowhere 
more so in the structures of governance. For example, using the German 
colonisation as a reference point for the analysis of the family as a key 
governance structure, specifically the genocide of 1904-08, serves to remind 
us of its direct impact on this structure of governance. Most significantly, the 
genocide provided a prelude to the systematic repression that followed and 
the wholesale appropriation of the land belonging to the communities.355  
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Whilst attempting to make reference to the historical progression of these 
systems, sadly though, I was obliged to be creative as indeed little is 
researched about Namibia and the social systems of rules, due in part to the 
protracted period of colonisation and apartheid, which effectively limited 
scholarly research to a handful of people outside Namibia. This is not in any 
way an endorsement of the notion that historical records and memory centres 
only on codified written texts as opposed to the oral traditions and rituals, but 
poignantly, such rituals and oral traditions are inaccessible and thus textual 
representations have taken precedence in modern day discussion about the 
history of Namibia.  
 
Historically induced macro governance vulnerabilities: national 
governance 
 
I have highlighted in earlier sections that the term governance, as it relates to 
the work of government, gained prominence after the great depression and 
subsequently the Second World War in what Mayntz calls the increasing 
claims of political guidance, and the “growing orientation of political decision-
makers towards planning and the use of planning techniques”.356 The idea 
was that governments had to take seriously the accountability to steer their 
nations towards sustainable human development, which development was a 
necessity to eliminate poverty, create jobs, increase sustainable livelihoods 
and protect the environment and the most vulnerable in society. Whilst 
governance became the mantra in political discourse as the guiding principle 
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in the years coming, this thinking has completely eluded the government in 
South Africa. Paradoxically, and when the world’s attention focusing on good 
governance and what this means for governments, things were taking a 
completely different turn in Namibia and South Africa. Precipitated by the 
election of the National Party into power in 1948; the term governance was 
diminished to the point that it became estranged from government. 
Conceivably, the systematic repressions of the indigenous structures of 
governance were followed by years of colonial administration set up to 
legitimise the policies of apartheid. In the early years, power was centralised 
to the national government comprising of a number of powerful individuals 
selected by the administrators of apartheid. From 1915-1977, the Head of the 
country was an Administrator directly responsible to the Prime Minister in 
South Africa.357 In 1977, the Administrator was replaced by an Administrator-
General who was empowered to act by proclamation but at the same time 
responsible to the Head of State in South Africa. Scholars often use these 
early institutional characteristics to explain how Namibia managed to elude 
the difficulties so endemic to many African states. These, according to Bratton 
and Van de Walle, is because Namibia was the last settler oligarchy, and 
thereby do not share the same characteristics as many other neopatrimonial 
regimes in Africa.358 Oligarchies, approximated “exclusionary democracies- 
where political competition is high but participation low- with settlers 
reproducing functioning democracies of themselves, while fully excluding the 
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indigenous majority.”359 In such instances, competition, though limited to a 
few, was tolerated and “the dominant group used instruments of law to deny 
political rights to ethnic majorities, usually through a restrictive franchise and 
emergency regulations backed by hierarchical organised coercion”.360 Whilst 
in the process indigenous people lost their political and economic powers, the 
settlers produced functioning democracies in their microcosmic enclaves, with 
regular elections, leadership turnover, opposition, independent courts and 
some degree of press freedom all of which were reserved for whites.361 In the 
process, strong institutions were established at the level of the state, making 
the transition from colonialism to independence somewhat seamless. 
Similarly, it could be said that because independence was not only won by the 
barrel of the gun, but by protracted periods of negotiations, the settler 
community became an integral part of the transition to independence, as they 
negotiated some form of power sharing and protection of the rights of 
minorities. This is clearly demonstrable in the constitution of Namibia, which 
contains explicit provisions for protection of citizens regardless of colour, skin, 
or socio-economic status. Additionally, a constitutional commitment was made 
to keep all the civil servants who held a position “in the civil service on the 
date of independence... until they resigned, or were removed in accordance 
with the law.”362 This clearly created problems from the onset as SWAPO had 
hoped that many of these people would opt to return to South Africa, freeing 
up space for returning comrades. But as evidence was piling up that South 
Africa was also on the verge of majority rule, almost all opted to stay. At the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid 
362 Linda Freeman, The contradiction of independence: Namibia in transition, International 
Journal, 46, (1992), pp. 687-718 
	   -­‐190-­‐	  
same time though, it ensured that the key structures remained intact and that 
critical skills could be transferred to the new government employees, many of 
whom were not adequately trained for the civil service. Of the 40,000-50,000 
who returned from exile, only an estimated 15% had some form of 
comprehensive post-secondary education; many were trained only as 
soldiers, or had other rudimentary artisan skills obtained in camps in 
Angola.363 Therefore, the remaining government employees played a key role, 
not only in transferring skills, but also in avoiding an overreliance on 
expatriate skills, a phenomenon found in many of the previously African 
independent states. These are the factors scholars often cite as undoubtedly 
the key reasons Namibia is hailed as a model for democratic transition- a 
model that indeed defies the African status quo. For the purpose of analysing 
this form of governance, undoubtedly, continuity through change was made 
possible.  
 
Historically induced macro governance vulnerabilities: local governance  
 
What existed in Namibia pre-colonialism was a system of local governance 
based on traditional systems of kings, chiefs, and headmen. But these 
traditional systems of rules were not uniform across Namibia. Most 
communities in southern and central Namibia were predominantly pastoral, 
and the uncertainty around pastures required that these communities disperse 
“widely over the territory in small groups in order to utilise existing resources”, 
with maximisation of pastures and water resources requiring “a high degree of 
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mobility, characterised by epicyclical migration”.364 Therefore, kingdoms and 
chiefdoms were defined in terms of small groups of people, usually consisting 
of a few families. “Corresponding to the high degree of mobility was a social 
and political structure characterised by a relatively low degree of political 
centralisation… (and) coherent tribal units with a paramount chief on top did 
not yet exist”.365 The northern parts on the other hand, were predominantly 
agro-pastoral, with communities settled around agricultural fields combined 
with animal husbandry. For the Owambo speaking people, the largest tribal 
group at the time, water was the crucial factor detecting human settlement as 
they relied on ground water and flood water (efundja). Communities were 
largely settled around cleared areas of flood plains after fairly heavy rains, 
which rains occurred occasionally during the summer period lasting a few 
months. Therefore unlike the people from the central and southern areas, they 
were fairly settled, the result of which was more organised communities under 
kingships. Historiography on Owamboland demonstrates that the kingship 
was an important aspect of their lives. Records demonstrate how king 
Mandume Ndemufayo became the forceful leader, known as one of the 
pioneers of resistance to colonial rule. These structures are known to be the 
first forms of local traditional governance in Namibia and their functions 
extended beyond land management and included such things as religious, 
judiciary, military and administrative management. In Owamboland for 
instance, these structures are known to have been well organised and were 
part of a complex political and religious organisation overseeing the 
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management of natural resources amidst the fragile ecological setting. Their 
organisation is well captured by Hayes who wrote that: 
 
“Each polity was divided into administrative districts called 
oshikandjo, presided over by a headmen or counsellors 
(omalenga), and further subdivided into wards (omikunda) under 
sub-headman (onlengwena). The main responsibility of omalenga 
was administration of the oshikandjo, where they arbitrated in 
minor legal disputes. They also organised labour for the king’s 
fields or bigger public projects, levied war bands and exacted the 
okasava, an internal cattle prestation from subjects.” 
 
Political commentators today ascribe the vulnerability of these traditional 
systems to the different traditional authorities that existed at the time.  
Because communities were loosely defined in the central and southern parts 
of Namibia, characterised by smaller groups and very small chiefdoms, who 
were constantly at odds with each other, they were easily penetrated and 
manipulated. In fact, records show that the first land was obtained in 1883, 
“when a German trader, Adolf Lüderitz, obtained the first tracts of land from 
chief Joseph Frederick in the south of Namibia”.366 Since then, the Germans 
signed protection orders with the chiefs for protection against their 
adversaries in exchange for land. On the contrary, records demonstrate that 
the powerful Kwanyama kingdom under the leadership of Mandume 
Ndemufayo was a key factor in limiting or at least delaying colonial settlement 
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in the northern parts of Namibia. As Hayes in reference to Germany’s slow 
move towards the north alludes; “not only was it economically an unpromising 
region, but the populous and well-armed Owambo polities were considered 
too formidable to be easily subdued, especially before 1904 when Germany 
was still struggling to establish a presence in the centre of German South 
West Africa.”367 This was largely due to organised traditional authorities under 
the leadership of kings, chiefs and headmen.  
 
Broadly, these were what Werner calls the “political and economic matrix into 
which German colonialism inserted itself”.368 Clearly, such a formidable local 
organisation posed a threat to both colonial settlement and governance. In the 
years following German colonisation, there was a persistent and consistent 
barrage to dismantle these traditional structures. Instead, what followed was a 
system of chiefs created by the colonial administration for the purpose of 
expanding their mandate. Indeed, matters became worse after the National 
Party government in South Africa engaged into the restructuring of rural 
societies, which fundamentally changed the role of traditional authorities. The 
Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 clearly rested the power with a hierarchy of 
compliant chiefs who were made utterly dependent on the patronage of the 
Department of Native Affairs, and were no longer accountable to their 
subjects but to the apartheid regime. As Kessel and Oomen pronounced, 
“their powers were increased while their legitimacy was being eroded.”369 
What this meant is that chiefs and everything related to the traditional 	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authority became unpopular and chiefs were no longer perceived as potential 
allies in the struggle for freedom. The roles of chiefs got so diminished to the 
extent that one leading ANC intellectual on the dawn of independence in 
South Africa straightforwardly wrote: “Backward tribal and other relationships 
such as the role of the chiefs in such situations, will be replaced by 
democratic institutions founded on the organs of people’s power’.370 This 
seems to be the philosophical underpinning of the local governance system in 
Namibia after independence. For better or for worse, the function of traditional 
authorities have been diminished to the extent that their role is marginal in the 
new political dispensation.  
 
Historically induced meso governance vulnerabilities: education system 
 
I have repeatedly presented education as the fundamental element in the 
governing process as it “provides for better citizenship, the ability to 
appreciate and recognise wider range of cultural and other services, reduced 
reliance on the market for such services as the filling of income tax returns, 
and the chance to give the next generation better education and … a better 
future.” It becomes imperative at this stage to reiterate that whilst the 
importance of education to the governing process has long been recognised, 
it was not only until the 1960s that W. Schultz, the Nobel prize winner for 
Economic Science, guided the revolution of recognising human capital in the 
production process, leading to the development and interest in the 
measurement of human capital, which capital was further extended to include 	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the creation of norms for harmonious living with others. Prior to this period, 
the value of peoplr was largely construed as a function of their physical rather 
than their mental strength.  
 
Whilst the paradigmic shift was taking place throughout the world, the South 
African apartheid regime, on the contrary, started implementing one of the 
most dehumanising systems of education ever known. In seeking to pursue 
the policy of apartheid, the regime had to introduce a new ideology into the 
black schooling system, which became known by the generic term ‘Bantu 
Education’.371 According to Gonzales, “several scholars have written about 
Namibia’s pre-independent education system, detailing its ideological 
propagandising, institutional discrimination, dependence on rote memorisation 
of the canon, and alienation of both pupils and educators”.372 In a sense, the 
Bantu Education became the cornerstone for apartheid and the vehicle 
through which the apartheid ideologies could be maintained. As Hopfer later 
wrote; “one of the strongest forces that sustained Apartheid in Namibia until 
1990, and in South Africa until 1994, was an education system with different 
schools and resources for the different population groups.”373 The historical 
progression of this ideology could not have been better phrased than Christie 
and Collins who wrote that: 
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“In January 1949, the Nationalist Government, believing that the 
schooling was an essential means to achieve success in bringing about 
apartheid, set up a Commission on Native education under the 
Chairmanship of Dr W.W.M. Eiselen…  In the main it considered that 
black education should be an integral part of a carefully planned policy 
of segregated socio-economic development for the black people. 
Above all, it emphasised the functional value of the school as an 
institution for the transmission and development of cultural heritage. 
Consequent to this report, the Bantu Education Act was introduced 
giving wide powers to the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H. F. Verwoerd, 
to bring into effect the major recommendations of the Eiselen 
Commission. Black education was to be directed to black- not white- 
needs; it was to be centrally controlled and financed under the Native 
Affairs Minister; syllabuses were to be adapted to the black way of life 
and black schools were to be slowly taken over from the missionary 
bodies who were running the vast majority of black schools at that time 
and to be placed under the Native Affairs Department.”374 
 
In the years that followed, all aspects of education was racially prescribed, 
which in effect, meant that formal schooling, introduced by missionaries as far 
back as the late 19th century was abandoned. Whilst it is true that the previous 
education used by missionaries to teach people to read the bible and later 
used by the Germans to teach people artisan skills was in many respects to 
propagandise colonialism, the racially prescribed school system became 	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known to have created acute disparities and inequalities to unimaginable 
proportions. In this context, the racial hierarchy was defined with Europeans 
on top, Indians, Arabs and other mixed groups in the middle and Africans on 
the bottom. Separate schools were built based on this hierarchy, with 
education not being seen as a right to blacks, but a privilege reserved for the 
whites. The segregation was made easier because at the same time, the 
geographical divisions were also implemented with the setting up of the 
reserves, modelled on the South African Bantustans or homelands, as they 
became known in later years. Thus, “education was further fragmented along 
tribal lines for schools all over the country”, in addition to having “different 
educational systems and administrators” based on race, “administered by 
racially based Education Department/Authorities.”375 Because as far as the 
whites were concerned education was not a priority for blacks, education 
directed to blacks was much more inferior than that of the whites. In fact, it is 
known that the apartheid authorities spent 10 times more on a white child than 
on a non-white child.  Shilongo puts this quite succinctly when he commented 
that, “to further strengthen the apartheid state’s machinery, only a few, ill-
equipped, poorly staffed and financed schools were made available for the 
indigenous people”.376 What this meant is that most black people stayed out 
of school and competed for the few places available in schools. Many 
peripheral tribes, such as the Himbas, Zembas, San and other tribes were 
literally excluded from the education system, because after all, it did not 
matter to the South African government whether these children attended 
school or not. What this meant is that a large number of the tribal groups were 	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excluded from the education system, a legacy still being felt to date. What is 
more, even in instances where some blacks were privileged to attend school, 
records show that only a small number proceeded to high school, with 
commentators believing that this was a deliberately engineered mechanism 
that enabled the colonisers to rationalise separate and unequal education 
systems to which the oppressed were submitted.377 The ideological 
consequences of this machinery seemed to have filtered through to the white 
middle class public in later years, as they became resolute to preserve the 
status quo, which status quo they believed must be passed on to later 
generations in order to maintain the privileges of the white communities.  In 
effect, this is as a result of what Bourdieu and Passerson refer to as the use 
of cultural capital that the white people gained through education, which they 
then used to make the rules to further build and appropriate it.378  
 
Historically induced micro governance vulnerabilities: family institution 
 
Looking at the present Namibia, it is not hard to recognise that the societal 
dimensions of its mnescope represents social and cultural juxtaposition 
resulting from an evolution spanning a period of over 100 years. It is what 
Kossler refers to as a fragmented mnescope discernable by key events, 
personage, dates and periods that form the most vital points of reference for 
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each region or community.379 In a sense, the consequences and internal 
contradictions of each period are readily evident in each region of the country. 
So, when looking at the family structure as a key governance institution, it 
becomes clear that whilst historically, the family institution has undergone 
tremendous transformation in various parts of the world as a result of external 
socio-economic environment, the Namibian family structure did not follow the 
same pattern and what is more, it did not evolve monotonically across all the 
parts of the country. What forms the central point of reference for the people 
of central and southern Namibia was the rebellion, which escalated into the 
catastrophic war of 1904-1908. After this war, major parts of the southern 
area were allocated for colonial settlement. Together with the genocide, this 
led to wholesale dispossession of most African groups of their land. For the 
people of central and southern Namibia, land dispossession meant “the end of 
independent communal life and posed a vital threat to the continuance of 
collective identity”.380 With collective identity retarded, coupled with reported 
75-80% of all Hereros and 50% of all Nama people killed in what is commonly 
referred to as the Herero and Namaqua genocide381, the institutions of the 
family were severely weakened. After the genocide, with many men having 
perished, large numbers of women were rounded up to work in concentration 
camps and prevented from owning land. Many more were used as sex slaves, 
resulting in numerous children being born to these abused women, some of 
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these children being used as research objects into the genetics of race.382 
Whilst scholars have been mute on this subject, the significance of colonial 
racism lies in its connection to the anti-Semitism attitude, which in many 
respects and to a certain degree, was the preamble to the Holocaust. Using 
examples from psychoanalytical school of thought, Melber, a leading scholar 
on German colonisation, reminds us that the impact of racial colonisation on 
the mindset of German petit bourgeoisie and other members of the middle 
class did not start after World War I, but can be traced to such events as 
those that happened in Namibia during the end of the 19th and beginning of 
the 20th century.  But for Namibia, these events meant families were 
fragmented, with increased single parenting and women headed households, 
a phenomenon still prevalent in most parts of central and southern Namibia. 
The interconnectedness of family members was broken, therefore the process 
of joint decision making within the culturally accepted notions was 
undermined. Conceivably, what this meant, for most communities, is that the 
family lost its role as an important structure in the governing process. Even 
when families were re-constituted after the genocide, the introduction of the 
contract labour system served to further undermine family life. When, after the 
genocide, the Germans were encouraged that they crushed the resistance, 
specific regulations were issued between 1905 and 1907 to expropriate land 
from the Hereros and the Namas. This allowed the colonial administration to 
exert control over the political affairs of these communities with the power to 
decide where and how the indigenous people must be settled. “Henceforth, 
black Namibians could obtain land only with special permission of the 	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Governor”, but up until 1912, “this was never granted”. Instead, the 
appropriation became the precursor of the migrant labour system, with native 
reserves being set up to provide a wage subsidy to the colonial economy. 
Such a system denied communal farmers to accumulate capital, so that every 
household is dependent on wage labour. It was used as a coercive means of 
extending the periods of employment of indigenous labourers and served as 
policing of movements of migrants from reserves where they were forced to 
live.383 Very broadly speaking, this meant that for the first time, a large 
number of men were separated from their wives and children, and in some 
instances, such separation endured for long periods of time. Equally, one can 
argue that, generally, this signalled the beginning of the end of family units, as 
it was previously known. 
 
For the people belonging to the northern areas of Kaokoveld, Owamboland, 
Kavango and Caprivi, actual colonial intrusion did not occur until after the 
Germans and did not specifically entail land dispossession. Actual intrusion 
only started during World War I, when South Africa, being part of the British 
Commonwealth started occupying Namibia. Indeed, many scholars agree 
that, contrary to the order of the Majesty to serve the interest of the people of 
Namibia, this marked an extension of yet another brutal repression of the 
people of this country. In fact, this was clearly documented, when, at the dawn 
of South African colonisation of Namibia in 1916, the Officer in charge of 
Native Affairs proclaimed that:  
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“the setting aside of small areas of land for use by black Namibians 
was never intended to create reserves to which tribes could remove 
themselves and thus restore their old tribal methods under the Chiefs. 
Instead, married women and children should live on their reserves and 
have benefits of the milk from their cattle… men should go out like the 
natives of the Transvaal and leave their women at home on the 
reserves until they return.”384 
 
Indeed, South Africa is known to have put this to good effect. Tribal 
confinement increased with the settlers deciding where each tribe is settled. 
Whilst South Africa did not have an explicit policy of forced migration per se, 
literature search of the history of Namibian contract labour system all seem to 
point to the fact that labour migration kept on increasing each year after the 
South African ‘take-over’. Although numerous reasons are often cited for the 
increase in labour migration in later years, job related reasons often outweigh 
the other reasons. To compel people to migrate, South Africa introduced a 
system of taxation through tribal chiefs in addition to introducing commercial 
goods (consisting of various types of food, ploughs, fencing wires, clothes, 
food and other modern commodities), which in effect necessitated one to 
have cash in order to buy these items. This was followed by the climate 
situation in the north, which led to 160,000 Owambo people dying from famine 
in 1915, and the imposition of ‘hut tax’. All these were meant to ‘force’ people 
to leave their tribal homes in search of employment. According to Mitchell, 
“the attitude of the early settlers to the reluctance of the local African 	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population to enter into wage-earning employment was that if ‘the African’ did 
not respond to economic motives, then the best way to make him work was 
not to pamper him, but to tax him so that he would learn the dignity of 
labour.”385  
 
Quite clearly, the consequences of the migrant labour system are still felt to 
the present time. Scholars today agree that as a result and despite its small 
population, Namibia has one of the greatest linguistic variety per capita in the 
world, with thirteen distinctive languages being spoken by these slightly over 
two million people. The long years of migrant labour system also meant that 
men, who would normally have one monogamous relationship, were put into 
situations that encouraged polygamous relationships, which over time, 
became an acceptable way of life for many of them. Writing on labour 
migration between South Africa and Namibia, Hishongwa posits that migration 
“prevented African men fulfilling their roles as fathers, husbands and 
members of the community”.386 Many men entered into what Hishongwa 
refers to as transnational polygamy, and many more established second 
families in South Africa leading to some abandoning their families back home 
in Namibia.387 This issue has received little attention from historians, and 
many scholars appear reluctant to engage in a dialogue on how the migrant 
labour system inspired the culture of polygamy and extra marital affairs in 
Namibia, which culture is still evident in major parts of the country. In fact, 
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others trace the high prevalence of child and wife neglect to the system of 
labour migration. Mager, whilst writing about the relationship between 
sexuality and violence, unwittingly admits that in the context of absent male 
migrants, wife neglect and sexual violence became endemic in South Africa. 
She further concludes that ‘the war on women’, as she phrases it, must be 
seen as “the outcome of a complex interplay between wider social processes 
and those power relations, themselves mediated by economic and political 
factors”.388 In a sense, this could be extended to argue that most men 
subjected to the migrant system developed dominant patriarchal attitudes in 
what Ramphele called “migrant labour hostels of Cape Town”.389 Moffet, 
writing about the complex relations between what she terms ’gender war’ and 
social and racial legacies in South Africa, also concludes that the reason 
South Africa has the highest rape of women and girls for a country not at war 
or embroiled in a conflict, is a result of the “pernicious and overtly racially 
ranked hierarchies endorsed and enforced during South Africa’s apartheid 
regime”. She further writes: 
 
“Under apartheid, the dominant group used methods of regulating 
blacks and reminding them of their subordinate status that permeated 
not just public and political spaces, but also private and domestic 
spaces. Today it is gender rankings that are maintained and women 
that are regulated. This is largely done through sexual violence, in a 
national project in which it is quite possible that many men are buying 	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into the notion that in enacting intimate violence on women, they are 
performing a necessary work of social stabilization”390 
 
This scenario leaves us with too many questions, one of which is the extent of 
the devastating impact of violence on women in these high HIV background 
prevalence countries. This is an important question because for young 
women, sexual coercion is a key factor limiting their ability to prevent HIV and 
sexually transmitted infections (STI) transmission as safe sex is rarely 
practiced where women are coerced. 
 
Other momentous effects of the labour migration system was to deny the 
woman and girl child from taking part in wage labour. Women were left at the 
tribal home to deal with the problems of caring for their children, themselves 
and the entire household.391 This implies that because of different 
experiences, these women were also united by oppression but differently from 
the men who were on contract in white areas. This too led to not only the 
development of an alternative lifestyle or subculture of resistance as I shall 
discuss later, but to further weaken women’s economic power relative to men 
and indeed to engage in sexual networking of their own as a means of 
survival. A study carried out in Halbisi, a community in South Africa’s Kwazulu 
Natal, corroborates this hypothesis. The study concluded that among the 
discordant couples, about 20% women were HIV positive whilst their migrant 
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husbands were negative.392 It therefore emerges that the contract labour 
system played an important role in altering the way of life of indigenous 
families. The effects are numerous to be discussed in any length. In fact, 
there is a vast amount of literature on the social effects and by implication the 
psychological effects of the contract labour system on families. The strong 
relationship of these events is not only evident in the spatial variations of the 
regions, but in that various communities in Namibia ascribe key aspects of 
their collective identity construction to these events.  Today, whilst everyone 
talks about one Namibia, it is much harder to talk of a unified Namibian 
culture, unless this is only in reference to the symbolic exercise of national 
identity formation. In a sense, making the task of discerning one family culture 
a complex exercise. Whilst it is true that most family units meet Murdock’s 
sociological and anthropological definition as a social group characterised by 
common residence, economic co-operation and reproduction… including 
adults of both sexes at least two of whom maintain a socially approved sexual 
relationship and one or more children393, a large number of families fall short 
of this definition. Single parenting, not only in the Western sense of an 
unmarried mother having to raise a child, but more so married mothers having 
to content with raising children in the absence of the father, and at times 
having to contend with the consequence of being in a polygamous 
relationship. At present, many men from the northern periphery work in the 
major towns of Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Lüderitz, Rosh Pinah and Oranjemund.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
392 Lurie M et al., Who infects whom? HIV-1 concordance and discordance among migrant 
and non-migrant couples in South Africa, AIDS, 17, (2003), pp. 2245-2252 
393 George Murdock, Social Structure, (New York: McMillan Company, 1949)  
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Conclusion 
 
Key to my argument is that the complex governances, both formal and 
informal, high and low, that provide and sustain intergenerational knowledge 
are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. Because the thesis 
characterises governance as a summative phenomenon that emerges from 
long run equilibria of processes, there will be little justification in omitting the 
historical influences of the violence, suffering, intimidation, death, distorted 
economy, population dislocation, and military rule on these systems. 
Emerging from this chapter is the profound impact of years of colonisation and 
apartheid on Namibia’s social systems of rules. The impact of the genocide 
and the migrant labour system on families are so profound, such that scholars 
often view this as a preamble to the lasting violence against women, the 
burgeoning culture of polygamy and extra marital affairs, wife neglect and the 
weakening of women’s socio-economic power relative to men.  As Britton 
reminds us; “during the colonial period and throughout the apartheid era, rape 
was used as a weapon to ensure control, obedience and interracial 
conformity.”394 As such, violence against women has become what Britton 
terms “the most visible and destabilising vestiges of this complex history”. 
Similarly, the consequence of years of distorted access to education are still 
evident today, with an estimated 35% of the labour force being unable to find 
a job because they are not qualified. Only about 43% of the labour force is in 
formal employment.395 After two decades of rapid increase in registration and 	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Statistics Office, 2012)	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the expenditure of billions of dollars, the position of the average Namibian has 
not changed. Clearly and whilst Namibia is heralded as a model for 
reconciliation and inter-party constitutional reformation for the rest of Africa, 
many scholars believe that “...the task of promoting greater social equity has 
yet to be adequately addressed.”396 Therefore we bear testimony to the 
subtle, daunting and long waved impacts of colonisation in these structures of 
governance. Conversely though, the implication of protracted period of 
colonisation meant that Namibia inherited very strong institutions at the level 
of nation state, and in the process was spared from the ominous danger so 
often associated with newly independent states in Africa. At the same time, 
independence occurred at a time that Bauer calls, the “apparent universal 
triumph of ideas of neo-liberalism and liberal democracy”. These ideas have 
formed the basis for Namibia’s constitution and other national development 
documents, strategies, programmes and plans. Today Namibia’s constitution 
is hailed the most liberal in the world and is regarded as a good case study for 
democratic transition, tempting many to court controversy by trumpeting that 
the protracted period of colonisation was, after all, not too bad.   
 
Nonetheless, Namibia’s case presents a good example of the 
interdependence of the various forms of governance from a higher to a lower 
order. In earlier sections, I made reference to the challenges faced by the 
traditional conceptions of governance due to the emergence and dynamism of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
396 See for example Chris Tapscott, National Reconciliation, Social Equity and Class 
Formation in Independent Namibia, Journal of Southern African Studies, 19(1), (1993), pp. 
29-39. Tapscott shows that while national reconciliation has played an important role in 
overcoming political and racial tensions of the past, he nevertheless hypothesise that such a 
policy entrenches the status quo by protecting the pre-independence gains of the minority 
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actors in the governing process and how academic description is necessary to 
reflect the interplay of the various actors on micro, meso, and macro levels of 
political aggregation. Using Rosenau’s conceptualisation of the 
interdependence of these various systems, I referred to governance as a 
summative phenomenon. Implied in the analysis of the various systems of 
governance is the interdependency of each of these on each other. It follows 
that the family is an important institution providing input to the education, 
which in turn is a necessary foundation for local and national governance. 
Similarly, the civil society is an important element in the governing process as 
it not only fills the gap between families and government, but fulfils important 
functions at grassroot levels, such as solving land disputes, and dealing with 
disasters such as HIV and AIDS and floods. In recognition of the 
interdependence of these systems, the Namibian government describes civil 
society as “a wide range of organisations found at all levels of civil society 
between the individual or family and the state, and which becomes involved in 
activities that pursue the interest of its members, sponsors and/or 
beneficiaries.”397  Whilst it was important to discuss governance for the 
specific arena in which it takes place, in the grand scheme of things, 
governance must be seen as a totality of these sectoral governances. 
Reiterating Kooiman’s words: “government (in Namibia) could never govern if 
people- in their organisations, their families, their groupings of all kinds- were 
not self-governing”.398   
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Chapter 6: Namibia HIV and AIDS related governance liabilities 
 
Introduction: AIDS in Namibia 
 
Since the first case of HIV was diagnosed in 1986, the epidemic continued to 
rise, reaching a peak of 22% in 2002, before declining to 17.8% in 2008 and 
picking up again to 18.8% in 2010 among pregnant women.  
 
Graph 1: Namibia HIV prevalence rate in pregnant women, 1992-2010 
 
Source: Ministry of Health and Social Services, Report on the 2010 National HIV Sentinel 
Survey 
 
Namibia monitors the prevalence of the HIV epidemic every second year 
through the sentinel survey, the first of which was carried out in 2002. The 
sentinel survey is conducted anonymously with pregnant women attending 
antenatal care (ANC). Blood samples are taken from women attending a 
selected number of sites and tested in accordance with methods 
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recommended by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The latest survey, 
conducted in 2010 and released in 2011, shows that the HIV prevalence 
among pregnant women was 18.8% compared to 17.8% in 2008.399 Similarly, 
the report highlights that there is “no significant difference between urban 
(18.5%) and rural (19.1%).”400 However the report also demonstrates that HIV 
prevalence peaked in the age group 30-39 years and the age group 30-34 
years to 29.6% and 29.7% respectively. Seemingly, as the report suggests, 
the epidemic is understandably concentrated in three geographical areas of 
the northwest, north and central districts. These areas have high mobile 
populations, or are border entry or exit points. The regional variations also 
testify to the various epidemics in Namibia, with some regions showing 
leveling epidemics, whilst others show emerging, and others declining. 
Encouragingly though, there appears to be a decline in the age group 15-24 
years from 15.2% in 2004 to 10.3% in 2010, though such optimism must only 
be viewed in the context of its nominal reduction, because as I shall discuss 
later, this number is still extremely high. Of the new HIV infections, an 
estimated 44% were among young people aged between 15-24 years, and 
77% of these are females. These women are most likely infected early in their 
sexual life by their first or second partner.401 Namibia recognises that the long 
incubation period of HIV means that the full-scale impact will manifest itself 
only within a decade or two. Despite regional and geographical variations, 
Namibia experiences what is referred to as a generalised epidemic with HIV 
being transmitted primarily through heterosexual sexual intercourse. As 	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401 Ministry of Health and Social Services, Namibia Demographic and Health Survey, 
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opposed to a concentrated epidemic where the spread is confined to a 
defined subpopulation, a generalised epidemic is well established in the 
general population. In concentrated epidemics, HIV is confined to specific 
groups, inter alia, prisoners, injecting drug users, men having sex with men, 
prisoners, truck drivers and commercial sex workers. While it is true that these 
groups continue to be most vulnerable to HIV transmission, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the rate of infection is different from that in the 
general population. Therefore in Namibia, heterosexual transmission 
continues to drive the epidemic among the population.  
 
So far, the sentinel survey report has given us the most reliable information, 
“due to its early detection of changes or trends and its ability to discern 
meaningful differences in disease rates and trends between sentinel sites.”402 
“To calculate national prevalence the ANC prevalence must be adjusted to 
account for males and other women that are not represented in the ANC 
surveillance.”403 The real prevalence in the general population is currently 
estimated at 13.4%. When adjusted and compared to other countries, the 
adult prevalence is the second least highest among countries in southern 
Africa as the table below shows. 
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electoral process in Namibia, Namibia Institute for Democracy, (Windhoek: Idasa, 2007), p. 
11 
403 Ministry of Health and Social Services, Namibia estimates and projections report, 
(Windhoek, 2008) 
	   -­‐213-­‐	  
Graph 2: Namibia’s adult HIV prevalence relative to selected countries 
Source: UNICEF Information by Country, 2011 (www.unicef.org/infobycountry/statistics) 
 
Therefore and besides the adjusted figure to account for men and other 
women not attending ANC, we cannot have certainty of the actual numbers of 
people infected without a comprehensive population based surveillance 
survey. Namibia lags behind many countries in Africa, who have started 
combining sentinel surveys with national based surveys in which testing is 
also included. This creates a particular problem because studies have shown 
that sentinel surveys generally overestimate the population prevalence by as 
much as 20%.404 Bongaarts, et al, lists various reasons why this may be the 
case; first, prevalence is a lagging indicator of HIV, because the numerator 
prevalence is all currently infected individuals, regardless of when they were 
infected. What we get is information on transmission patterns and levels of 
infections that occurred over a decade ago. Second, the treatment of HIV has 
made it possible for many people to survive beyond the normal disease 	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progression, putting an upward pressure on prevalence. Third, when 
individuals start to die as a result of AIDS related illness, the pool of infected 
people reduces and as a result, may provide a picture of declining prevalence. 
Moreover the interpretation of data obtained from sentinel surveys are 
complicated by various factors, including what Gouws, Mishra and Flower 
refer to as “….biases in the sample due to subfertility associated with bacterial 
sexually transmitted infections and HIV and by the disproportionate selection 
of surveillance sites in urban area”.405 These complications have often been 
linked to the failure to deal with HIV in many countries. Instead, 
epidemiologists have urged Namibia to opt for the use of incidence rate, a 
technique to measure annual rate of new infections. Despite these caveats, 
sentinel surveys continue to provide a good approximation of the burden of 
HIV related morbidity and a good advocacy tool for action.  
 
Understandably, the immense scale of AIDS related illness and deaths is 
weakening governance capacities for service delivery with serious impacts on 
food security, economic growth, and human development in Namibia. The 
AIDS epidemic has started to undermine the capacities of individuals, 
families, communities and the state to fulfil their roles and responsibilities in 
society. It has been hypothesised that if current trends are not reversed, the 
longer–term survival of Namibia as a country will be seriously threatened. 
Though prevention efforts are beginning to reverse the trend, the epidemic 
still affects large numbers of individuals, families and communities in Namibia, 
creating a severe burden for the country as a whole. The government has on 	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several occasions made a public call for a concerted effort to continue to 
prevent new infections especially in the young age group, more so among 
young females. HIV and AIDS have reached the crisis stage in Namibia and 
require multi-sectoral approach, where all Namibians, including bi- and multi-
lateral organisations have been asked to intensify the fight against its spread. 
The staggering spread of HIV and AIDS in Namibia has prompted the 
government to adopt a multi-sectoral approach in order to intensify the fight 
against the spread of the disease. The government’s national response had 
been organised through the implementation of four consecutive plans; the 
Short-term Plan, covering 1990-1992, the Medium Term Plan (MTPI) covering 
the period 1992-1998, the National Strategic Plan on HIV and AIDS (MTPII) 
covering the period 1999-2004, the Multi-sectoral National Strategic Plan for 
HIV and AIDS (MTPIII) covering the period 2004-2009 and now implements 
the National Strategic Framework (NSF) covering the period 2010-2016.  
Each plan highlights changes in the management and coordination of the 
national response. Structures are set up to coordinate and oversee the 
implementation of the various plans. The current plan intends to prevent 
further infections, enhance care, treatment and support, and mitigate the 
impact of HIV and AIDS. It underlines the importance of harmonisation and 
synchronisation of the various interventions with national response priorities 
and the imperative of result and evidence-based planning. In 2007, an HIV 
and AIDS Policy was formulated to legitimise the plans, and more specifically 
to provide a supportive policy environment for implementation of HIV and 
AIDS programmes to reduce new infections, improve treatment, care and 
support and mitigate the impact of HIV and AIDS. The policy also offers a 
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basic framework for responding to HIV and AIDS in the workplace, monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E), surveillance and research, and institutional framework 
for policy implementation.  
 
Changing demographic structure 
 
As in many countries severely affected by the AIDS epidemic, Namibia has 
gone through a demographic transition. The first population census carried 
out in 1921, estimated the population at 229,000. Since then, the population 
has been growing steadily at 2% per year during the first half of the 1900s, 
rising to 3% during the five decades leading to the 2000s.406 In the last 
decade up to 2010, the population growth declined to 1.5%. It was earlier 
estimated that the population will rise to 2,2250,00 in 2010, but only 2,104,900 
were enumerated during the last census, 4% lower than the expected 
increase. The annual rate of increase is expected to decline lower than the 
1.5% between 2010 and 2020, both as a result of HIV and AIDS and falling 
fertility rates. 
 
The shape of Namibia’s population pyramid shows an obvious increase in the 
number of people but at a decreasing rate, with the most obvious increase 
observed in the younger population. Overall the population under 15 years 
make up 43% of the population and those between 15-44 make up 42%. This 
presents a very youthful population, making Namibia’s population very 
distinctive. In the more developed countries of the world, the age group below 	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15 years makes up only 22% and the average for less developed countries is 
35.5%.  
 
There seems to have been a reduction in the rate of growth of 0-4 year olds in 
recent years. The most obvious trend in Namibia’s demographic structure is 
the effect of AIDS mortality and decline in fertility rates on the population 
structure. These appear to be the two demographic variables affecting the 
structure and as a result of HIV and AIDS, these are intertwined. Because the 
age pattern of AIDS mortality is different from the normal mortality patterns in 
the absence of HIV, the J-shaped model have started to assume a different 
shape. Whilst the number of women exceeds men in the age group 20 
upwards, and with a disproportionately greater discrepancy in older age due 
to women’s longer life expectancy, there are signs that the younger aged 
population is not growing as it would have in the absence of HIV.  Because 
HIV is more prevalent in the sexually active population, fertility is reduced. 
The shape of the pyramid is expected to change further as HIV starts to take 
its toll in the coming years with increased mortality in the middle-aged 
population. At the top end of the pyramid, dramatic changes are expected as 
life expectancy at birth starts to fall to the projected levels of 52 years. In the 
absence of HIV Namibia’s population was expected to reach 3.5 million by 
2021, but projections now point to a growth to 2.6 million.407 In short, the 
effects of HIV on the demographic structure are not hard to see. HIV and 
AIDS decreases life expectancy in the general population, increases mortality 
in the middle aged group, reduces fertility and makes children orphans. A 	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report examining the effect of HIV in Namibia’s municipalities put this picture 
more succinctly:  
 
“The crude death rate for Namibia is expected to more than triple due 
to AIDS, rising to 19/1000 by 2006, well above the expected level of 
5/1000.  Infant mortality is expected to be 59% higher with AIDS than 
without AIDS, while child mortality is expected to be double due to 
AIDS, despite enormous advances made in child health.”408 
 
At the same time, these effects render population projections in Namibia 
problematic. As Heuveline points out, HIV has quickly rendered obsolete 
contributions to demographic estimation and forecasting in populations 
hardest hit by the epidemic, especially those with HIV exceeding a few 
percentage points.409 This is the case because “no existing model accurately 
represents the age structure of mortality when AIDS accounts for a significant 
proportion of all deaths”.410 Therefore, to accurately project the population, 
Namibia may require models that allow for the different age-specific rates of 
mortality and child-bearing of HIV-positive individuals.  
 
Why HIV has spread rapidly across the population in Namibia  
 
Like much of southern Africa, the HIV epidemic in Namibia has grown at an 
extremely fast pace and has reached exceptional intensities in several 	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regions. As the graph below demonstrates, the northern towns of Katima 
Mulilo, Oshakati, Tsumeb, Rundu and Engela all have prevalence over 20% 
of the adult population.   
 
Graph 3: National prevalence rate relative to selected sentinel sites in 
Namibia 
Source: Ministry of Health and Social Services, Report on the 2010 National HIV Sentinel 
Survey 
 
 
Again, like countries in the sub-region, there is no evidence that the Namibian 
epidemic is declining in intensity. Not even the apparent stabilisation of HIV 
prevalence can, on current evidence, be linked to prevention efforts. Rather, it 
is likely that these are either statistical anomalies or reflect an appalling 
equilibrium, with the numbers of people newly infected with HIV roughly 
equalling the numbers dying of AIDS. It has often been cited that as 
elsewhere in Africa, patterns of sexual behaviour in Namibia are embedded in 
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complex and often opaque social relations which, in different respects and to 
differing degrees, may favour or hinder viral transmission.411 Unfortunately 
there are major gaps in knowledge about what is actually happening. Across 
Namibia, there is very little knowledge in all regions about the factors fuelling 
the epidemic in terms of relative importance. However, through this research, 
logical inference and limited other researches, among the core vectors 
include: multiple concurrent partnerships, intergenerational sexual relations, 
negligible usage of condoms, transactional sexual relations, pervasive use of 
alcohol, migration and gender relations.  
 
Multiple concurrent partnerships 
 
Evidence collected as part of this research demonstrates that multiple 
concurrent partnerships, particularly with men having more than one partner is 
a significant factor in spreading HIV in Namibia. As one respondent put; “the 
biggest problem in Namibia is our culture that encourages men to have as 
many sexual partners as possible. Therefore, we can only talk about the 
reversal of the spread of HIV if we are able to convince our men and women 
that having more than one partner is dangerous”.412 The general admittance is 
that this is the key factor facilitating the spread of HIV. Other studies 
corroborate this and show that multiple partners for men are condoned and 
even encouraged. For example, a study which I have conducted in 2010, 
examining the knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs about HIV and AIDS 
in the Kunene and Erongo Regions of Namibia found that over 56% of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 Poku, ( 2006) 
412	  Interview 9, July 2011	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respondents surveyed agreed with the statement that “It is acceptable for men 
to have many sexual partners”.413  Similarly, Caprivi and Kavango, for 
instance have reported a striking increase in the number of men reporting two 
or more sexual partners between 2000 and 2006.414 In attempting to 
understand this concept more clearly, recent anthropological and gender 
research have demonstrated the traditional and historical practices that 
makes concurrent relationships acceptable. These issues include the practice 
of polygamy in some places in Namibia, the history of the migrant labour 
system, rapid modernisation and the need for transactional sexual relations 
necessitated by the sudden shift to a cash based economy.415 The issue of 
multiple partnerships in Namibia has also been seen in the context of the 
relatively low rates of marriages compared to the rest of the world.416 What is 
more, the marital rates has been decreasing, with consecutive National 
Demographical and Health Surveys (NDHS) showing a decrease in marriages 
from 27% in 1992, to 23% in 2000 and 19% in 2006. Major reasons for the 
low rates of marriages include the migrant labour system, high prices of 
wedding and lobola417 and the apartheid controls that forbade cross-ethnic 
relations. Because studies have shown that in countries with low marriage, 
the incidence of multiple and concurrent partnerships is high, it could safely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Jerry Mameja, A study to identify knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs (KAPB) on 
HIV/AIDS of women and men in Kunene and Erongo, (Windhoek: Meicos del Mundo, 2010) 
414 UNICEF/UNAIDS, Children and HIV and AIDS in Namibia, (Windhoek: UNICEF/UNAIDS, 
2011) 
415 For more analytical discussion, see Timothy Mah and Daniel Halperin, Concurrent 
Partnership and the HIV Edpidemic in Africa: Evidence to move forward, AIDS and Behavior, 
14(1), (2010), pp. 11-16 
416 See Jan, P.H Rossouw and Jan, L van Tonder, (eds.), Southern African Demographic and 
Health Survey: Namibia, (Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 1989) 
417 Denotes a practice where a man pays the family of his wife-to-be for their hand in 
marriage, widely practiced in parts of Southern Africa. 
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be argued that this is a key factor in multiple concurrent sexual relations in 
Namibia.  
 
In the context of HIV, the secondary evidence collected as part of this 
research conclusively shows the significant role multiple concurrent (as 
opposed to serial) sexual relationships play in exacerbating the transmission 
of HIV. This is not hard to see, because serial monogamy traps the virus 
within a single relationship for years or months, whereas as soon as one 
person in a network of concurrent relationships contracts HIV, everyone in the 
network is placed at risk especially women as it is biologically easier to 
transmit HIV from men to women, then from women to men. Therefore 
concurrent partnerships have a possible bearing on an HIV epidemic’s 
trajectory. Mathematical modelling have shown that when multiple 
partnerships are concurrent, as opposed to consecutive (so-called “serial 
monogamy”), the chances of HIV spread appear to increase considerably.418 
This is partly due to the fact that a newly infected person has an extremely 
high viral load (infectivity) in the first weeks after infection, which also 
increases the likelihood that anyone else in that person’s sexual network at 
the time will be infected.419 Indeed, one recent study has calculated that more 
than half the heterosexually transmitted HIV infections from men to women in 
sub-Saharan Africa occur in the first six weeks of the man’s infection.420 This 
has prompted some observers to court controversy by trumpeting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
418 Susan A Cohen Susan, Promoting the ‘B’ in ABC: Its Value and Limitations in Fostering 
Reproductive Health, The Guttmacher Report on Public Policy. October. (2004), 7(4), pp. 11-
13 
419 Halperin DT, Epstein H Concurrent sexual partnerships help to explain Africa’s high HIV 
prevalence: implications for prevention, Lancet, 364, (2004), pp. 4-6 
420 See Christopher Pilcher, et al., Brief but efficient: acute HIV infection and the sexual 
transmission of HIV, Journal of Infectious Diseases, 189 (10), (2004), pp. 1785-1792 
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importance of promoting “fidelity” and even serial monogamy, as part of a 
comprehensive prevention strategy.421  
 
It follows that without multiple sexual partnerships, an HIV epidemic in 
Namibia would not occur. By extension, partner reduction is the most obvious, 
yet paradoxically neglected approach to the prevention of HIV in Namibia. In 
the ABC model for preventing HIV in Namibia (abstinence, or deferred sexual 
inception—A, be faithful, or partner reduction—B, and condom use—C), 
promotion of sexual deferral and condom use have persuasive advocates but 
partner reduction does not.  
 
Intergenerational sexual relations 
 
The 2010 sentinel surveillance in Namibia projects that the overall HIV 
prevalence for the age group 15–24 years is 10.3%. Of the new HIV infections 
in 2007, an estimated 44% were among young people aged between 15-24 
years, and 77% of these are females. This is often regarded as a sign of early 
sexual debut, which in turn is associated with the concept of sugar daddy, 
with major motivation being material gains by young girls. The issue of sugar 
daddies is said to be more prevalent in the more urban and affluent 
settings.422 As one participant noted in a focus group discussion; “these girls 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
421 See for instance Simon Gregson, et al. Fluctuations in sexual activity, the validity of sexual 
behaviour estimates for short time-intervals, and HIV intervention evaluation in rural 
Zimbabwe, Journal of Sex Research, 2, (2001), pp. 180-181. The authors argue that the 
duration of partnerships in serial monogamy is of epidemiological interest because the chain 
reaction in very short relationships related to viraemia with new infections could fuel the 
epidemic. However, if patters of turnover in serial relationships were more than 3 months, the 
risk for infections decreases dramatically. 
422 See Peter Delius and Liz Walker, AIDS in Context. African Studies, 61(1), (2002), pp. 5-13 
who elaborated that particularly in urban areas, these relationships are formed amid 
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want to live a high life and they want to have cell phones so they end up 
dating sugar daddies and having unprotected sex.  The men buy them beer 
and when drunk they will have multiple partners which leads to pregnancy as 
well.”423 Another member of the group added that the “young girls are getting 
cornered by sugar daddies and manipulated with money.  Sugar daddies are 
ruining the lives of young girls; they get them pregnant and later deny the 
responsibility.”424	    This age-­‐mixing phenomenon is one of the crucial factors 
increasing STIs and HIV among adolescents. A study examining the 
behavioural and contextual factors driving the epidemic in Namibia found that 
“among women aged 15 to 24, seven percent of single women and 26 percent 
of married women have a partner 10 or more years older.”425 The same study 
also concludes that intergenerational sex is associated with higher levels of 
sexually transmitted infections.426 It follows that if adolescent girls were merely 
having sex with boys their age, the spread of infection among adolescents 
would not be as high. When girls are having sex with older men, who are 
more likely to be infected, compared to boys their age, and who might also be 
involved in other high risk relationships, the chances are that the epidemic 
among this group will increase. In Namibia, this issue has proved the most 
difficult to deal with as evidences suggest that physiological factors, such as 
the need for food and shelter may also be exchanged for sex as a matter of 
survival, desire for material goods such as fashion items, cell phones, money 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
aggressively propagated cultures of consumerism, and in the midst of extreme juxtapositions 
of abundance and deprivation. As a result, sexuality, survival and consumption have become 
closely intertwined. 
423	  FGD 1 participant 4, September, 2011	  
424 FGD 1 participant 2, September, 2011	  
425 Christina de la Torre, Shane Khan, Erin Eckert and Jennifer Luna, HIV/AIDS in Namibia: 
behavioural and contextual factors driving the epidemic, (MEASURE Evaluation, Macro-
international, 2010), p. ix 
426 Ibid 
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and transport, which may foster risky transactional sexual relationships. The 
evidence also suggests that in some instances much of the very early sexual 
activity for girls takes place with parental knowledge, with a number of parents 
confessing that while this may be shameful and disgraceful, parents 
reluctantly look away when this happens.427 Not only do parents look away, 
but according to one key informant; “some parents put pressure on their kids 
to emulate their friends to dressing nicely and having nice things even though 
these other kids might be from well of families.”428	   The reason for this lies in 
the fact that around 28% of households in Namibia are classified as being 
poor, with 50% of these households severely poor, representing about 14% of 
all households.429 In some instances, the ability of families- mainly women- to 
provide for their own personal, social and financial needs is seriously 
compromised by their care giving roles in households where, for instance, 
someone is infected with HIV. This shows that in many of these cases, such 
“age mixing” is tied to economies of need and aspiration of the parents. But 
the older men are also more likely to have been exposed to HIV, all the more 
so in these areas with high background prevalence.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
427 See for example Luke & Kurz, Cross-generational and transactional sexual relations in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: prevalence of behaviour of behaviour and implications fofr negotiating 
safer sexual practices, (Washington DC: Office of HIV/AIDS, Global Bureau, September, 
2002) and Longfield K et al., Relationships between older men and younger women: 
Implications for STIs/HIV in Kenya. Studies in Family Planning, 35(2), (2004), 125-134. In this 
multi country study the authors demonstrate that there are often other factors at play. It found 
that many girls looked to older men as potential marriage partners, or as sources of 
assistance in education, jobs and other aspirations or desires. Many reported that gifts of 
clothes, jewellery and perfume also boosted their self-esteem and their status among their 
peers 
428	  Interview 5, June 2011	  
429 Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission, A Review of Poverty and 
Inequality in Namibia, (Windhoek: Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning 
Commission, 2008) 	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This issue was noted by several key informants, with one key informant 
eloquently purporting that “the kids today just want to have nice things and 
when a man comes to her to ask for sex, she will do it as long as the man can 
pay her more and buy her nice things”.430 This was corroborated by another 
key informant who added that “youth today are infected by HIV/AIDS because 
they copy what their friends do, for example if a girl sees her friends with 
expensive cell phone and nice clothes which her parents cannot afford to buy 
for her she will get involved with a sugar daddy in order to be given money so 
that she can also buy an expensive cell phone.”431 This leads to adolescents 
engaging in sexual activities with older man in order to buy these nice things, 
added a couple of participants in a FGD.432 But, such early sex carries a 
threat of HIV infection in areas where HIV prevalence is high and their male 
partners are substantially older.433 The problem is that women are particularly 
vulnerable to unsafe sexual activities within such sexual relationships due to 
their weaker bargaining position relative to their male partners.  Young women 
tend to use their limited bargaining power to negotiate for higher economic 
gains instead of safe sexual practices increasing their risk for contracting HIV. 
 
Negligible usage of condoms 
 
The evidence suggests that inconsistent use of condoms with regular and 
non-regular partners is often linked with the rapid spread of HIV, with other 
reports also showing that condom use is seen as the antithesis of good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
430 Interview 4, June, 2011	  
431 Interview 5, June, 2011	  
432 FGD 2, September, 2011	  
433 For in-depth analysis see Elisabeth Pisani, The Epidemiology of HIV at the Start of the 21st 
Century: Reviewing the Evidence. Working Paper, (New York: UNICEF, 2003) 
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pleasurable sex for men. The experience of condoms by men as physically 
desensitising was a common emphasis in men’s accounts during this 
research and is widely recognised as a complaint among men in Namibia in 
general. As one male participant in a FGD puts it; “there are men who would 
risk contracting HIV instead of using condoms”.434 In other words, the practice 
of safe sexual practices by using condoms involves de-prioritising their own 
sexual pleasure in the interests of sexual safety something that a significant 
majority of men in Namibia are not willing to entertain even in high HIV 
prevalence environment as is common in the country. When women insist on 
the use of a condom for their own safety, they are going against the 
construction of sexual intercourse as men’s natural pleasure, and women’s 
natural duty. This shows that women's HIV risk from HIV transmission in 
Namibia clearly is embedded in the context of gender relations and that this 
context has central implications for interpersonal relationship factors relevant 
to women's HIV. Cultural norms of womanhood in Namibia place a high value 
on sexual innocence, passivity, virginity, and motherhood. Women and girls 
are not supposed to be knowledgeable about sex and generally have more 
limited access to relevant information and services in the country as some 
studies have shown.435 They often, therefore, remain poorly informed about 
sex, sexuality and reproduction. For instance, according to a number of key 
informants, for a Himba woman to raise the issue of using condoms before 
they are actively involved in sex, or for a woman to have condoms available, 
means that she must make explicit her sexual interests and this is in 
contradiction to traditional gender roles regarding sexual interactions. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
434 Interview 2, June 2011	  
435 See Lucy Edwards, HIV/AIDS, Poverty and Patriarchy: A Gendered perspective, 
(Windhoek: !Nara Training Centre, 2003) 
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Condoms are thus rarely used, increasing opportunities for the transmission 
of sexually transmitted infections and HIV. Condom use must thus be 
understood in the context of the contradictions and tensions of gendered 
relationships.  
 
Moreover, the inconsistent use of condoms with regular and non regular 
partners is due in significant part to the type of interventions that the actors 
(primarily the government) have been implementing and the availability of 
condoms i.e. interventions that focus on general HIV and AIDS education 
rather than on behaviour change that addresses underlying factors that lead 
men and women to take risks.436 As one national key informant noted; “for 
many years, condom availability was not matched with condom promotion.”437 
It follows that it is not enough to just provide condoms without educating 
communities on correct and consistent use of condoms and the benefits of 
condoms as a prevention method for HIV and sexually transmitted infections.  
In order to promote behaviour change among the communities, it has often 
been suggested that Namibia embarks on the use of theory based, 
participatory approaches (e.g. stepping stones), which challenge communities 
to confront, reflect on, develop their own responses to, and build their own 
normative consensus concerning sexual values and practices.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 See Jerry Mameja, A study to identify knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs (KAPB) 
on HIV/AIDS of women and men in Kunene and Erongo, (Windhoek: Medicos del Mundo, 
2010) 
437 Interview 8, July, 2011	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Transactional sexual relations 
 
Whilst data on the number of transactional sexual relations in Namibia is not 
available, this study and various other researches have identified this as a 
widespread phenomenon. For example, a report by LeBeau on alcohol 
consumption, sexual partners and HIV concluded that the most pertinent 
problem for poor women in Namibia is that they tend to have multiple men; 
one steady partner and another one whose paying the bills and buy them 
gifts. As such, “even if the woman knows that her partner has other women or 
makes use of sex workers, because she is economically dependent on him, 
she is in no position to curtail her partner’s sexual exploits”.438 One key 
informant added, “some young girls who go to school are given free transport 
to school by taxi drivers in exchange for sex and parents know this is 
happening”.439 According to another key informant these issues are 
paramount, and parents cannot necessary be blamed for this because, 
according to him, “parents need jobs and income to look after our children to 
avoid girls having sexual relationships with sugar daddies who provide 
material things and money which parents cannot provide”.440 Similarly, even if 
women may prefer to be in a steady relationship, because men float between 
partners, many women and adolescent girls participate in exchange sex and 
sometime sex work with the hope that one day, they may find a man with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Debie LeBeau and Stanley Yoder, DHS Qualitative Research Studies 16, Alcohol 
consumption, sexual partners and HIV transmission in Namibia, (Windhoek: USAID, 2009) 
439 Interview 2, June 2011	  
440 Interview 4, June 2011	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whom they can settle.441  LeBeau also concludes that many sex workers in 
Namibia admitted to have started sex in exchange for goods such as food.442  
 
Hence, it becomes impossible to divorce the issue of transactional sexual 
relations, especially involving older men and younger girls, with low economic 
status (poverty and unemployment). As girls are trying to find other means for 
financial income, they are left with little option but to start sexual relations with 
older partners. In most cases the financial assistance extend beyond the 
women and helps to meet girls’ family essential needs such as school fees, 
transport costs and groceries.443 Therefore the most common explanations of 
transactional (in this sense intergenerational) sex with older men hinges on 
assumptions of economic desperation of these households. As a result, 
sexuality, survival and consumption have become closely intertwined.444 
Transactional sex therefore simultaneously reflects men’s generally superior 
economic position and access to resources. Studies in other countries have 
found relatively high proportions of women reporting that they have accepted 
money, goods or services in exchange for sex.445 In the context of Namibia, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 LeBeau, (2009) 
442 Ibid 
443 A 2002 survey in South Africa, for example, found that sexual experience among youth 
was significantly higher in urban informal areas (where unemployment levels are extremely 
high and affordable recreational opportunities very rare), than in any other types of localities; 
Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). (2002) Nelson Mandela/HSRC Study of 
HIV/AIDS: South African National HIV Prevalence, Behavioural Risks and Mass Media 
Household Survey, Pretoria). The research indicates that in the context of deep 
impoverishment and high unemployment (and the absence of affordable recreation), sexual 
relationships often feature in bids to boost self-esteem and peer status, or simply relieve 
boredom and torpor. What makes these quests dangerous for so many young girls is that 
they are played out not only in areas where HIV has firm footholds but in circumstances 
marked by glaring gender and other inequalities. 
444 Peter Delius & Liz Walker, AIDS in Context, African Studies, 61(1), (2002), pp. 5-13. 
445 See Delius  & Walker, (2002). The authors elaborate that particularly in urban areas, these 
relationships are formed amid aggressively propagated cultures of consumerism, and in the 
midst of extreme juxtapositions of abundance and deprivation. As a result, sexuality, survival 
and consumption have become closely intertwined. 
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this seems to tell only half the story, because in the grand scheme of things, 
sexual behaviour must be seen in the context of its intertwining relationship 
with a host of other factors, for instance, many young girls look to older men 
as a source of assistance in education (due to parents’ inability to pay), whilst 
others look at older men to boost their self-esteem (to buy them mobile 
phones, perfumes and clothes) and others look at it to escape poverty 
(especially those orphaned). 
 
Pervasive alcohol abuse 
 
Alcohol abuse in Namibia is pervasive, with 41% of all respondents admitting 
that they have drunk alcohol in the past month during the 2006 NDHS. As this 
research found, alcohol has been seen as the most abused substance in 
Namibia. In the ensuing years since independence, various other studies 
proceeded to make similar conclusions. Citing various studies, LeBeau and 
Yoder put the issue of alcohol more succinctly: 
 
“A small 1996 survey found that at least 51% of respondents said they 
had more than one drink daily; furthermore, 9.5% of the adult 
population said they consumed alcohol daily. Almost 75% of out-of-
school youths who had access to money consume alcohol regularly, 
while those without money only drank occasionally. Many school 
children, some as young as nine years old, said they had also 
experimented with drinking alcohol. Early 1990 estimates indicated that 
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7.5% of the Namibian population had alcohol-related diseases and 
were thus classified as alcoholics…”  
 
Empirical evidence from this research shows that alcohol consumption in 
Namibia is episodic and heavy, occurring mainly on weekends. It has become 
a currency for sexual exchange, which heightens the risk for HIV, as the many 
evidence point to the link between alcohol abuse and sexual risk behaviour, 
including frequency of sex, more casual partners and unprotected sex. 
Alcohol and heavy drinking is also associated with the desire to meet new sex 
partners and when this is nested in an environment of poverty and gender 
inequality, it provides a conducive setting for risky sexual encounters. The one 
big factor facilitating the use of alcohol in Namibia, as this research shows, is 
that venues for alcohol consumption are numerous, with “shebeens” (drinking 
establishments) almost making up every second or third house in major 
towns. Therefore many young people are exposed to these establishments at 
an early age, the implication of which is the belief that this is part of the social 
fabric. This is particularly worrying because these children are at a stage of 
seeking for and developing norms around appropriate social behaviour.	  
According to a member of one FGD; “peer pressure leads to this risks and as 
a result a 10 year old child ends up drinking beer and sometimes the child 
have copied from the parents when they used to go with them to the 
club/shebeen and some parents do not talk to their children about these 
things because of cultural barriers.”446	   Another key informant added that, 
“young children from the age of 10 are being sent by their parents to purchase 
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alcohol and in the process they end up drinking alcohol with other teenagers 
and end up having sex without protection because their hormones have 
kicked in and are not educated about such issues.”447 Another FGD 
participant was adamant that the issue of alcohol is directly linked to parents 
who are “setting a bad example to their children because they drink alcohol 
with their children”. 
 
Also, because alcohol in Namibia seems to be central to men’s lives, young 
boys grow up with the belief that alcohol consumption is normal and for better 
or worse, can be used as a currency to secure sexual favours. Often 
associated with high alcohol use, unlike many other countries in Africa, is the 
apartheid system that institutionalised massive alcohol consumption. During 
the heightened years of apartheid, workers, such as farmer workers were paid 
in alcohol in what is referred to as a DOP448 system. This presents a 
challenge for post-apartheid health sector transformation in Namibia. Whilst 
no research has been conducted on the DOP system in Namibia, studies 
elsewhere, for example in South Africa, have confirmed the implication of this 
system for alcohol abuse among the mainly poor people.449 
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  Interview 6, July, 2011	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  DOP is an Afrikaans concept meaning a glass of wine, a pint of beer or a tot of 
whisky/brandy	  
449 See Leslie London, Alcohol consumption among South African farm workers: a challenge 
for post-apartheid health sector transformation, Drug and alcohol dependence Journal, 59(2), 
(2000), pp. 199-206 
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Migration 
 
Evidences collected shows that in recent years, Namibia has experienced one 
of the most rapid internal migration of people from the rural to the urban 
areas, with the growth being fastest in the migrant receiving areas like 
Windhoek, Walvis Bay, Oshakati, Rundu, Swakopmund and Luderitz. I have 
earlier alluded to how years of migrant labour system provided fertile grounds 
for polygamous relations and how over time, this became an acceptable way 
of life for many Namibian men. The effects of this system and many aspects 
of the system still remain, with men commuting from the northern areas to 
work in mines and fishing industries in central, western and southern Namibia. 
In fact, the system of labour migration is the most fundamental determinant of 
present day migration patterns in Namibia. It started in the northern areas of 
Namibia with young men being recruited to work in the so-called white areas, 
denied the opportunity to visit their families until their contract ends and 
women being prevented to work in these areas. In fact, estimations point to 
the fact that up to 50% of men were absent from the northern areas at any 
given point in time.450 Winterfeldt writes that the long history of migration has 
created what he calls “collective experience for a culture of migration”, which 
system also created a culture for cheap labour in primary industries.451 
Coupled with seasonal agricultural production, and a rapid urban migration, a 
major part of the population is constantly ‘displaced’. As de la Torre, et al., 
posit; such a scenario makes it easier for infections to pass on “rapidly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
450 See, for example, Debie LeBeau, Corridors of mobility: mobility and HIV vulnerability 
factors in four sites along transport corridors in Namibia, (Windhoek: IOM and IPPR, 2006) 
451 Volker Winterfeldt, 2002. "Labour Migration in Namibia: Gender Aspects", cited in Debie 
LeBeau, Corridors of mobility: mobility and HIV vulnerability factors in four sites along 
transport corridors in Namibia, (Windhoek: IOM and IPPR, 2006) 
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through a chain of interconnected sexual networks that are often distributed 
over various regions of the country”.452 This is the case because such large-
scale migration happens in the context of impoverishment, deep socio-
economic inequalities and social dislocation, which provides an ideal situation 
for the transmission of STIs.453 It follows that conditions favour HIV 
transmission, when men are separated from families and their customary 
frameworks of social regulation are disrupted, and have some disposable 
income, lack recreational options, and live or socialise in low-income 
communities, marked by strong gender and other inequalities, specifically 
among migrant labourers (such as low poor living conditions, high levels of 
unemployment and lower access to health). Indeed, very high infection rates 
have been reported with migrants in informal settlements, farm labourers, 
military personnel, truckers and mine workers in Namibia, all of which fit the 
description of being ‘internally displaced’.  
 
According to de la Torre, et al., compounding the problem of migrants is that 
they usually tend to arrive into areas with higher STI and HIV prevalence, “so 
there is a greater likelihood of coming into contact with infected individuals”. 
This is the reason, according to one national key informant, “we focus most of 
our attention on these vulnerable areas in terms of providing specific guidance 
to prevent the spread of HIV and mitigate the impact of AIDS.”454 Similar to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
452 Christina de la Torre, Shane Khan, Erin Eckert and Jennifer Luna, HIV/AIDS in Namibia: 
behavioural and contextual factors driving the epidemic, (MEASURE Evaluation, Macro-
international, 2010), p. ix 
453 See, for example, Sydney Kark, The social pathology of syphilis in Africans. South African 
Medical Journal, (1949), pp. 23:77-84. Reprinted in International Journal of Epidemiology, 
32(2), (2003), pp. 181-186, and Myer L, Morroni C, Susser ES Commentary: The social 
pathology of the HIV/AIDS pandemics. International Journal of Epidemiology, 32(2), (2003), 
pp. 189-192. 
454	  Interview 8, July 2011	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other countries in Southern Africa, migrant-receiving areas have been 
documented to have higher levels of HIV infection. De la Torre and his 
colleagues conclude that it is not surprising that “some of the highest HIV 
prevalence areas in Namibia also correspond to locales that receive large 
numbers of migrants or transient individuals, such as Katutura in Windhoek, 
Oshakati, Walvis Bay, Swakopmund, Rundu and Katima Mulilo.”455  
 
Gender relations 
 
Women make up little over 51 percent of the total population; but in spite of 
their numerical strength compared with men, they bear a disproportionate 
burden of HIV in Namibia. The gendered contours of HIV risk among women 
are profound. Therefore, it would not be possible to address any issue in 
Namibia without coming up against a gender issue, as this research shows. 
As one key informant alludes, “the issue of gender in Namibia is complicated 
and we are a long way understanding what the concept actually means. Since 
independence, we have been trying to understand the issue of gender (and 
gender based violence), but it seems every time we think we have made 
some progress, new issues emerge.”456 
 
This is testimony to the fact that the enduring contribution of gender role 
socialisation and norms to both men and women’s vulnerability to HIV in 
Namibia is incontrovertible. As this and other similar researches have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
455 Christina de la Torre, Shane Khan, Erin Eckert and Jennifer Luna, HIV/AIDS in Namibia: 
behavioural and contextual factors driving the epidemic, (Windhoek: MEASURE Evaluation, 
Macro-international, 2010), p. ix 
456 Interview 8, July 2011	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demonstrated, women's HIV risk transmission in Namibia is clearly embedded 
in the context of gender relations and that this context has central implications 
for interpersonal relationship factors relevant to women's HIV. The evidence 
shows that women and girls, in particular, encounter numerous sexuality-
related risk factors that stem not from individual choice but are embedded in 
the social relations and material realities of their families. Gender roles are 
historically emergent, culturally dynamic constructs through which individuals 
and groups actively interpret, engage and construct their daily behaviours and 
relationships and as such, they have broad implications for sexual behaviour 
in relationships. Evidence from recent studies, which I conducted suggest that 
sexual decision is largely gender based, with girls and boys displaying 
differential power and agency relating to sexual activity.457 The study also 
shows that masculinity is equated with sexual knowledge, while femininity is 
equated with innocence, and in sexual activity, girls are also supposed to be 
submissive and less sexually aggressive than men. Dominant femininities 
among these women are characterised by an ‘over respect’ of men and to 
relate to men in a submissive and obedient manner and such naiveté, ‘over 
respect’ and obedience to men may not sit well with the assertiveness, the 
planning and the sexual knowledge they need to ensure that their sexual 
encounters are safe. These are the factors that appear to influence people’s 
cognitions and emotions as sexual beings and if, how, and when to have sex 
and use protection. It has often been hypothesised that males are socialised 
to be more directive and assertive about their sexual needs and the initiators 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 Jerry Mameja and Backson Sibanda, Community Needs Assessment, Global AIDS 
Program, (Windhoek: Namibia National Center for HIV, Hepatitis, STD and TB prevention 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2012) 
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of sexual intimacy, whereas females are expected to be sexually naive.458 
This may lead males to be more open in discussing sexual topics.  
 
Empirical evidence from this research also shows that a related issue is that 
while cultural norms of womanhood in Namibia place a high value on sexual 
innocence, passivity, virginity, and motherhood, where the virtue of chastity in 
areas like the Caprivi is supposed to be observed by women, which means 
remaining a virgin before marriage and faithful to their husbands, alive or 
dead, the increasing number of young people falling pregnant tells a different 
story. “Girls are falling pregnant as young and 12 years, whether we like it or 
not”, proclaimed one participant in a FGD.459 Compounding the problem, as 
one key information puts it; “is that parents do not speak to their young ones 
about these contemporary issues that affects their sexual health, but instead 
focus on the cultural norms that, on the contrary, increases their 
vulnerability.”460 However, most such cultural norms shape community 
attitudes where, as a result, girls are not supposed to be knowledgeable about 
sex and generally have more limited access to relevant information. They 
often, therefore, remain poorly informed about sex, sexuality and 
reproduction.  
 
Because gender has become convoluted and synonymous with women, 
addressing gender issues is challenging for Namibia. The concept of gender 	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  See for example Sandra Metts and Brian H. Spitzberg, Sexual communication in 
interpersonal contexts: A script-based approach, Cited in Brant R. Burleson (Ed.), 
Communication yearbook 19, (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 1996) pp.49-91 	  
459 FGD 2, September, 2011	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has become confused also at grass roots level, where this concept needs to 
be widely understood in the context of HIV and AIDS. The mistake is that 
interventions on HIV and AIDS being implemented have been addressing 
gender issues generically without understanding the underlying factors. It 
follows that there is need for any efforts to develop and implement evidenced 
based strategies that empower women, but also deal with male responsibility.  
 
HIV and AIDS liabilities of the family structure 
 
It then becomes much clearer why, in the context of HIV and AIDS, the 
historical progression of the family structure makes it vulnerable to disruptions 
and fragmentations. The long protracted migrant labour system (a system that 
forced men to stay away from their families) and the historical and legal status 
of women as minorities have weakened the institution of the family to 
withstand the threat posed by HIV and AIDS. Today, HIV and AIDS related 
morbidity and mortality put severe strain on this already fragile institution. It is 
hypothesised that in Namibia, HIV and AIDS affect every family in one way or 
another. This conclusion is not surprising as a family unit in Namibia could 
broadly be defined to consist of a group of people who live together in the 
same households, share common ancestry, are related by blood or have long-
term commitment to each other. And given that at least one in every six 
persons is living with HIV in Namibia, it is not hard to see the validity of such a 
hypothesis.  Even if the definition of a household is adopted, which is but a 
smaller component of a family unit, due to the high prevalence of HIV, and the 
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estimated 204,000461 people infected with HIV, it is fathomable to conclude 
that of the 465,400462 households in Namibia, at least every third household 
has one person who is infected with HIV. The fact that AIDS related morbidity 
and mortality places sever strain on the coping mechanisms of families in 
Namibia cannot be in dispute. As Poku and Freeman put it; the fact that 
people are not dropping dead in the streets cannot be construed as evidence 
that families are coping.463 Anecdotal accounts in Namibia suggest that the 
severe stress families experience as a result of HIV and AIDS often results in 
families disintegrating as social and economic units. When we see 
grandmothers assuming new roles of motherhood due to orphans, 
adolescents becoming head of households, women becoming widows, we are 
reminded of the devastating impact of AIDS on this key institution. Because of 
the multifaceted and interconnectedness nature of HIV and AIDS impacts on 
families, various perspectives can be adopted to demarcate the AIDS effect. 
In what follows, I will discuss the vulnerabilities from a few perspectives: the 
orphan perspective, the child headed household perspective and the loss of 
breadwinner perspective.  
 
Examining the situation of orphans in Namibia reveals the devastating 
impacts of AIDS on families and how as a result, the traditional conception of 
families is ever rapidly changing. In 2006, the NDHS revealed that 17% of 
children under the age of 18 years are orphaned and only one in three of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461 Ministry of Health and Social Services, Estimates and Projections of the impact of 
HIV/AIDS in Namibia, (Windhoek: Ministry of Health and Social Services, 2008) 
462 National Planning Commission, 2011 National Population Census, (Windhoek: National 
Planning Commission, 2012) 
463 Jane Freedman and Nana Poku, The socioeconomic context of Africa’s vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS, Review of International Studies, 31, (2005), pp. 665-686 
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Namibian children aged under 18 years live with both parents. The orphan 
figure in Namibia is staggering, with the NDHS suggesting that the orphan 
population in Namibia more than doubled, from 11% during the previous 
survey carried out in 2000, to 17% during the 2006 survey. Double orphans, 
that is, children with both parents dead, tripled from 1% in 2000 to 3% in 
2006. The NDHS further states that 14% of children under the age of 18 years 
live in a household with at least one adult who is chronically ill during the past 
year or at least one parent suffering from a chronic disease. Whilst all these 
cannot be attributed to HIV and AIDS alone, it is well known that death as a 
result of AIDS has left in its wake a growing number of orphaned children. 
Indeed the declining rate of HIV in Namibia is not indicative of a declining 
orphan population. The orphan population has been increasing exponentially 
from 131,130 in 2004 to 248,000 by 2008.464 It is estimated that AIDS 
accounts for 28% of these children. For a population of slightly more than two 
million this figure is appalling, no more so because children under 20 years 
make up 50.7% of the population.465 These figures do not only tell a story of 
the suffering endured by these orphans and vulnerable children, but that the 
traditional conception of a family as comprising a man, a woman and children 
is changing. Even in this African country with clearly defined extended family 
support networks, one cannot help but to deduce the strain put on these 
families, mainly those living in rural areas as research has shown that 
orphans and fostered children are more likely to be found in rural than urban 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 See Godfrey Kanyenze and Frederic Lapeyre, Growth, employment and decent work in 
Namibia: A situational analysis, Employment Working Paper no. 8, (Geneva: International 
Labour Organisation, 212) 
465 National Planning Commission, (2012)	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areas (51% compared to 24%).466 This is not difficult to explain because as 
people fall ill, children are often sent to rural areas, placing a burden on 
already struggling households. The gendered dimension of HIV and AIDS 
means that these children are sent to female parents and relatives. The 
NDHS confirmed that in Namibia 63% of women as compared to 45% of men 
are more likely to be primary care givers of children under 18 years.467 This is 
not surprising because care giving has traditionally and socially been 
regarded as the domain for women, and hence the role for caring for orphans 
has been abdicated to grandmothers. Whilst no data exist on the number of 
children living with their grandmothers, there is no doubt that the number of 
granny-headed households is appallingly high. In some cases children are 
sent to distant relatives, compromising a significant number of children’s 
wellbeing, because as UNICEF posits; the well being of children depends on 
the relatedness of the household head. It follows that the more distant the 
relationship, the worse the outcome for the child. 
 
Another momentous effect of HIV and AIDS in Namibia has been the 
increasing numbers of child- and youth-headed households (CHHs). As part 
of the coping mechanisms of families, children are often distributed among 
family members to spread the burden. Whilst the poor collection of statistics 
and registration makes it difficult to estimate the exact numbers of CHHs, the 
2006 NDHS provide some hints. When orphans were asked about their living 
arrangements, 55% said they do not live with their siblings. Whilst this is not a 
direct measure of children headed households, it is reasonable to deduce 	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  Ministry of Health and Social Services, Namibia Demographic and Health Survey, 
(Windhoek, 2006)	  
	   -­‐243-­‐	  
from the figures that of the 45% who live with their siblings, a significant 
number could be classified as child or youth headed households. For 
example, 55.5% of the 0-4 years and 45.2% of the 5-9 years respectively 
indicated living with their siblings.  Because of their relatively young age, one 
can assume that siblings, who are not much older, are parenting a significant 
number of these children. Also, anecdotal accounts show that fewer orphans 
are absorbed into extended family networks and the absolute numbers of 
relatives available to take care of orphans is shrinking. This is clear evidence 
of the mutually reinforcing effects of HIV and AIDS. This leaves siblings as the 
only choice available to orphans. Whilst sibling connectedness is seen as 
particularly important after the death of the parent as a means to maintain 
family coherence, in the context of HIV and AIDS, it creates problems in that it 
is more likely that these families are poor and could not afford proper medical 
care, the children and siblings are still young and they live in rural or the 
poorest areas of Namibia. As a result of children being orphaned, there is now 
a growing problem of child labour in Namibia, with reports of children being 
used to commit crimes and some being used for sexual exploitation. The 
Ministry of Labour recently commissioned a number of studies to look into the 
situation of child labour, in order to inform the drafting of the National Action 
Programme on the elimination of child labour. What these reports found is that 
16.3% of Namibia’s workforce of 331,000 were children and that “many of the 
worst forms of child labour were practiced in the country”.468  This situation 
has been attributed to the high incidence of poverty and the rise of orphaned 
children.  	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Viewing the impact of HIV and AIDS on the family structure from the orphan 
and child headed perspectives are only a few among many other ways of 
demarcating the AIDS impact on this important, but rather fragile institution in 
Namibia. The most striking and indeed distinctive nature of HIV and AIDS is 
that it kills people in the prime age, thereby increasing the likelihoods of loss 
of wage earner for many families in Namibia. The recent sentinel survey 
confirms that HIV prevalence peaks in the age 30-39 years with 29.6% in the 
age group 30-34 and 29.7% in the age group 35-39 testing positive 
respectively.469 With mortality expected within the first decade following 
infection, it is clear that a large number of men and women will succumb to 
AIDS in their economically active years, robbing not only the economy of key 
skill, but families of their most important sources of income. In Namibia, the 
spread of HIV is linked to economic mobility of people, with income earners at 
the highest risk than any other members in the population. Whilst we do not 
have accurate statistics on the age of people, it could be argued that a 
substantial number of the 5,400 people who died as a result of AIDS in 2008 
were economically active people. Even with the roll-out of ARVs, the number 
of deaths per year was expected to increase to 7,500 by 2013.470 This shows 
that even if ARVs have offered a temporary reprieve, the situation of people 
dying will become worse. As the Namibian Estimates and Projections report 
suggests; “as the size of the treatment population increases, the absolute 
number of deaths will grow and eventually approach the number of deaths 
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prior to treatment, though patients would have lived longer.”471 The implication 
is that many more families are on the verge of losing one and in many 
instances two economically active members of their households. When this 
happens, families lose their most important resource for survival, creating far-
reaching consequences for every dependant in the line of support. Because in 
Namibia, working people often take care of multiple households, a loss of one 
person extends far beyond only the immediate family members. In more 
extended terms, and considering that AIDS kills the brightest in society, the 
loss of one person diminishes the community’s level of social capital. 
 
HIV and AIDS liabilities of the education system 
 
Whilst the constitutional provision makes preserving this sector a necessary 
obligation on the part of the government, and by implication on every 
Namibian, this sector has been the hardest hit by HIV and AIDS, not least 
because it is the key institution necessary to reverse the spread of the 
epidemic and as I have explained earlier, this sector is by far the most 
significant employer. Before the introduction of ARVs, projections were made 
that Namibia will lose about a quarter to a third of its workforce by 2020. It 
was further estimated that 20% of teachers would be lost as a result of HIV 
and AIDS.472 Many of these figures are now being revised to take into account 
the impact of ARVs. However, whilst it is reasonable to celebrate the relative 
success of ARVs in slowing AIDS related deaths, it is also reasonable to 
assume that ARVs offer only a temporary reprieve. The only difference ARVs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 Ibid, p. 20 
472 Abt Associates, The impact of HIV/AIDS on education in Namibia, (Windhoek: Ministry of 
Education, 2002)	  
	   -­‐246-­‐	  
bring to the equation is to make some people live a little longer. This 
argument cannot only be seen in the context of our inability to foretell the 
lifespan of people on ARVs, but must be seen in the context of the complexity 
engendered by improper use of ARVs. Namibia, like many countries in Africa, 
use a combination therapy involving generic forms of zidovudine, didanosine, 
zalcitabine, stavudine and lamivudine (jointly known as reverse transcriptase 
inhibitors), all of which are known to have a higher probability of developing a 
multi-drug resistance mutation. In recent years, many cases of serious multi-
drug resistance strains have been reported, many of which resulted in 
premature deaths. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that whilst Namibia is 
a leader in the rollout of ARVs, with over 80% of all people in need of 
treatment being enrolled, the success will only be measured in terms of the 
number of people on treatment able to evade the development of multi-drug 
resistant mutation of the virus in the coming years.   
 
Whilst it is complex to determine exactly how many people in the education 
sector are infected with HIV and how many are on ARV treatment, against the 
backdrop of the high prevalence rates among the general population, it is not 
hard to see how HIV and AIDS affects teachers and learners. The only 
comprehensive study on the impact of HIV and AIDS in the education sector 
was carried out in 2002. The report, using projections from the 2000 sentinel 
survey projected the number of teachers living with HIV in 2002 to be one in 
seven, with levels reaching one in four in Katima Mulilo.473 The report further 
estimated that 3,360 teachers might be lost between 2002 and 2010 in the 
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absence of effective ARVs and 860 if comprehensive ARV treatment is 
introduced. Whilst we cannot have certainty of the exact numbers of teachers 
lost through the system as a result of AIDS since these projections were 
made, assuming that most teachers accessed treatment since then and that 
the treatment was successful, we can conclude that perhaps somewhere 
between 1,000 to 2,000 teachers died as a result of AIDS. This translates into 
about 5-10% of the teaching force lost due to AIDS in the past decade. In 
2009, the Ministry of Education commissioned a study to ascertain the 
attitudes, practices, behaviours and beliefs of teachers with regard to HIV and 
AIDS. The surveys interviewed 4,257 teachers. Among the questions asked 
were whether any of the respondents tested positive for HIV and a staggering 
14.4% said yes. Using this as a proxy of prevalence among teachers, slightly 
over 3,000 of the 21,607 teachers are infected with HIV. The report further 
suggests that due to the sensitivity around this question, under reporting were 
observed, mainly among younger and male respondents.474  Considering the 
endemic problem of lack of properly trained teachers (especially in science 
subjects and mathematics) and the reported slow growth in the number of 
people entering the teaching profession per year, these figures are 
frightening. Suffice to say, the Ministry of Education put the number of 
teachers with less than 2 years tertiary education at 3,255, in other words, 
about 15% of all teachers are not properly qualified. It follows that AIDS is 
compounding an already dire situation, with the burden of HIV and AIDS 
currently being manifested in higher teacher absenteeism, attrition and 
turnover. Evidences point to an increase in the demand for relief teachers 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Susan Rogers, Amy Uccello and Elisabeth Sommerfelt, Knowledge, attitudes, practices 
and behaviours survey with Namibian Teachers, (Windhoek: Ministry of Education, 2009), p. 
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across the country. For science subjects, the situation is more frightening, 
because of the short supply of this cadre of skills. Looking into the impact of 
HIV and AIDS on secondary school science teachers, Chinsembu, Kasanda 
and Shimwooshili-Shaimemanya conclude that the main putative impact of 
HIV and AIDS on science teachers in Namibia is absenteeism, poor 
performance and stress.475 The authors further allude that whilst the 
perception on the putative impact of HIV and AIDS was low at 10% of all 
learners interviewed, they posit that this may be as a result of the ameliorative 
power of ARVs. In their words; “We conclude that with the advent of free ART 
[antiretroviral therapy], the impacts of HIV/AIDS on science teachers and 
learners have now been transformed from quantitative losses of mortality and 
attrition to more qualitative attributes of stress and poor performance at 
school.”476 Whilst these qualitative attributes are clearly visible, due in part to 
ARVs and the secrecy surrounding HIV, as I have earlier demonstrated, it is 
reasonable to conclude that we are yet to see the full effect of HIV in the 
coming years. With the ameliorative and temporary relief of ARVs, it is nearly 
impossible to predict, with any degree of certainty, if ARVs will offer 
permanent and longer-term mitigation. Encouragingly though, the Ministry of 
Education seems not deceived and have taken steps to deal with HIV and 
AIDS in the education sector, introducing a comprehensive workplace policy 
aimed at curbing the spread and mitigating the impact of HIV and AIDS 
respectively.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 See for instance, Kazhila Chinsembu, Chosi Kasanda and Cornelia Shimwooshili-
Shaimemanya Impacts of HIV/AIDS on secondary school science teachers and learners in 
Namibia, Journal of Public Health and Epidemology, 3(11), (2011), pp. 540-549 
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Concomitant to the effects on teachers, many young people are infected with 
HIV annually. Young people are particularly among Namibia's most 
threatened citizens, but also its greatest hope for turning the tide against 
AIDS. Various research have demonstrated that despite high levels of HIV 
knowledge among young people, large numbers continue to have risky sexual 
practices, including unprotected sex, multiple and concurrent partners, 
transactional and intergenerational sex, and this is often coupled with low risk 
perception.477 As I have stated earlier, the most recent results of the 2010 
sentinel surveillance projects that the overall HIV prevalence for the age 
group 15–24 years is 10.3% and of the newly infected people in 2007, 44% 
were aged between 15-24 years of which 77% were females.478 There is no 
doubt that these young people were infected early in their sexual life by their 
first or second partner. The table below provides statistics of the education 
system in Namibia. As the table demonstrates, the current student population 
is 614,101 of which approximately 172,000 are in secondary schools (Grade 
8-12). The Namibian teacher-learner ratio is 28:1, which is not that bad 
compared to many countries in the sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 See Ministry of Health and Social Services, HIV/AIDS in Namibia: behavioural and 
contextual factors driving the epidemic, (Windhoek, 2009); Jerry Mameja, (2010): NDHS 
(2006); Jerry Mameja and Backson Sibanda (2012)	  
478 Ministry of Health and Social Services, Namibia Demographic and Health Survey, 
(Windhoek, 2006)  
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Table 2: Namibia education system at a glance 
  State Private 
Number of 
schools 
Total 1,680 1,573 107 
Primary  1,040 984 56 
Combined  444 408 36 
Secondary  183 169 14 
Tertiary  3 2 1 
Other 10 10 0 
 
Number of 
learners 
Total 614,101 579,792 34,309 
Pre-Primary 6,141 4,627 1,514 
Primary 406,920 387,194 19,726 
Secondary 169,390 160,723 8,667 
Tertiary 28,630 24,350 4,280 
Other 3,020 2,898 122 
  
  Total Without 
teacher 
training 
With 
teacher 
training 
Teachers 
Qualifications 
Total 21,607 845 20,762 
Less than Grade 12 1,094 279 815 
Grade 12 or 1-2 years' 
tertiary 3,255 470 2,785 
More than 2 years' tertiary 17,258 96 17,162 
  
Learners per 
teacher 
Average learner: teacher 
ratio  28.42    
  
Number of 
teaching 
rooms 
Total 19,859     
Permanent 17,230     
Prefabricated 1,098     
Traditional 1,363     
Hired 168     
Adapted from Namibia 2010 Education Management Information System (EMIS) report 
 
Taking the prevalence among the age group 15-24 to approximate the 
prevalence among learners, it should become clear that a significant number 
of the secondary school children are indeed infected with HIV. With the 
availability of ARVs, it means that the population of children living with HIV is 
not declining in the medium to long term. It is reported that in Namibia, 52% of 
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all children in need of ARVs are receiving treatment.479 Be that as it may, the 
question remains the extent to which the needs of these children are met by 
the education sector. Following the immediate emergence of HIV, the major 
and most immediate focus in Namibia was limited to education about HIV 
prevention, treatment, and care and support, neglecting the most fundamental 
needs of these children as enshrined in the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, including the right to equitable and equal access to 
education. Indeed, the Convention has specific sections particularly applicable 
to HIV-infected children. A report by UNESCO examining Namibia’s and 
Tanzania’s response to the educational needs of children infected with HIV 
demonstrates that the learning needs of HIV-positive children in both 
countries are currently not being met by their education sectors. The report 
states: 
 
“…while structures are in place to manage the issues, there are 
widespread sense that the MoE is not tackling HIV and AIDS seriously 
enough, and repeatedly attributed this lack of leadership and capacity 
in HAMU… Recurring criticisms of the attitudes of teachers, principals 
and schools across Namibia seem to confirm systematic failure to 
address the problem of HIV and AIDS. The study revealed a pervading 
sense of denial at the school level, feeling that the best way to handle 
HIV and AIDS is to ignore it on a personal level, to reduce information 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479 Ministry of Health and Social Services, Namibia estimates and projections report, 
(Windhoek, 2008)	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about it to the minimum curricular requirements and to restrict 
discussion to AIDS Week of AIDS Clubs.”480 
 
Clearly demonstrable in this is the lack of capacity or more appropriately the 
little understanding of how to respond to the HIV-related needs of learners. 
Certainly, HIV is posing new challenges to the education sector. Fulfilling the 
needs of children infected with HIV and AIDS means that the education sector 
recognises these special needs. Whilst the HIV and AIDS Policy of the 
Ministry of Education has at its core the principle of full participation in 
educational activities by all learners, the UNESCO report notes the apparent 
failure of policy implementation, monitoring and reporting. This is testimony to 
the overwhelming nature of HIV in these hyper endemic countries. For the 
children infected with HIV in Namibia, the failure to address their needs have 
led to truancy and school drop-outs. Whilst no data exists to relate school 
drop-outs and HIV positivity, it is not particularly difficult to see the increased 
probability of drop-outs when a 9-year old Namibian boy who is HIV-positive 
says the following; “My friends will just laugh at me and leave me out of the 
group if I tell them I am HIV-positive. Then who will be my friend”.481 When 
this happens, the likelihood for the child to drop out of school is significantly 
increased. Again, this is clearly linked to the education sector’s failure to 
provide comprehensive HIV and AIDS education to correct people’s 
misconception about HIV-positivity.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 Peter Badcock-Walters, Supporting the educational needs of HIV-positive learners: 
lessons from Namibia and Tanzania, (Windhoek, Dar es Salam: UNESCO, 2008, p.25) 
481 See Peter Badcock-Walters, Supporting the educational needs of HIV-positive learners: 
lessons from Namibia and Tanzania, (Windhoek, Dar es Salam: UNESCO, 2008), p.25 
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The two scenarios presented above are but only two ways of looking at the 
impact of HIV and AIDS on this sector. Obviously, whilst HIV-positive children 
and teachers pose a significant threat to educational attainment of children, 
the most ominous effect is the growing number of children left orphaned by 
AIDS. Namibia is among the few countries providing welfare support in sub-
saharan Africa to citizens in destitute situations including orphans and 
vulnerable children. To this effect, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Child 
Welfare reported that 110,000 OVCs and families caring for OVCs received 
nutritional support through the education system in 2006.482 Whilst this is clear 
testimony of the government’s efforts to mitigate the impact of HIV and AIDS 
on orphaned children, clearly a significant number of these children are lost 
through the system. The Namibian government admits that despite all these 
efforts, many orphaned children are denied their inalienable right to education. 
The evident inability of the system to absorb orphans is captured in the 
Government’s National Plan of Action for OVC, which states:  
 
“Despite the evident intentions to ensure that OVCs are not deprived of 
schooling because of their financial position, in practice there are still 
some OVCs who do not attend school either because they cannot 
afford the school development fund contribution, the boarding fees or 
the school uniform or because they are required to stay at home to 
care for sick parents or siblings. In practice, the exemption procedure 
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for orphans and poor children is rarely used due to lack of 
awareness.483 
 
What this does not say is the role of stigma in school drop-outs and truancy. 
In earlier sections, I have referenced a number of studies to demonstrate the 
effects of orphanage on school attendance.  Namibia is no different from 
countries like Kenya, where Evan and Miguel found that 5% of orphans are 
less likely to attend school484 or Zimbabwe where Rember found that the 
“consequence of orphanhood is delayed school enrolment, an increase in the 
drop-out rate, erratic attendance, lack of concentration and poor 
performance.”485 In Namibia, it could also be argued that the impact of 
reduced school enrolment is greatest for children transiting from primary to 
high school.486 Therefore, it becomes apparent that HIV and AIDS present a 
particularly worrying scenario given the government’s relentless efforts to fill 
the Science and Technology deficit which the country so desperately needs to 
address the socio-economic challenges, which challenges paradoxically 
include HIV and AIDS.  
 
HIV and AIDS liabilities of the macro governance structures 
 
The summative impact framework, which I developed in earlier sections, 
clearly captures the various waves of impacts and demonstrates how the 
impacts are circular within and across the various facets of society. Therefore, 	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484 See Evans and Miguel, (2007) 
485 Symphorosa Rembe, An assessment of the policies and programmes of Zimbabwe in 
addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the education sector, Education Research and Review, 
1(7), (2006), pp. 234-255 
486 See Gertler, Levine and Ames, (2004) 
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the demographic impacts, the effects of the institution of the family and 
deficiencies created in the education system mean that the ability of the 
government to function properly is seriously undermined. In April 2007, 
Namibia adopted the National AIDS Policy and in the foreword, the Namibian 
President, Hifikepunye Pohamba, made the following observation: 
 
“HIV/AIDS is the single largest threat to the development of Namibia.  
Its impacts are felt at every level of our society, and affect all 
individuals, families and communities, who are the fundamental 
building blocks of our social and economic development.  HIV/AIDS 
threatens the education and psycho-social development of our children 
as it robs them of their parents, caregivers, teachers and, ultimately, 
their future. As the infected become too ill to work, workplaces lose 
valuable human resources and expertise.  At the same time, increasing 
portions of our land remain unattended as those who must work it 
succumb to the ravages of the epidemic.”487 
 
It is obvious why the president arrived at this conclusion: In Namibia, HIV and 
AIDS has wrought havoc to every aspect of the society. Namibia is particularly 
susceptible in this respect for two reasons. First as a young democracy, every 
aspect of the Namibian society is so closely intertwined such that impacts are 
easily replicated across the social systems. It follows that once a crack 
appears in one structure of governance, all others are easily affected. 
Second, close to a quarter of all employed people work for the public service 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Ministry of Health and Social Services, National HIV and AIDS Policy, (Windhoek: MoHSS, 
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(96,000 of the 334,000 employees), making the government the single most 
important sector of the Namibian society.488 Therefore, there is an intrinsic 
mutual dependency between government and the people, in the same way 
that children are inseparable from their families or families inseparable from 
their communities. In the context of HIV and AIDS, these are important factors 
and must enter the frame of mind when analysing how the various social 
systems interact in varying horizontal and vertical densities, because this 
bears upon the nature of their vulnerability to HIV and AIDS. For instance, the 
Ministry of Education is the government’s biggest division, employing 
38,000489 of the total governments workforce, therefore an impact is not only 
limited to this sector, but is directly linked to the government’s capacity to 
deliver services. Because approximately 10,000490 of the employees in the 
Ministry of Education (or 10% of the total government workforce or 3% of the 
total country workforce) are administrative staff, it follows that the burden is 
not only evident in the classrooms, but filters through to the government’s 
capacity to deliver services. As I shall demonstrate in the subsequent 
sections, when an administrator, whose responsibility is to formulate staff 
retention or relief policies is ill or dies as a result of AIDS, the government’s 
policy making capacity is reduced. When this happens, the quality of 
education is impacted by the inability to fill positions left vacant by teachers 
who died as a result of AIDS. At the same time, as I have posited earlier, the 
capacity to implement HIV and AIDS Workplace programmes is weakened, 
exacerbating the already structural incapacity to adequately deal with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
488 See the International Labour Office, Employment Working Paper No.81, Growth, 
employment and decent work in Namibia, (Geneva, ILO, 2012)	  	  
489	  See The Ministry of Education Annual Report, (Windhoek, MoE, 2012)	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problem of infected teachers and children in schools. The UNESCO study 
attests to this that whilst the Ministry of Education’s HIV and AIDS Policy is 
among the most robust in sub-Saharan Africa, its implementation is hampered 
by the “lack of leadership and capacity in the HIV and AIDS Management Unit 
(HAMU)”.491 In a nutshell, a loss of staff is not only a loss of government 
capacity to formulate and implement policies, but for the entire learning 
system in its totality and the welfare of many households whose livelihoods 
are heavily dependent on this sector. Thus, the importance of the education 
sector lies in its centrality to the systemic interaction of the people, and their 
organisations and government. Hence, in a summative sense, the impact on 
this sector has the greatest multiplier effect. 
 
Delineating the various mechanisms through which government as an 
individual sector is impacted would require that I discuss the effects as they 
move through the various waves; with the first being people falling sick, 
leading to increased attrition of the work force due to morbidity, reduced 
productivity, compounded and consolidated by the second wave when 
workers in the government institutions develop full blown AIDS and eventually 
die, with the overall impact being the cumulative absolute losses in the 
quantity and quality of labour and the tax base of the government. This will 
also require the presentation of data on the actual impacts on these 
mechanisms, which data is scanty at best owing to the secrecy surrounding 
HIV and AIDS. Such secrecy is indeed provided for in the National Code on 
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HIV and AIDS in Employment492, which guarantees the right to confidentiality 
of HIV status in the workplace and with disclosure only being possible with the 
written consent of the person concerned. But in truth, chapter 4 of this thesis 
sufficiently captures the effects of HIV and AIDS on government function. 
Being a hyper endemic country, it means the analysis presented in chapter 4 
is well suited for the Namibian scenario. However, how HIV and AIDS subtly 
erode the democratisation process in Namibia is less understood.  One way to 
understand this is by looking at how HIV and AIDS affect the electoral 
processes. This is the approach I would like to adopt to demonstrate the 
sectoral impact of HIV and AIDS on this key governance institution, not least 
because I view Namibia’s transition to democracy as relatively incomplete.  
 
Before Namibia gained independence, a constitutional principle by the so-
called Western Contact Group was brokered, which set out the post-
independence dispensation, including the conduct of regular elections. It was 
later also agreed that the Proportional Representation (PR) System is to be 
used for the Constituent Assembly elections (that is the members of 
parliament), with the presidential elections following the single majority 
principle of 50% and the regional elections following the single plurality 
system or first-past-the-post system. These criteria are fully enshrined in the 
constitution. The local authority elections are not enshrined in the constitution 
but since independence it has been following the ward system until in 2002 
when it was replaced with the party list system. However, elections in Namibia 
are governed by the Electoral Act, No 24 of 1992.  The Act, inter alia, provides 	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for the election of persons to the office of the President, as well as members 
of the National Assembly, regional councils and local authority councils; the 
establishment of an electoral commission and its powers, duties, and 
functions; the registration of voters and of political parties; the conduct of such 
elections; and to provide for matters incidental thereto.493 This Act has since 
been amended over nine times. To understand the impact of HIV on electoral 
processes would firstly require an analysis of the internal impact of HIV and 
AIDS on this organisation responsible for elections and secondly, an outline of 
the cost of conducting an election in the event that a member of the regional 
council or local council dies. The Electoral Commission of Namibia (ECN) is 
the highest electoral body and the sole and exclusive authority, that has been 
tasked by the Electoral Act No 24 of 1992, as amended, to oversee and 
supervise all electoral processes.494 It comprises five Commissioners whose 
role is to enhance the mission and vision of the ECN by providing strategic 
support and guidance to the management. The Commission appoints a 
secretariat consisting of The Director of Elections, Director of Operations, 
Deputy Director of Operations, Deputy Director for Finance and Administration 
and Deputy Director for Voter Education and Democracy Building. The 
Commission also appoints supervisors of registrations, registration officers 
and returning, counting and presiding officers. The task of the ECN could be 
summarised to include, among other things, the supervision and control of 
registration of voters; preparing, publication and maintenance of a national 
voter register and local authority voter’s register; the registration of political 
parties and conducting of the electoral processes. Despite a few isolated 	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2009 (Act No. 7 of 2009), (Windhoek, 2009)	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cases, the ECN has been successful in conducting the various elections since 
independence. But there are anecdotal evidences that HIV and AIDS 
complicates the electoral process. 
 
In 2007, the Institute for Democracy in Southern Africa (Idasa) carried out a 
research in which the aim was to “unravel the governance consequences of 
the AIDS epidemic (in order) to help institutions to understand the implications 
and respond appropriately.”495 What this research demonstrates is the impact 
of HIV and AIDS as it moves from the internal impact of loss of qualified skills 
to the cost of conducting by-elections when an elected member of one of the 
government’s sector dies. Whilst the report acknowledges the complexities 
surrounding access to appropriate HIV and AIDS related data, the authors 
postulate that moving forward, “the cost of additional sick leave by HIV-
positive employees is likely to affect productivity and increase costs.”496 
Moreover, the report makes the following observation: 
 
“With the loss of skilled, experienced employees, staff will need to be 
trained at extra cost. Increased absenteeism due to AIDS-related 
illnesses, the attendance of funerals and having to take care of sick 
family members might also hinder the internal functioning of the 
commission. The effective administration of elections is also likely to be 
seriously affected by lower staff morale, making for a negative impact 
on the employment equity profile.”497 	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The Commission is particularly vulnerable because of its youthful profile, with 
21 of the 25 permanent employees aged between the 25 and 49 years.498 
Whilst this cannot be attributed to AIDS, the report notes that at least two 
members of the Commission died due to illness in the past five years 
preceding the research.499 With Namibia’s low capacity base and the 
protracted employment procedure of the Public Service Commission, the 
death of senior members of the Commission could be detrimental to its 
function.  
 
The most direct impact of the HIV and AIDS epidemic is on the cost of 
conducting elections. Because of Namibia’s use of the Proportional 
Representation system, it follows that when a member of either of the houses 
dies, a by-election must be carried out. As at 2004, Idasa estimates that 32 
by-elections were made and observed that “eight (or 25%) might thus be 
blamed on AIDS.”500 The report further outlines that whilst it is difficult to 
quantify the cost of hosting by-elections, the £ 5 million budgeted each five 
years for elections should provide an indication of the cost associated with the 
exercise of conducting elections in Namibia, with other effects being 
increased demand for service delivery during the pre-election and polling 
phases. During the pre-election period higher demand is placed on the ECN 
to accurately and timeously compile and maintain the voter’s register due to 
high mortalities in order to protect the integrity of the voter’s register. If the 
ECN fails to do this, “inaccuracies on the register could facilitate electoral 	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frauds.”501 During voting, complexities arise in part due to the tendered voting 
system that requires people to travel to polling stations. As I have emphasised 
in earlier sections, the combination of people being sick and unable to vote 
and members of the family shifting their attention from taking part in the 
electoral process to taking care of the sick, means that casting a vote, the 
cornerstone for democracy and the most fundamental and absolute of rights 
and civil liberties, is diminished.  Voting becomes a burden; the legitimacy of 
locally elected persons is put into question; and the democratisation process 
is jeopardised. 
 
Conclusion 
 
There is generally an acknowledgement of the devastating impact of HIV and 
AIDS, but the evidences suggest that Namibia is yet to comprehensively 
address the factors fuelling the epidemic. Tackling the AIDS epidemic in 
Namibia is fundamentally about behaviour change, aimed at effecting a 
‘transformation’ in gender relations and roles. This inherently means 
interventions need to move away from generic messages, but begin to tackle 
underlying cultural factors and societal dispositions within the gender 
dynamics that are putting men and women at risk. Namibia seems to have 
missed the point in addressing the epidemic because targeted strategies that 
address the needs of men and women within the cultural dimensions, which is 
key to addressing the hidden underlying challenges, has been few and far 
between. Also, evidence is piling up that partner reduction is the key to 
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preventing the spread of HIV especially in epidemics driven by heterosexual 
transmission, but many approaches around prevention have been focusing on 
abstinence and the use of condoms, whilst neglecting partner reduction. 
Moreover, the various epidemics in Namibia, also express particular 
configurations of social, cultural and economic orders, and occur on various 
templates of social relations. And AIDS research has been unsuccessful in 
uncovering these “complicated interactions of social norms and networks, 
sexual ideology, and behaviours that could provide us with the leverage to 
view African sexual systems in broader socioeconomic, political and historical 
context”.502 As such sustained inroads against the epidemics in all likelihood 
have remained inadequate because these social templates are less 
understood and continue to be reproduced.503 Incidentally, these patterns are 
often fraught with controversy and ellipsis, not least because attempts to 
explore these dimensions of Africa’s AIDS epidemics have often sailed close 
to the winds of racialist discourse. Discomforting stereotypes about “African” 
sexual mores and behaviour have long coloured HIV prevention discourse in 
Africa, and according to Poku, this tendency has already been pointed out 
more than a decade and a half ago by Green (1994).504  
 
What this chapter also demonstrated is that the scope of prevention and 
impact-mitigation needs in Namibia is too great and that ARVs only offered a 
temporary reprieve. Moving forward, successful roll-out of ARVs should not 
only be about the numbers reached, as it is the case currently, but attention is 	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required to the focus, quality, sustainability and the impact of ARVs. Each 
element is vital in its own right, but even more so in its symbiotic relationship 
to the others. Notwithstanding, it is clear that HIV and AIDS will remain a de 
facto threat to the Namibian society for the foreseeable future. 
 
Similarly, I have presented the various socio-demographic impacts of HIV and 
AIDS as they impact the various levels of governances from the family 
institution, the education and the electoral process, with the purpose to 
demonstrate the multifaceted nature of the impact of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Syndrome- HIV. Clearly, it would be impossible to discuss 
the full effect of HIV and AIDS in any length. Discussing the full effect of HIV 
will require an inclusion of the micro and macro economic gaps created by 
HIV and AIDS in the economic sectors as well. For the purpose of 
demonstration and because this thesis aims to demonstrate the impact of HIV 
and AIDS on governance, I have rather adopted a more ‘social’ approach to 
the analysis of the impacts. In truth though, the impacts on the social systems 
cannot be separated from the loss in the economic sectors as HIV creates a 
vicious circle in which a loss of key staff in the Ministry of Education impacts 
the quantity and quality of policies, which in turn impacts the quality of 
education, thereby the pool of qualified resources available to business. At the 
same time, HIV and AIDS contributes to the rising cost of infrastructure, 
including roads and telecommunications, which businesses rely on for their 
operations, at the same time that it reduces labour productivity. Therefore HIV 
and AIDS become a vicious complex circle that reinforces itself through the 
iteration of impacts throughout the various sectors of the Namibian society; 
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making it imperative that these be understood in the context of their 
intertwining impacts. 
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Chapter 7:  Intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer impacts of HIV and AIDS on sectoral and 
summative governances 
 
Introduction 
 
My contention is that the necessity of knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer for the purposes of sectoral and summative governance is generally 
assumed and that our understanding of how HIV and AIDS affect the 
interactions of the various levels of governances through impacting the 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer is impoverished. I have presented 
the framework of knowledge formation as the best lens though which the long 
waved impacts of HIV and AIDS on the levels of governances could be 
understood, because as I have demonstrated, the evolution of governance 
from long run equilibria of processes is in itself the function of the evolution of 
knowledge- for knowledge is the necessary condition for the various levels of 
governances to interact between actors on the micro-, meso- and macro-
levels of socio-political aggregation. The purpose of this chapter is twofold. 
First, it is to demonstrate, through the empirical data that indeed the necessity 
of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for the 
purpose of both sectoral and summative governance is not well understood 
and is generally assumed. Second, it is to show how, by delineating the 
perception of key people in the Ministry of Education on the impact of HIV and 
AIDS on the various levels of governance, our understanding of the 
foundation of governance, both sectoral and summative is impoverished.    
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In what follows, I will utilise the theory of tacit knowledge to demonstrate how 
HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge formation within these various 
levels of governance, but more importantly, how they affect the interaction of 
the various actors on the micro, meso and macro levels of socio political 
aggregation. The analysis is limited to the school system and national 
governance. As highlighted in previous chapters, the education system in its 
totality encompasses a whole spectrum of governance systems in Namibia. 
Demonstrating the impact of HIV and AIDS as it moves through the various 
levels of governance do not require that all the levels of governance be 
discussed. I have outlined how, in the Namibian context, all systems of 
governance are closely intertwined as a consequence of the fact that Namibia 
is a young democracy and the importance of government, not only as a 
facilitator of development through policy making, but itself as an important 
employer. In a real sense, government plays the key role in the economic and 
social lives of many people, making it more than only an enabler, but a key 
player of the very system for which it aims to enable. I will complete this 
chapter by providing an analysis of the summative impact of HIV and AIDS on 
governance and how this is likely impacted through the disruption in the 
process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. 
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Impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation, 
retention and transfer for micro and meso governances 
 
Based on Polanyi’s description of tacit knowledge, we could proceed to 
conclude that knowledge resides in people and that learning is not merely a 
process by which information is transferred from the head of the teacher to 
the head of the learner. It is through their senses (seeing, hearing, touching, 
smelling, tasting, and feeling) that learners interact with teachers in the 
classrooms to make sense of the world. Therefore, both the teacher and the 
learner are active agents in the process of knowledge formation, with the 
learning resting ultimately with the student. In a sense, education could be 
seen as a process of experimental inquiry and critical reflection in which 
learners make sense of what is being taught. To a large extent, the Namibian 
government made no secret after independence that the previous system, 
based on rote memorisation was not in the best interest of the country and 
adopted the “system based on critical thinking and problem solving”505, in 
other words, a system based on the tacit theory approach that views 
education as a cooperative learning strategy that allows learners to engage in 
the process of knowledge formation, which knowledge is largely tacit. It 
follows that the philosophy underpinning Namibia’s education system, 
acknowledges that the process of knowledge formation is evolutionary, in the 
sense that it is a sequential integration of knowledge. Consequently, as the 
theory of tacit knowledge would say, the process of knowledge formation is a 
function of previous knowledge, in that learning is filtered through pre-existing 
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knowledge. Therefore, the various actors throughout a child’s development 
play an important role in the process of knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer, with families often seen as the first transmitter of such knowledge. 
When one talks of the impact of HIV and AIDS for the process of knowledge 
formation, the family structure should come into prominent focus, because, 
according to the theory of tacit knowledge, there exists good reason to say 
that all our knowledge are socially and culturally conditioned. Such knowledge 
is germane to all other forms of knowledge. The problem, as I have 
demonstrated earlier, is that HIV and AIDS have had the biggest impact on 
how families function, with many children left orphaned and others taking care 
of ill parents. In this respect, whilst it was not possible to interview children, as 
discussed in the methodology section, many respondents in both Focus 
Group Discussions (FGDs) and Local Key Informants (LKIs) agreed that when 
a parent dies, children’s learning process is affected. As one teacher puts it; 
“The most difficult thing for these orphans is that there is no one at home to 
impart the necessary social skills to them and therefore it becomes difficult for 
these children to cope with daily demands of life.”506  
 
Demonstrable in this quote is the impact of HIV on the process of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. It goes without 
saying that such loss of knowledge extends beyond only causing learning 
inability but threatens the survival of these children as well. When asked 
about their perception of the consequences of the loss of intergenerational 
knowledge, many respondents were of the opinion that the greatest loss is the 
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thread that links knowledge obtained in family settings to knowledge 
generated within the institutions of learning. This is a general admittance that 
when children are denied the opportunity to learn in family settings, their 
educational prospects are also put in jeopardy. Such loss is hard to recognise 
but usually its presence is manifested in various behavioural aspects, for 
instance, difficulty in learning, inability to distinguish wrong from right and 
general risky sexual behaviours that put these children at risk of contracting 
HIV.  
 
Besides the obvious gap created in the process of intergenerational 
knowledge when a parent dies, there are various ways in which the theory of 
tacit knowledge could be used to demonstrate how HIV and AIDS affect the 
process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. The key issue is that 
because learning is a reflection of one’s personal life, embedded in distinct 
thought process that we utilise in our daily experience, it is easy to see how 
experience of parents infected with HIV will affect the learning of children. 
Because every person comes to the learning process with a set of life events, 
which life events may have been altered by HIV and AIDS, it follows that 
children who have been robbed of the opportunity to learn some critical skills 
from their parents come to the process with heavily constrained life 
experiences. As a result, the learning process is also inhibited, because as I 
have alluded earlier, children construct knowledge from a base of prior 
knowledge.  
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Similarly, in earlier sections, I have outlined the impact of HIV on the learning 
outcomes of children. When children are infected with HIV, education is one 
among other things that loses their appeal and sometimes even relevance. 
Because the theory of tacit knowledge is rooted in the belief that our sense of 
knowing is not a passive expression of the world, but a result of our 
construction, beliefs and emotions about our experiences of our lives, it is not 
difficult to fathom how the experience of living with HIV or AIDS will severely 
alter the learning process, in other words, the process of knowledge formation 
in classroom settings. As I have said, being infected with HIV invites 
stigmatisation and discrimination by others or self-infliction. As a result, and 
because stigma and discrimination are the hardest things a child could ever 
experience, children use such life experience in their endeavour to make 
sense of the world. Again, this means that a child enters the process of 
learning in a heavily constrained state. The implication is that the interaction 
between the learner and teacher is also constricted, thereby affecting the 
learning environment. With the current learner-centred system requiring 
greater interaction between the learner and the teacher, when such 
interaction is disrupted as a result of HIV and AIDS, the consequence for the 
learner is more severe. Therefore in the Namibian case, the impact of HIV 
and AIDS is more severe when the experience of HIV and AIDS is on the part 
of the child, because these children are expected to be active agents in the 
process of knowledge formation. Teachers’ account of HIV-positive children’s 
inability to interact with others ostensibly shows the complexities these 
children face. One teacher noted that, “for children to be infected with HIV 
means their self-esteem is affected, which ultimately affects the way in which 
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the particular student interacts with others. The situation is more severe when 
others know that the student is HIV positive”.507 
 
In the context of the Namibian schooling system, this creates a particular 
problem because the process of learning involves other learners, and is 
therefore not only intergenerational but also omni generational. In other 
words, the process of learning involves the student, other students and the 
teacher, with such interactions taking place against a backdrop of prior 
knowledge obtained as the learner navigates the interstice of life since 
childbirth. Therefore, effectively dealing with HIV and AIDS in schools would 
require that the impacts are understood in the context of their intertwining 
effects on other learners and teachers. It follows that not only is the impact of 
knowledge formation one dimensional, but also at times multi-directional, 
because if a student is infected with HIV, the interaction with other students is 
also affected, therefore robbing the group of possibly their active and bright 
member. The current response, which focuses on providing material support, 
does not address the fundamental question of what learning is about. As 
demonstrated in earlier sections, regardless of the terms used to describe the 
difficulties faced by children experiencing the scourge of HIV and AIDS, it all 
boils down to its impact on their ability to learn and thus the process of 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer. When teachers were asked 
whether they attempt to address these needs of children, the general 
response was always non-affirmative. Understandably, addressing the needs 
of these children would first and foremost require full disclosure and 
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identification of the children infected and affected, which, as I have shown 
earlier, would be problematic because, in Namibia, full disclosure is not 
possible. Therefore the response has remained largely inadequate in 
addressing the learning needs of these children. Indeed, many respondents 
raised the concern with the current focus on material support at the expense 
of the ‘real’ learning needs of children infected by HIV and AIDS. According to 
one informant; “There is a need to move away from the material driven 
programme to programmes that would address the cognitive and learning 
needs of these children”.508 In a sense, there is a general recognition that for 
the learning environment to be conducive for children affected by HIV and 
AIDS, psychotherapeutic interventions in schools are required. Scholars today 
talk of remedial education, not in the strictest sense of postsecondary 
education aimed at increasing the skills competency for the purpose of higher 
education entry, but to address the learning deficit created as a result of HIV 
and AIDS.  
 
In earlier sections, I have referred to how HIV and AIDS also affect teachers 
en masse. Therefore students infected with HIV and orphaned by AIDS are 
but one part of the equation. The omnipresent nature of HIV and AIDS makes 
it hard to even start conceptualising the impact on the education system.  
Those children lucky enough not to be infected or orphaned face the prospect 
of losing teachers to HIV and AIDS. Besides their situation made complex by 
being infected, the ability of teachers to teach is compromised. Whilst it would 
have been ethically inappropriate to ask HIV positive teachers if their situation 
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is made complex, from the discussions with both key informants and 
members of FGDs, there is a general admittance that the biggest effect is 
when teachers develop AIDS and absenteeism increases. As a couple of 
respondents attested; “The process of knowledge formation for the students is 
impacted, because in most of these cases, students are left without a 
teacher.”509  
 
But besides this obvious loss, when someone is HIV positive their confidence 
is severely affected, and normal things such as teaching lose their appeal and 
relevance. The situation is also compounded when learners know that the 
teacher is positive, because as some respondents alluded, in some instances, 
students are mocking teachers. As one respondent noted; “The greatest 
problem for teachers infected with HIV is not only that they lose their passion 
for teaching, but that they fear that if their students know that they are 
infected, they will be discriminated against”.510 Therefore, even if teachers are 
willing to teach, stigma and discrimination inhibits their interactions with 
learners. Because learning is an active engagement of the learner and 
teacher, instead of the type of learning where the student passively receives 
knowledge, it presupposes the importance of the teacher as the key driver of 
the process of learning. Teachers are the leaders that help learners through 
guided discovery of knowledge. It follows that the teacher plays an important 
role of prompting and facilitating discussion in a guided manner. Living with 
HIV is said to affect this critical role of teachers. When asked if they have 
noticed differences in the teaching outcomes, a number of key informants 	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admitted that teachers’ HIV status affects the teacher as well and that in some 
instances learners complain of lack of attention by the teacher, especially if 
the teacher is frequently falling ill. In a sense, the effect of HIV and AIDS on 
the process of knowledge formation cannot only be seen as a function of 
teachers being absent, but must also be understood in the context of the 
environment in which learning takes place.  
 
Therefore, when I say that HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge 
formation in the education system as a key governing system, I am not only 
saying this in reference to the obvious loss of teachers, but I am highlighting 
an endemic problem that affects the very core of the system and our 
existence- our desire to know. Because the learner and teacher are the active 
agents in the process of learning, and HIV and AIDS affects both of these 
agents in varying degrees, the impact on knowledge formation is daunting. 
Taken together, we are starting to see that because learning or the process of 
learning is a function of pre-existing knowledge, the impact of HIV and AIDS 
become long-waved, which in essence affects the process of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer not only for 
current generations, but more poignantly, future generations as well. This fact 
cannot be trivialised by stating that ‘the HIV and AIDS Policy sufficiently 
addresses issues of AIDS in the Ministry’511, as some respondents may want 
us to believe. Also, the fact that these issues are not well understood cannot 
provide sufficient justification for not dealing with the intergenerational 
knowledge gaps created by HIV and AIDS, because evidently, the education 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Interview 11, September 2011	  
	   -­‐276-­‐	  
system is the key mechanism through which such knowledge transfer is 
facilitated. In a sense, understanding and attempting to tackle the problem 
that is weakening the very reason for which it exists should be the greatest 
focus of any intervention facilitated by principals of this institution. But, as I 
have discussed throughout the preceding sections, the issue of how HIV and 
AIDS impact the process of knowledge formation has received little attention. 
When the question of how the Ministry of Education addresses the issue of 
intergenerational knowledge liabilities of HIV and AIDS, the various responses 
reveal a lack of understanding of what this issue pertains to. In some 
instances, the responses were astonishing, for example one key informant 
puts things this way:  
 
“The Ministry of Education is the principle caretaker of education in the 
country, but it is difficult for the Ministry to deal with such issues as we do 
not understand them very well. Issues of how HIV and AIDS affect 
intergenerational knowledge within schools or our institution requires that 
we first and foremost understand what this is all about before moving to 
questions of how to best deal with it. So, in short, we have not even started 
talking about HIV and how it affects the learning process of students, 
because our immediate concern is to try as best as we can to reverse the 
spread of HIV and also to mitigate its impact”.512 
 
One could argue that on account of this statement, there is a sense in which 
the government is being overwhelmed by HIV and AIDS, and admittedly, the 
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many facets of the epidemic makes it difficult for the system to rank the 
relative importance of each of these impacts.  
 
Impact of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation, 
retention and transfer for macro governances 
 
It is perhaps appropriate that I start this section with the theory of tacit 
knowledge’s assertion that organisational knowledge is ineffable in that it 
cannot be known until it becomes a problem in its absence. It is the type of 
knowledge, whilst important, that cannot be written in manuals, grammatical 
expressions or symbolically encoded. As I have discussed throughout the 
preceding sections, the theory of tacit knowledge, originally proposed by 
Polanyi, depicts knowledge as vested in our ability to know how to do things, 
but ironically our inability to say, at least symbolically, how we know such 
things. Polanyi believes that the best start is to acknowledge that ‘we can 
know more than what we can tell’. It follows that such knowledge is hard to 
study with current research tools. Fundamentally, the purpose of this research 
was not to demonstrate whether tacit knowledge exists, but rather whether 
there exists an understanding of such knowledge and more appropriately 
whether the loss of such knowledge poses a threat to the organisation of the 
Ministry of Education. It became obvious during my interviews that these are 
indeed very complex questions to ask. For instance, a senior manager in such 
an important institution says the following: “The issue of how knowledge is 
transferred between individuals in the organisation is not a focus of 
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management, as our concern is whether our staff perform in accordance with 
their job description”.513 
 
When the above happens, we are reminded that knowledge has been 
delegated to its propositional form, in the sense that there is a belief that our 
understanding of things is only possible when broken down into grammatical 
propositions or formal terms. Whilst this should not be seen as an attempt to 
relegate scientific knowledge, the theory of tacit knowledge views scientific 
knowledge only as part of a larger knowledge base, but more importantly that 
the area in which such knowledge extends is the tacit. It would therefore 
appear that the theory puts forward tacit knowledge as an important 
dimension of the knowledge that people possess, more than what proponents 
of scientific knowledge would like us believe. Therefore, when managers 
reduce workers’ responsibility in the process of knowledge sharing to written 
work codes, the tacit dimension of knowing has been demoted to a state of 
irrelevancy. In the strictest sense however, this is not surprising, because 
even within highly capacitated institutions of business, acknowledging the 
existence of tacit knowledge has been very difficult. With Namibian 
governance institutions being relatively in their infancy, coupled with the 
capacity constraints engendered by years of colonisation and the system of 
apartheid, it is not surprising that there is an acute inability to recognise that 
such tacit knowledge does exist. Strictly speaking, it should not be entirely 
unacceptable when another senior manager says the following: “When you 
ask about the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within 
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our Ministry, you are but reminding us that there are issues which we do not 
yet understand. For sure, these issues relating to how knowledge is formed 
and how HIV and AIDS impact this are not yet on our radar. How do you 
expect us to deal with these issues if we are yet to make all the services 
available to our staff?”514 
 
Clearly, in the context of HIV and AIDS, understanding the issue of 
intergenerational knowledge, that is, how these institutions are most efficiently 
run, is an imperative. It would appear that even if the general feeling is that 
the Ministry is yet to deal with these issues, when asked if a highly skilled 
personnel should die as a result of HIV and AIDS, most respondents agreed 
that this will create serious problems, with one key informant eloquently 
saying: “There are some people that are just irreplaceable. If one of these 
people has to leave, we would not know what to do. Even if a replacement is 
found, things will not be the same”.515 This is the type of knowledge that the 
theory of tacit knowledge refers to. The type of knowledge that these 
‘irreplaceable’ people possess, which knowledge they are unable to articulate 
clearly, even if they are aware that the organisation is unable to operate 
without such knowledge. The Ministry of Education, as I have stated earlier, 
operates a highly structured system, with a line of authority that extends from 
the clusters, through the circuits, to the regional directorates, up to the head 
office.  At every level, there are key people who possess key proficiencies (or 
tacit knowledge), which will make it difficult for the organisation to operate in 
their absence. Because as I have outlined time and again, HIV and AIDS, are 	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non-discriminatory, in that they affect the poor, rich, educated, uneducated, 
employed and unemployed in an equal measure, it is not difficult to see that 
the organisation of the Ministry of Education is in jeopardy, not more so 
because it is the largest employer of highly skilled people such as teachers, 
lecturers, and other professionals. Already, there is an admittance that some 
positions within the structure are hard to fill when someone resigns or dies. As 
one key informant puts it: “There are some positions that we have been 
unable to fill because we are just not getting the right people. Some of these 
positions have been vacant for a long time, and in some cases even years.”516 
 
Whilst this statement should not be taken on face value to mean there is an 
explicit search for tacit knowledge in candidates, it goes a long way to 
highlight that whilst the exercise of breaking down tacit knowledge is complex, 
it does not prevent an implicit pursuit for such knowledge. As Polanyi would 
say, it is only when such knowledge is absent that we begin to understand 
that it is necessary. Therefore, being unable to find a suitable candidate could 
easily be construed a subtle understanding that such knowledge is indeed 
necessary for the running of the institution. Because it would have been 
ethically inappropriate to ask if these positions have been left vacant by 
people who died of AIDS, assuming that AIDS was a factor, the hypothesis 
that AIDS creates knowledge gaps could well be proven by the above 
statements that ‘positions are hard to fill and even if these are filled, things 
may never be the same’. Because AIDS is not an imminent disaster, in as 
much as people die instantly and leave others bereft, the impacts of AIDS are 
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subtle, daunting and long-waved, one would naturally expect that institutions 
are able to predict and thus deal with such impacts. At the same time though 
one should acknowledge that the non-discernible nature of tacit knowledge is 
the key reason that even private business organisation have been struggling 
to document such knowledge. Here, I am putting forward this sympathetic 
critique, because to expect government organisations to know that such 
knowledge does indeed exist is somewhat far-fetched. But again, when 
respondents acknowledge that the unprecedented levels of absenteeism, high 
staff turnover and lower productivity makes operations difficult, it may not be 
far fetched to conclude that even if such knowledge is not known by the name 
‘tacit knowledge’, it is still regarded an important part of business. When 
respondents agree that illness and death have replaced old age as the 
leading cause for leaving work, it is not far-off from an admission that the 
intergenerational knowledge formation is being affected by the losses of 
economically active people. For instance, one key informant put things this 
way: “It is not difficult to see that we (Ministry of Education) are losing many 
people due to illnesses and death. In such cases, we are losing people who 
would have otherwise still be in their work if it was not due to their illnesses. 
Therefore, yes losing people in their active years is painful not only for the 
family and colleagues, but for the institution as well, because then it means 
we must recruit, train and reorient the new person.”517 
 
The Ministry of Education can safely be regarded a knowledge based 
institution, in that its work is predominantly that of the purveyor of knowledge. 
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In other words, the Ministry of Education is, or at least has been mandated by 
an act of parliament to lead the country’s research agenda through its partner 
institutions, including the University of Namibia and the Polytechnic of 
Namibia, both of whom are directly accountable to the Ministry of Education. 
Suffice to say though, there is little understanding that indeed when one talks 
of the process of knowledge formation, the Ministry of Education should take 
prominence. Be that as it may, the effect of HIV and AIDS on the process of 
knowledge formation in the Ministry has far reaching consequences. These 
consequences are not hard to see: At the macro-systemic levels, such 
knowledge gaps create problems for governability as these institutions are 
robbed of highly knowledgeable people, some of whom have been with the 
system for years. As I have highlighted in earlier sections, when Namibia 
gained independence, an agreement was reached that government would 
maintain all civil servants who held positions at independence, until such 
people resign, or are removed by law. I have also discussed how these 
people played a key role, not only in transferring skills to the new employees 
returning from exile, but also in maintaining continuity of the governance 
systems. By and large, the reason that Namibia is considered a successful 
case study for democratic transition is partly a result of the agreement to keep 
the civil service intact at independence. Whilst it could be argued that it is long 
after independence, these civil servants still hold positions of extreme 
prestige. Demonstrably though, for the framework of knowledge formation that 
I have adopted for this thesis, in as much as the agreement to maintain the 
civil servants of the apartheid regime was to ensure continuity, the fact that 
such continuity is a product of knowledge transfer cannot be disputed. Suffice 
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to say, Namibia has not been able to successfully fill the knowledge gaps 
which may suggest that whilst political independence has been achieved, 
ideological independence is far from being achieved in many of the institutions 
of governance. Clearly, a number of employees have what key informants 
referred to as ‘irreplaceable skills’, whose absence as a result of HIV and 
AIDS can seriously undermine the ability of this institution to meet its 
mandate. This is not difficult to see because the theory of tacit knowledge 
asserts that knowledge is vested in people, who regularly transmit such 
knowledge between themselves within organisations. Strictly speaking, such 
knowledge is not necessarily transmitted in whole, in the sense that some 
people hold such knowledge until they die, the fact that HIV and AIDS affect 
people in their prime years, one can argue, quite generally, that the process 
by which knowledge is transferred within organisations is being clogged mid-
way. In the case of Namibia, this creates serious problems for governability 
mainly if the person referenced possesses a highly sought after skill, because, 
as I have alluded earlier, only 15% of the approximately 40,000 civil servants 
who returned from exile had post-secondary education. Because the 
apartheid system ensured rigorous education for employees of the state, it 
would appear that some are highly trained, and their death as a result of AIDS 
means that such skills may be lost forever, particularly since the government 
seems unable to attract newly trained professionals. This is worrying, because 
it is clear that moving forward, the governance institutions at the level of 
nation state would find it difficult to operate without an injection of newly 
trained people. Again, this is not difficult to see because we are officially part 
of a ‘knowledge-based society’, which society requires concerted efforts to 
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safeguard organisational knowledge. Therefore my assertion that the impact 
of HIV and AIDS on the process of knowledge formation will endanger 
governance in Namibia cannot be trivialised, but must be seen in the context 
of Namibia’s constrained knowledge base, the inability to fill such gaps and 
the relatively low understanding that such gaps may create macro-systemic 
impacts which may eventually pose a threat to future governability of the 
country. 
 
At the micro-systemic level, as I have stated in earlier sections, when people 
in key positions of the Ministry die, not only is the institution affected in terms 
of how it does business at the national level, but these are likely to trickle 
down to the regional offices as well. Applying the knowledge-sharing 
continuum518 analysis to the organisation of the Ministry of Education, one 
could argue, quite generally, that even in the absence of an in-depth 
knowledge readiness assessment, there is a constant pulling of knowledge 
between the various structures, in that employees of the various structures 
require knowledge from someone other than themselves to complete tasks. 
There is an evident intrinsic knowledge-dependency among the various 
structures, wherefore staff in lower units of the organisation exhibits relatively 
high dependency on staff in higher structures. Fathomably, because the 
nature of the structure, following a lean line of authority to the national level, 	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means that people on the upper levels of the structure are mandated certain 
control over the business of the lower structures. When respondents were 
asked whether there is evidence of disruption at the lower level when 
someone at the national level dies or resigns as a result of illness, one senior 
member puts things this way: “Obviously, the various structures of the Ministry 
are interlinked in the sense that the reporting structure is clear to everyone. 
There are things that the lower level structures can carry out on their own, but 
in most cases, the head office must approve this to ensure they are in line 
with the Ministry’s mandate. Also, the lack of properly trained staff at the lower 
levels means they require continuous input from the head office.”519  
 
This statement is an admission that things cannot be carried out without the 
continual involvement of the head office. Similarly, the inability of the regional 
offices to attract qualified staff means the lower level structures are always 
under-capacitated, requiring constant feedback from the upper structures for 
work to be completed. Therefore when evaluating the business organisation 
of the Ministry of Education as an institution on the basis of the knowledge-
sharing continuum framework, it is clear that its movement towards 
knowledge independence is inherently constrained. This means that HIV and 
AIDS impacts are readily replicated through the various levels when a skilled 
personnel is lost due to illness or death. In other words, not only is the 
process of knowledge formation constricted within the organisation of the 
Ministry at the head office level, but also the impacts become more so evident 
at the local levels, thereby impacting on how schools are being run. This is in 
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addition to the process of knowledge formation being constricted at the 
regional, circuit and cluster levels by the loss of skilled people in these 
structures, which skills, as I have said earlier, are already in short supply. 
Therefore we are beginning to see that in addition to impacting the process of 
knowledge formation and transfer between learners and teachers in the 
classroom, the disruption of the process of knowledge formation within the 
institution and the related structures also affect the learning environment by 
impacting the way in which schools are run more efficiently. It could therefore 
be argued that whichever way one looks at it, the magnitude of the impacts on 
the interactions of the various systems of governance is beyond our 
understanding. Perhaps utilising the framework of tacit knowledge to 
demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS on organisational knowledge 
formation serves a higher purpose- in as much as we know the multifaceted 
nature of the impacts of HIV and AIDS, such knowledge is ineffable in that we 
are unable to articulate these impacts clearly. What can be said however is 
that AIDS has located itself among the brightest of society, thereby taking 
away the drivers of business operation. In today’s knowledge based society, 
the impacts are more so evident, because knowledge is the key commodity of 
business operation. Thus our defectiveness as humans to articulate and 
describe what we know means that AIDS- as it compounds the problem by 
obstructing our attempt to overcome such defectiveness- has become the 
most potent problem facing the human race. It would appear that the only 
viable solution for these institutions of governance is in stopping the spread of 
the virus, but paradoxically their ability to deal with the spread of HIV has 
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been rendered ineffective in stopping the very agent that is weakening these 
institutions. 
 
Summative intergenerational knowledge impacts of HIV and AIDS 
 
The impact of AIDS has reverberated every system of governance in Namibia. 
Whilst the above analysis was restricted to the two levels of governances to 
demonstrate the impact of HIV and AIDS on the sectoral governances, I need 
to refer back to the summative impact framework presented in earlier 
sections. In this framework, I have demonstrated how HIV and AIDS impact 
the various governances as they interact in varying horizontal and vertical 
densities. The analysis presented above served to substantiate this 
framework and must put to rest any doubt that the impact of HIV and AIDS on 
one system of governance filters through to all other structures, thereby 
endangering fundamental systems of governance. In a sense, and as I have 
alluded in the methodology section of this research, the education system is 
the quintessence of the flow of impact from the lower to the higher levels of 
socio-political aggregation in Namibia. What this means is that when gaps are 
created in the school system, the ability of the institutions of governance at 
the level of nation state to carry out its mandate is limited. Limitations are 
created because when school enrolment is reduced due to parents and 
children being infected with HIV, orphanhood and absenteeism and death of 
teachers, the amount of people available to work in the institutions of 
governance is reduced. Because this thesis characterises education as the 
means through which society creates norms for harmonious living with others; 
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as an important element for good governance and participatory democracy, 
and the means to create what Rosenau refers to as the governors and the 
governables, a defect in this system creates trouble for governability. At the 
same time, when gaps are created at the institutional level as a result of 
employee absence and death, service delivery is disrupted and in the case of 
Namibia, the schools are at the receiving end of such losses, because the 
Ministry of Education is the purveyor of education in Namibia and thereby 
directly responsible for schools. A I have put forward earlier, because the 
impacts of HIV and AIDS are circular within and across the systems of 
governance, HIV and AIDS have become a complex vicious circle that 
reinforces itself through the iteration of impacts between the schooling system 
and the institutions of governance at the level of nation state. Therefore, the 
best way in which the nascent governance systems’ (for example the 
schooling system) impacts can be understood is in the context of its 
intertwining impacts with the institutional systems of governance. In 
summative terms, the impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the 
sectoral governances, but structured, and in the long run, may endanger the 
fundamental systems of governance. I have earlier referred to the 
interdependency of the various systems of governance in Namibia; therefore 
the impacts easily pass through the various systems somewhat unimpeded. 
On this account, one can argue that there is no better place to demonstrate 
the impacts of HIV and AIDS as they impact the interplay of the various actors 
on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of political aggregation than Namibia. 
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
I have presented the various mechanisms through which governance 
emerges, with the family, at the micro level, being the most basic, but yet the 
most crucial and necessary foundation for all order and morality. It follows, 
that the fundamental systems of governance are endangered if the institution 
of the family is not governable. The education system was presented as 
another form of governance at the meso level, which not only re-enforces and 
produces the governable but generates the governors. I have presented 
education, not only as the learning of techniques, but as the pillar for 
governance, for it helps people understand what it is to be a citizen and 
sustain democracy by encouraging full participation of citizens in political, 
social and economic life. Increasingly, education will play a key role as we 
move towards an integrated society with new democratic space facilitated by 
the rapid development of technology. At the same time I described how this 
system is highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. I have 
discussed the more formal macro level governance, and pronounced that the 
term government and governance had the same etymological roots and 
hence were regarded to mean the same thing. However, with criticisms 
exerted over the glaring failure of governments to maintain social and 
economic order, did it dawn on people that governance not only encompass 
the work of government, but also include all other mechanisms of control. 
Therefore, I have adopted Rosenau’s conceptualisation of governance as a 
summative phenomenon, that is the sum of all governances, premised on 
various orders or criticality, including the necessity of the process of 
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knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In a sense, summative 
governance is the way in which the various levels of governance interact in 
varying horizontal and vertical densities, with the process of knowledge 
formation being the grease that allows these systems to interact smoothly and 
act as the string that holds them together. The major question I set out to 
explore was how HIV and AIDS impact the various levels of systems of 
governance and how this is likely affected through impacting the process of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer. In addition, the 
research aimed to demonstrate that the necessity of intergenerational 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer that sustain these systems is 
generally assumed and to show how the systems of governances that sustain 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer are highly 
vulnerable to disruptions.  
 
I have referred to HIV and AIDS impacts on the systems of governance as 
long-waved, gradual, subdued and daunting. The summative governance 
framework and the intergenerational knowledge framework, in combination, 
provided the most formidable way in which these long waved, daunting, subtle 
and subdued impacts of HIV and AIDS could be understood. The summative 
governance framework proved the most appropriate to demarcate the impacts 
as they move through each of the structures in varying horizontal and vertical 
densities, at the same time that the framework of intergenerational knowledge 
helps us understand how HIV and AIDS disrupts the continuity through 
change of the governance systems. In other words, the framework of 
intergenerational knowledge challenges the traditional conception of how 
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continuity through change is maintained. I referred to knowledge as the order 
of criticality for governance in the sense that we cannot imagine functionality 
of these systems, let alone our existence as humans, without some degree of 
knowledge. I have presented the framework of knowledge formation as the 
best lens through which the long waved impacts of HIV and AIDS on these 
levels of governance could be understood, because as I have put forward, the 
evolution of governance from long run equilibria of processes is in itself the 
function of the evolution of knowledge- for knowledge is the necessary 
condition for the various levels of governances to interact between actors on 
the micro-, meso- and macro-levels of socio-political aggregation.  
 
To quell any doubt that because knowledge can be inscribed in books, 
manuals, documents, and databases, and therefore easily transmittable; I 
have adopted the tacit knowledge framework proposed by Michael Polanyi 
that views knowledge as ineffable. Such knowledge can only be passed 
through non-explicit means, because as Polanyi articulates “an art that cannot 
be specified in detail cannot be passed on by prescription since no such 
prescription exist for it”.520 It follows that because such knowledge can only be 
transferred among people, as it is carried in strings of symbolically encoded 
meanings, it requires constant contact between people in their everyday 
interactions. I have gone a step further to propose that the process by which 
tacit knowledge is shared is largely intergenerational, because according to 
Polanyi, such knowledge is passed through learning from example, like from a 
master (a carrier of tradition) to an apprentice. In communities and household 
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settings, intergenerational transmission of knowledge is fundamental and the 
process by which knowledge is transferred is through tradition kept in the 
memories of the elders throughout generations. In general terms, knowledge 
is passed on through observation, performances, storytelling and ceremonial 
practices because the area into which such knowledge extends is tacit. I 
argue that knowledge formation, retention and transfer in organisational 
settings, especially as it pertains to the tacit dimension is also 
intergenerational. Intergenerational in that it is the type that is embedded in 
experiences, beliefs, perspectives and values that individuals accumulate 
over successive years of their lives, which they pass on to the younger 
generation through non-explicit means, because as I have put forward, such 
knowledge is hard to articulate with formal language. Polanyi’s contention that 
tacit knowledge is accumulated, for example, by a master craftsman who after 
years of experience develops a wealth of expertise at his fingertips, is 
testimony to his belief that the process of knowledge formation is, to a large 
extent, intergenerational. 
 
Namibia provided the best case study because of the interdependency of the 
various systems of governance, which makes it easier for the impacts to pass 
through the various systems somewhat unimpeded. At independence, the 
future of Namibia was severely constrained from the legacy of apartheid, 
making a move towards real independence and development minimal, such 
that many commentators agreed that only a “few countries have started in 
such a heavily determined context”.521 This question is often explored within 
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the context of the legacy of the colonial history, because at present, the varied 
forms in which every activity is acted out and staged, whether individually or 
collectively, reflects the colonial history of this country. The present mnescope 
portrays the colonial history, and therefore justifies situating the governance 
structures within the context of the enduring struggle for independence. The 
case can be argued that these pre-independent periods went beyond reifying 
racial and ethnic division throughout the country, but as Tapscott eloquently 
alludes, went to the extent that different communities were segregated 
geographically, economically and socially, with the bitterness engendered by 
war and by the racist practices of apartheid rule presenting a real threat to a 
peaceful post-independent Namibia.522 As I have said in earlier sections, the 
threat lies in protracted disruptions and in some instances retardation of some 
important indigenous systems of rules, which systems I perceive not only to 
include those of the state, but every other command mechanisms that perform 
functions, irrespective of whether these systems have evolved institutions. I 
earlier defined these to include command mechanisms at every level of 
human activity.  
 
Clearly and whilst Namibia is heralded as a model for reconciliation and inter-
party constitutional reformation for the rest of Africa, many scholars believe 
that “...the task of promoting greater social equity has yet to be adequately 
addressed.”523 Therefore we bear testimony to the subtle, daunting and long 
waved impacts of colonisation in these structures of governance. On this 
account, it is reasonable to argue that there is no better place to demonstrate 	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the impacts of HIV and AIDS as they impact the interplay of the various actors 
on micro-, meso-, and macro-levels of political aggregation than Namibia. At 
the same time though, the implication of the protracted period of colonisation 
meant that Namibia inherited very strong institutions at the level of nation 
state, and in the process was spared from the ominous danger so often 
associated with newly independent states in Africa. Nonetheless and 
notwithstanding HIV infection and AIDS remain at pandemic levels and the 
impacts on governance institutions at the national and local levels are 
frightening. There is evident deterioration of social welfare indicators. General 
levels of life expectancy, literacy, and schools enrolment have been falling as 
a result of high morbidity and mortality. Life expectancy has declined to levels 
seen during pre-industrial ages. Because life expectancy is low and 
prevalence is high, high profile personnel are lost in their active years in 
sectors as diverse as the military, the civil service, the private sector, the 
educational system, industry and other indigenous sectors such as 
agriculture. This has the potential for institutional collapse, which may in the 
long run undermine governance. This proves the vulnerability of the systems 
of rules to disruptions and fragmentations, which in turn also affects the 
process by which knowledge is formed, retained and transferred. This should 
not be hard to see because this thesis characterises governance as a 
summative phenomenon, in that governance cannot only be seen as 
encompassing the work of government, but that of every command 
mechanism at every level of human activity.  
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Synopsis of major findings 
 
The main findings were presented in the preceding chapters six and seven: 
Namibia HIV and AIDS related governance liabilities and Intergenerational 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer impacts of HIV and AIDS on 
sectoral and summative governances. The result confirms that the various 
levels of systems of governance, on the micro, meso and macro levels, are 
highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations, but more so in Namibia, a 
country that endured one of the harshest forms of colonisation. Situating 
Namibia’s governance systems within the context of the enduring struggle for 
independence reminded us of the effects of the pre-independence periods on 
the susceptibility of these systems to disruptions and fragmentations. The 
point was made that the governance systems in Namibia were severely 
constrained from the legacy of apartheid, making them highly susceptible to 
fragmentations. This has become ever more so evident with the onset of HIV 
and AIDS. Situating the vulnerabilities of these system within the historical 
context also served to remind us that the Namibian epidemics express 
particular configurations of social, cultural and economic orders, and occur on 
various templates of social relations, necessitated by years of oppression. 
These are complex interactions of social norms and networks, sexual 
ideology, and behaviours that research has been unable to uncover, because 
such is not viewed in the broader socioeconomic, political and most 
importantly, historical context. As I have put forward earlier, inroads against 
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the epidemics in all likelihood have remained inadequate because these 
social templates are less understood and continue to be reproduced.524  
 
Using the example of the migrant labour system, I have demonstrated how 
this was fundamental to the disruption of family lives. The system of migration 
was the precursor to wife neglect, sexual violence and the culture of polygamy 
and extra marital affairs, all of which are still evident in Namibia. The long 
years of migrant labour system also meant that men, who would normally 
have one monogamous relationship, were put into situations that encouraged 
polygamous relationships, which over time, also led to breakdown of families. 
The vulnerabilities of this structure of governance must therefore be viewed in 
the context of its historical progression. Today, HIV and AIDS is able to put 
severe stress on this important institution, which often results in families 
disintegrating as social and economic units. Most importantly, when this 
happens, not only do families lose important members of their households, 
but in more extended terms, family life is disrupted and ruptured, their 
traditional roles and responsibilities are altered and the process of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer is retarded.    
 
Similarly, I have shown, how, on the meso levels, the racially prescribed 
schooling system created acute disparities and inequalities to unimaginable 
proportions. Because education was not seen as a right for blacks but a 
privilege reserved for the whites, only a few ill equipped and poorly staffed 
and financed schools were made available to black people, effectively limiting 
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schooling to a few. A large number of the population, especially those from 
the peripheral tribes of the Himbas, Zembas and San were excluded from the 
education system because after all, it did not matter to the settler 
administration whether these children attended school or not. At 
independence, Namibia inherited an education system in a state of chaos, 
designed to perpetuate apartheid rather than provide the necessary human 
resource base to promote equitable social and economic development. The 
implication is that the ability of this important governance system to provide 
the firewall against such things as HIV and AIDS was undermined. The 
system’s accountability to ensure that the process of knowledge formation is 
safeguarded was compromised. I have demonstrated how, in the context of 
HIV and AIDS, it is not only important to maintain stability in this sector for the 
sake of preserving knowledge transfer to younger generations, but to mitigate 
the macro-economic impact as well.  
 
The vulnerability on the macro level should not be too hard to discern. On the 
local governance levels, the local governance systems, which performed 
important functions that extended beyond land management and included 
such things as religious, judiciary, military and administrative managements 
were disintegrated through systematic and carefully planned strategy of divide 
and rule. I have demonstrated how, in areas of the north, these structures 
were known to have been well organised and part of a complex political and 
religious organisation overseeing the management of natural resources 
amidst the fragile ecological setting. With colonisation and the policy of 
apartheid, there was a persistent and consistent barrage to dismantle these 
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traditional structures and instead new structures for the purpose of expanding 
the mandate of the settler communities were instituted, which fundamentally 
changed their traditional roles. Whilst the absolute powers of these structures 
were increased, their legitimacy was undermined because they (the structures 
and the chiefs) were no longer regarded as potential allies in the struggle for 
independence. In the context of the summative governance framework, one 
could argue, quite generally, that there was local government but no 
governance. Over the years, the functions of these traditional structures were 
diminished to the extent that their role became marginal in the new political 
dispensation.  They no longer occupied the space between the family and the 
state, but instead they were replaced by a system of local governance 
characterised by decentralisation of activities to regional and local councils. 
Today these structures no longer play their vital traditional role of dealing with 
diverse issues such as solving local problems, solving conflicts and disputes, 
dealing with risks and disasters, and promoting sustainable practices such as 
those dealing with environmental protection. In a sense, they have been 
rendered ineffective to play a role in the prevention and mitigation of the 
impact of HIV and AIDS. These locally based structures bear a heavy burden 
and experience the epidemic’s impact on their own operation and evolution as 
well.  
 
At the national governance level however, I argued that because Namibia was 
the last settler oligarchy, which does not share the same characteristics as 
many other neopatrimonial regimes in Africa, it inherited very strong 
institutions at the level of nation state, and in the process was spared from the 
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ominous danger so often associated with newly independent states in Africa. 
Because the indigenous structures of governance were repressed and 
replaced with colonial administration set up to legitimise the colonial and 
apartheid systems, power was centralised to the national government 
comprising highly educated and powerful individuals carefully selected for this 
purpose. This was further legitimised by instruments of law that denied 
political rights for ethnic minorities, but encouraged functioning democracy in 
their microcosmic enclaves- characterised by regular elections, leadership 
turnover, opposition, independent courts and some degree of press freedom 
all of which were reserved for whites.525  In the process, strong institutions 
were established making the transition towards independence somewhat 
seamless. From the summative governance framework adopted for this 
thesis, which characterises governance to emerge from a long run equilibria 
of processes, it should not be difficult to see that the vulnerability of this 
system results as well from the vulnerability of the other levels of governance 
due to their inherent interdependency. I have presented the HIV and AIDS 
summative impact framework to show the full effect of the pandemic as it 
moves in waves from the nascent to the fully institutionalised mechanisms of 
control. Therefore, understanding the vulnerability of this fundamental level of 
governance requires that this be understood in the context of the intertwining 
impacts engendered by the various levels of governance. I have postulated 
that HIV and AIDS not only impacts the sectoral governances in isolation, but 
adopted the view that it affects the interplay between these systems from a 
lower to a higher order, that is, the interplay between the formal, non-formal, 
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state and non-state governances. Notwithstanding, because the settler 
community was part and parcel of the transition to independence, and all the 
civil servants of the state were kept in position by law, most of which were 
highly trained, this creates serious problems of shortage of skills when one of 
these people should resign or die. Coupled with the fact that only 15% of the 
approximately 40,000 civil servants who returned from exile had post-
secondary education, the multitude of vulnerabilities for this structure of 
governance should be comprehendible.   
 
Because my contention is that the necessity of intergenerational knowledge 
formation, retention and transfer for the purpose of sustaining the flow of the 
governance systems from a lower to a higher order is generally assumed, I 
have utilised the knowledge framework to help us conceptualise the flow of 
impacts across the various levels of governance. Consequently, I have 
elevated knowledge to the level of criticality for governance to emerge from 
long run equilibria of processes and also as the necessary condition for the 
various systems of governance, from a higher to a lower order, to interact 
between actors on micro, meso and macro levels of socio-political 
aggregation. In chapter seven of this thesis, I have demonstrated how HIV 
and AIDS affects the knowledge formation of the institution of governance 
through mainly affecting how knowledge is formed, retained and transferred 
between people. The process of knowledge formation is evolutionary and 
sequential, with the institution of the family being the first transmitter of such 
knowledge. I have posited that good family governance is increasingly a 
crucial element for peace and development and fundamental to the well being 
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of society and by extension the security of states, primarily because they 
transmit the knowledge necessary for maintenance of peace and order.  But 
we now bear witness to how, in the most severely affected countries of the 
world, the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within family 
settings is disrupted as a result of HIV and AIDS. Experience of parents being 
sick and dying as a result of AIDS is the harshest thing a child has to deal with 
and because, as I have put forward, it disrupts the hierarchy of authority to 
which they submit themselves for the purpose of intergenerational knowledge 
formation and transfer. As the theory of tacit knowledge would assert, learning 
is first a-critical and children would surrender themselves to the knowledge of 
their parents and older siblings, it is not hard to see how a sick or dying parent 
easily relegates the authority as the main transmitter of knowledge. Suffice to 
say, knowledge to which these children ought to submit to is tacit, in that it 
cannot be said precisely, because it is carried in symbolically encoded 
meaning, and at the same time, it cannot easily be accessed through 
formalised systems, therefore the loss is greater in the context of HIV and 
AIDS. I have earlier alluded to the intergenerational nature of the trajectories 
of the impact of HIV and AIDS, because children born to HIV positive parents 
may grow to be orphans, who may grow up to be infected, but perhaps before 
they themselves have had children, who will also become orphans. In a 
sense, when families are disrupted as a result of HIV and AIDS, it not only 
raises questions of loss of income but raises problems for the process of 
intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer for successive 
generations. Because our identities, values and epistemologies are all learned 
and shaped in family contexts, and when the process of intergenerational 
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knowledge formation for one generation is disrupted, the entire spectrum of 
life bears the repercussions and creates disjuncture in the process of 
knowledge transmission for the rest of the other structures, not only for the 
current generations but for future generations as well. In the context of the 
summative framework adopted for this thesis, this creates problems for 
current and future governability at the macro level of socio-political 
aggregation.  
 
Similarly, through formal and informal education, we learn our values, 
identities and epistemologies. But in these high prevalence countries, when 
people are infected with HIV and AIDS, education is one among other things 
that loses its appeal and sometimes, even relevance. This is not hard to see 
because many activities that used to be attractive when life expectancies 
were normal are replaced with important things such as taking care of the 
sick. I have shown how the education system in Namibia, as the key 
mechanism for knowledge formation, is under the barrage as a result of HIV 
and AIDS and how it fails to address the fundamental question of what 
learning is all about.  I have also shown that the impacts on the process of 
knowledge formation for the schooling system are multifaceted and omni 
present, involving the family, the child, other children and teachers. First, not 
only does a loss of parent create knowledge liability within the household 
setting, but also, learning becomes a problem when children are denied the 
opportunity to learn at home, putting their educational prospects in jeopardy. 
Because the theory of tacit knowledge adopted for this thesis views 
knowledge as a reflection of one’s personal life events, children who have 
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been robbed of the opportunity to learn some critical skills from their parents 
come to the learning process with heavily constrained life experiences. As a 
result, the learning process is also inhibited, because these children construct 
knowledge from a base of prior knowledge. Second, experience of living with 
HIV or AIDS severely alters the learning process of children because of 
stigmatisation and discrimination by others or self-infliction often associated 
with it. I have highlighted how stigma and discrimination are the hardest things 
a child could ever experience. When children are subjected to stigma and 
discrimination, they enter the process of learning in heavily constrained 
states, the implication of which is constricted interaction between the learner 
and teacher, thereby affecting the learning environment. Third, with the 
learner-centered approach of the Namibian schooling system requiring 
greater interaction amongst learners, it raises problems with the learning 
process when other learners are also infected with HIV. In a sense, because 
the process by which knowledge is transmitted in classroom settings is not 
only intergenerational, but multi generational, it requires that the impact on 
knowledge formation, retention and transfer be understood in the context of 
their intertwining effects on other learners and teachers. When, as I have 
demonstrated, a student is infected with HIV, the interaction with other 
students is also affected, therefore robbing the group of possibly their active 
and bright member. Fourth, I have shown how the omnipresent nature of HIV 
and AIDS makes it impossible for the schooling system to escape its 
onslaught. Those children lucky enough not to be infected or orphaned face 
the prospect of losing teachers to HIV and AIDS. I have demonstrated how 
being infected with HIV affects teachers in various ways; including frequent 
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absence from school, the loss of confidence in teaching and thus lack of 
attention and the stigma associated with students’ knowledge of the status of 
the teacher.  Evidently, the greatest impact on the schooling system is the 
loss of a teacher due to illness or death as a result of HIV and AIDS 
respectively, because the teacher is the key driver of the process of learning 
in a classroom. 
 
Correspondingly, the theory of tacit knowledge is dominantly used in 
organisational studies as it challenges the traditional input-process-output 
conception of organisational knowledge studies. The theory, as adopted and 
further developed by Nonaka and Takeushi views organisations as knowledge 
creating machines, because, “while new knowledge is developed by 
individuals, organizations play a critical role in articulating and amplifying that 
knowledge.”526 The knowledge to which this refers to is tacit, which knowledge 
remains unidentified until when it is necessary and impossible to do without it. 
I have expressed how such knowledge is hard to articulate with formal 
language as it is embedded in such things as individual experiences, personal 
beliefs, perspectives and value systems held by individuals within an 
organisation. The Ministry of Education was presented as the quintessential of 
the flow of impacts of HIV and AIDS on intergenerational knowledge 
formation, retention and transfer. It is the purveyor of knowledge and the key 
institution mandated by an act of parliament to lead the country’s knowledge 
creation agenda. At the macro-systemic level, this institution is robbed of 
highly knowledgeable people when HIV and AIDS struck. As highlighted in 
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previous sections, to ensure continuity and transfer of knowledge, at 
independence an agreement was reached to keep the civil servants, some of 
whom have been with the system for many years. I earlier referred to how 
apartheid ensured rigorous education for employees of the state and how the 
current government struggles with attracting newly trained professionals. In 
the event that one of these highly trained personnel should die as a result of 
AIDS, serious knowledge gaps are created within this key institution of 
governance. On the macro-systemic level, the impact of HIV and AIDS on the 
process of knowledge formation in this key institution will endanger 
governance in Namibia, because there is an inherent inability to fill the 
knowledge gaps. What is more, the relatively low perception that such gaps 
may create macro-systemic impacts, which may eventually pose a threat to 
future governability of the country, is worrisome. Using the Ministry of 
Education, I have demonstrated how, at the micro-systemic level, the loss of 
knowledge filters through the other structures of governance almost 
unhindered, due to the structure of the education system in Namibia. Because 
of the nature of the structure of the education system, following a lean line of 
authority to the national level, people on the upper levels of the structure are 
mandated certain control over the business of the lower structures, effectively 
creating an intrinsic knowledge-dependency among the various structures. It 
follows that the staff in lower units of the organisation exhibit relatively high 
dependency on staff in higher structures. It is clear that HIV and AIDS impacts 
are readily replicated through the various levels of the structure. In other 
words, not only is the process of knowledge formation constricted within the 
organisation of the Ministry at the head office level, but also the impacts 
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become more so evident at the local levels, thereby impacting on how schools 
are being run. Because, as I have said, knowledge is the key commodity of 
business operation, HIV and AIDS essentially take away the drivers of 
business operation within the Ministry of Education, thereby creating problems 
of governability across all the structures of governance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, the analysis confirms the hypothesis that the impacts of HIV and 
AIDS are circular within and across the systems of governance, and that HIV 
and AIDS have become a complex vicious circle that reinforces itself through 
the iteration of impacts throughout all the levels of governance. In more 
extended terms, the impacts are not merely additive and isolated to the 
sectoral governances, but are summative, intergenerational and structured, 
thereby beginning to endanger the fundamental systems of governance. 
Therefore, the demographic impacts, the effects of the institution of the family 
and deficiencies created in the education system mean that the ability of the 
government to function properly is seriously undermined. Government’s ability 
to deal with the very agent that is weakening it has been rendered ineffective. 
As I have put forward in earlier sections, these are no longer projections, 
because evidences are piling up that government’s ability to deal with the 
epidemic has been weakened; children no longer attend school as a result of 
being orphaned or being sick; teachers are dying as a result of AIDS and 
organisations are losing employees due to HIV related illnesses and death, all 
of which create liabilities for the process of knowledge formation, retention 
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and transfer. The fact that people are not falling dead in streets cannot be 
seen as a sign of the ability of nations to deal with HIV and AIDS. The 
ameliorative powers of antiretrovirals (ARVs) have evidently changed people’s 
perception of the devastating impact of HIV and AIDS. But, I argue that ARVs 
may have offered us with a temporary reprieve because the impacts of HIV 
and AIDS are yet to be felt in the coming years. 
 
I have referred to HIV and AIDS impacts on the systems of governance as 
long-waved, gradual, subdued and daunting and how the concept of 
knowledge helps us understand these impacts. How knowledge is germane to 
the evolution of the systems of governance from a lower to higher order and 
how the process of knowledge formation and transfer facilitates both the 
vertical and horizontal interactions of the governance actors has largely been 
ignored in contemporary literature on governance. The concept is less 
understood in literature on AIDS, specifically in terms of how HIV and AIDS 
affect the process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer within and 
across the various systems. Therefore, strictly speaking, I have opted to enter 
into an unknown territory, or more appropriately into one of the least 
researched fields, not because of a sense of bravery, but because I feel the 
need to add to human endeavor to find solutions to a rather pressing issue. 
Be that as it may, I have adopted the theory of tacit knowledge to show how 
HIV and AIDS affect the process of knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer. This theory proved useful in that it refers to the hard to articulate 
knowledge with formal language, the type that is embedded in experiences, 
beliefs, perspectives and values that individuals hold. Such knowledge is 
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ineffable in that it cannot be understood by looking at how people 
communicate to each other. As such, tacit knowledge cannot be stored but 
only transmitted from individuals to individuals. Utilising this theory also 
proved useful because the mechanisms through which knowledge is 
transferred in these systems are complex. The theory of tacit knowledge 
transcends the earlier theories of knowledge in that it is not only concerned 
with propositional knowledge and the intrinsic value that it possesses, but with 
how people learn from each other. In a sense, it provides an intellectual 
discourse around how the process of knowledge formation is possible. 
However, I have limited my analysis to the process of knowledge formation in 
households, schools and organisations respectively. It should be noted that 
because knowledge formation is a product of interweaving factors in 
successive stages of a person’s life, therefore the boundaries between the 
socially and institutionally situated knowledge is always open. As I have 
demonstrated, when the process of knowledge formation in the schools is 
constrained as a result of parents, teachers and learners falling ill and dying, 
the knowledge gaps are replicated in the other systems of governance. In 
other words, HIV and AIDS reduce the pool of the knowing people that the 
institutions of governance, like the Ministry of Education needs in order to 
operate more effectively, at the same time that it creates the institutional 
knowledge gaps in the Ministry of Education, thereby reducing its ability to 
create the necessary instruments to facilitate the process of knowledge 
formation in schools. Ultimately, whichever way one looks at the sectoral 
knowledge gaps created by HIV and AIDS, the bottom line remains; because, 
as Simon would postulate, summative governance refers to a complex 
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hierarchical structure, characterised by multilevel structures, each of which 
depend in an aggregate way on each other527, it follows that knowledge gaps 
created in any of these structures exponentially replicate across all the 
structures. What is more, because HIV and AIDS simultaneously create 
knowledge gaps within each of these structures, the impacts are indeed more 
than summative, but are highly structured, thereby endangering the 
fundamental systems of governance at the level of nation state. 
 
Theoretical and policy implications 
 
Whilst the framework of summative governance provided the first step 
towards viewing governance as the complex web of multi-level governance 
structures, it nevertheless does not sufficiently address the most important 
question of how continuity through change is maintained. There has been a 
lot of scholarly work conducted over the years on organisational knowledge 
management, some of which also made reference to the necessity of 
intergenerational knowledge. Nevertheless they all fail to address knowledge 
in its totality and how the evolution of knowledge is maintained and predicated 
upon certain micro, meso and macro societal conditions, including the 
necessity of the governance systems themselves to sustain the process of 
knowledge formation. The theoretical case for intergenerational knowledge 
formation, retention and transfer therefore needs to be revisited in order to 
further understand the various orders of criticality that sustain the flow and 
interactions of the various levels of systems of governance between actors on 
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the micro, meso and macro levels of socio-political aggregation. In a sense, 
the summative governance framework, whilst acknowledging what Rosenau 
refers to as the unpredictability, messiness, complexity and dynamism of this 
system, and the complex web in which these various governances must 
interact, cannot on its own, account for what makes the system function in 
summative terms. It would appear, therefore that a new theoretical and or 
conceptual model, capturing the various socio-political imperatives of 
summative governance is required. Such model would help us understand the 
flow of impacts of HIV and AIDS (or any other adversity for that matter), as 
they move in both vertical and horizontal directions. 
 
Understanding the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, 
retention and transfer for the purposes of both sectoral and summative 
governances is an important step in helping us conceptualise and therefore 
address the impact, not only of HIV and AIDS, but any other problem that 
affects the continuity of these governance systems. The research further 
supports the argument that the reciprocity of the governance systems that 
sustain the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and 
transfer are highly vulnerable to disruptions and fragmentations. If (as argued 
here), HIV and AIDS affect the interactions of the various systems, from a 
lower to a higher order, through affecting the process of knowledge formation, 
retention and transfer and the inherent vulnerabilities of the various systems 
of governance are indicative of their inability to withstand the multifaceted 
threat posed by HIV and AIDS, then the findings that the impacts are circular 
both within and across the various systems have the following theoretical 
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implications: First, the necessity of intergenerational knowledge formation, 
retention and transfer cannot continue to be assumed if we are to start 
addressing these core issues, more so in the wake of HIV and AIDS. 
Therefore, once these core issues are understood, we can start 
comprehensively addressing the fundamental questions of how best to deal 
with these less than obvious issues. Second, the point can be made that 
addressing the more subtle impacts of HIV and AIDS needs further 
understanding. The major problem, as it were, is with the emergency type 
response adopted in response to HIV and AIDS, focusing on the most obvious 
issues, which in many respects has shrouded intellectual discourse on the 
subtle impacts. Symptomatically, our analysis has often been preoccupied 
with the quantifiable (gross or crude) impacts, thereby limiting the ability to 
deal with the subtle impacts in the most effective ways.  
 
On policy level, it is clear that we are a long way off addressing these less-
than-obvious issues. But the fact that these are difficult to understand and 
analyse is not enough reason to pretend that they do not exist. The impacts 
on the process of intergenerational knowledge formation continue to be 
reproduced, with the schooling system being at the receiving end of this. 
Paradoxically, the system is the key to filling the gap in our knowledge about 
these issues, at the same time that it is the very system that facilitates the 
process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer. It transpires that HIV 
and AIDS may abrogate the status of the system as the purveyor of the 
process of knowledge formation, retention and transfer.  But this hyperbolic 
pessimism can only be viewed in relation to the system’s inability to provide 
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the firewall against a force that threatens to alter the very reason for which it is 
required- in other words, its accountability to ensure that the process of 
knowledge formation is safeguarded. In a sense, understanding and 
attempting to tackle the problem that is weakening the very reason for which it 
exists should be the greatest motivation and focus of any intervention 
facilitated by principals of the institutions of governance at the macro level. 
Policy review, which will enable the various systems of governance to address 
the issue of how HIV and AIDS impact the governance systems that sustain 
the process of intergenerational knowledge formation, retention and transfer, 
especially in this high prevalence country, is an imperative, though 
challenging. Disconcertingly, the reciprocity and the systematic relationship of 
the governance systems that sustain intergenerational knowledge and the 
knowledge that sustains these governance systems are not well understood, 
which to a large extent creates problems for policy formulation and 
implementation. In the context of HIV and AIDS, these issues cannot be 
treated as though they were epiphenomenal, and/or divergent, because it is 
not only common sense that tackling one issue may solve only a fraction of 
the problem, but that addressing the summative impacts of HIV and AIDS also 
means that a summative approach is required. Admittedly, these issues are 
not easy to address, but then it is also important to recognise that, as I have 
stated in the introduction of this thesis, human social systems self-consistently 
generate complex problems, requiring that our responses (through our 
policies, strategies, programmes, plans and activities) reflect our adaptive 
capacity to deal with these complex issues. However difficult and challenging 
these issues are, as long as they pose challenges for our established systems 
	   -­‐313-­‐	  
of rules that ensure our continual existence, and as long as we have an 
awareness of the extent to which they pose threats, we have the capacity to 
confront these issues head-on, and our policies are the instruments through 
which our desire to confront such societal problems are expounded.  Worth 
noting however, is that one problem, often and consistently overlooked (either 
in policy formulation and implementation) is the demographic realities of 
Namibia as the most sparsely populated country in the world after Mongolia, 
making a move towards coordinated efforts to eradicate HIV and AIDS 
extremely complex. Concomitantly, this cannot be used as an excuse 
because whilst statistics always emerge with every research in Namibia on 
the impact of HIV and AIDS on all facets of society, this is never followed with 
extensive intellectual analysis that will put the country on a road map to deal 
with these issues in the most effective way. I hope this thesis will act as 
stimulus to undertake further research on these difficult issues. In all important 
respects, the enviable Namibian constitution provides the necessary 
foundation to thrive amidst the constraints and adversities, and therefore 
Namibia’s future is her own to make. 
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